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It is not unlikely that a new security/trust protocol, with 
the magnitude of the influence from the invention of the 
public-key protocol, [will be] inspired by the study of 
animal communication networks.   
– Prof. Zhanshan Ma, 
Chinese Academy of Sciences, 2009 
 
Abstract This paper applies biomimetic engineering to the 
problem of permissionless Byzantine consensus and achieves 
results that surpass the prior state of the art by four orders of 
magnitude. It introduces a biologically inspired asymmetric Sybil-
resistance mechanism, Proof-of-Balance, which can replace 
symmetric Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake weighting schemes.  
 
The biomimetic mechanism is incorporated into a permissionless 
blockchain protocol, Key Retroactivity Network Consensus 
(“KRNC”), which delivers ~40,000 times the security and speed 
of today’s decentralized ledgers. KRNC allows the fiat money 
that the public already owns to be upgraded with cryptographic 
inflation protection, eliminating the problems inherent in 
bootstrapping new currencies like Bitcoin and Ethereum.  
 
The paper includes two independently significant contributions to 
the literature. First, it replaces the non-structural axioms invoked 
in prior work with a new formal method for reasoning about trust, 
liveness, and safety from first principles. Second, it demonstrates 
how two previously overlooked exploits — book-prize attacks 
and pseudo-transfer attacks — collectively undermine the security 
guarantees of all prior permissionless ledgers.   
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Part I: Concept 
1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Summary 
Reverse engineering biological systems has yielded rapid 
advancement in fields ranging from pharmacology and artificial 
intelligence to materials science and aerospace design. [1] This approach, 
known as biomimicry, allows humans to learn from and copy what are 
effectively “alien technologies” developed through billions of years of 
evolutionary optimization. 
It has long been hoped that biomimicry could be the key to a major 
leap forward in trust-minimized computation. In 2009, the same year that 
Bitcoin was released, one of the world’s few dual PhDs in computer 
science and biology predicted that adapting animal-communication 
techniques to fault-tolerant distributed systems could yield a breakthrough 
comparable to the invention of asymmetric encryption in the 1970s. [2] 
This paper vindicates that prediction: it adapts cue-authenticated biological 
signaling to construct the first asymmetric method of Sybil-resistance, 
which allows correct agents to verifiably retain control of a permissionless 
blockchain even if they are unable to match the adversary’s budget for an 
attack. Adding biomimetic cost asymmetry to off-the-shelf consensus 
algorithms unlocks a 40,000-fold increase in reliability, speed, and 
scalability over symmetric weighting methods, such as Proof-of-Work and 
Proof-of-Stake, which require correct agents to expend more resources than 
their faulty counterparts.   
Those legacy technologies embody the “handicap principle,” a 
theory that originated in biology to explain the evolution of seemingly 
wasteful traits, like the oversized tails of male peacocks. According to the 
handicap principle, the reliability of a signal depends on its verifiable cost 
to the signaler. [3] Inside the Bitcoin community, this theory has been 
elevated to the status of a supposedly universal natural law, which applies 
with equal weight to biology and computer science. [4] In Proof-of-Work, a 
handicap is imposed by forcing consensus participants to expend 
computing power. In Proof-of-Stake, a handicap is imposed by forcing 
participants to expend money. In both cases, the goal is to authenticate the 
results of consensus by auctioning control of the blockchain to the highest 
bidder. If voting power is assigned in proportion to verifiable handicaps, 
then a virtual network can be created on which the fraction of faulty 
replicas is guaranteed to fall below the security threshold of a specified 
consensus algorithm.  
This approach predates Bitcoin by four years. It has been the 
foundation of permissionless Byzantine consensus since the publication of 
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the first Sybil-resistant algorithms. [5] Unfortunately, it is deeply flawed. 
The present paper identifies three critical problems. 
A Confluence of Errors  
First, the traditional handicap principle is no longer good science. It 
reflects the state of biological signaling theory in the 1990s, when formal 
mathematical methods were first introduced. [6] Subsequent research, some 
of it by the same scientist who first formalized the handicap principle, has 
refuted the theory that a signal’s reliability depends on its verifiable cost to 
the signaler. In reality, honest signals can be transmitted at zero cost, as 
long as the verifiable cost of a dishonest signal is sufficiently high. [7] 
There is thus no intrinsic reason that participants in permissionless 
consensus should be forced to waste money or computing power. The costs 
that Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake systems impose on their users are a 
design flaw, not a feature.  
Second, the assumption that Sybil-resistance is sufficient to 
guarantee consensus on a permissionless network is false. It conflates two 
distinct forms of statistical bias: sampling error and non-sampling error. 
The former relates to which elements of a population are included in a 
sample, the latter to how those elements are counted. [8] Sybil-resistance 
guarantees that the entities participating in consensus will be counted 
correctly, but it does not guarantee that those entities are an unbiased 
sample of the population that is axiomatically known to contain an honest 
majority or supermajority. The fraction of corrupted entities within the 
protocol can be verified only if the set of protocol participants is large 
enough to ensure an accurate sample of the population whose composition 
is axiomatically known. Today’s Sybil-resistant protocols do not satisfy the 
minimum threshold for statistical reliability, so they are vulnerable to 
“book prize” attacks, which exploit their reliance on non-probability 
sampling.   
Third, axioms about control of a designated resource are 
incompatible with the concept of an adaptive adversary. Economic agents 
have varying resource endowments, so an adaptive adversary can alter how 
much of a given resource it controls simply by switching which agents it 
has corrupted. To establish the security of a resource-weighted protocol, it 
is therefore necessary to start with an axiom that is invariant in the face of 
adaptive corruption — such as the maximum combined value of all 
resources within the adversary’s potential control — and to prove from that 
axiom that the adversary will be unable to acquire the fraction of the 
designated resource needed for an attack. Existing proofs of security for 
permissionless blockchains are tautological, because they start with this 
desired conclusion as their premise.  
These three problems are related. Because computer scientists have 
mistakenly assumed that it is necessary to employ handicap-authenticated 
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signaling, they have designed protocols that force all participants to waste 
money or computing power. Because today’s protocols force all 
participants to waste money or computing power, most internet users 
decline to join, so the set of participating agents is not large enough to 
ensure a statistically unbiased sample. Because the set of protocol 
participants is not a reliable sample of the population, it is impossible to 
prove the existence of an honest majority within the protocol, so one has 
simply been assumed as an axiom. 
It should be a red flag when the most rigorous proofs in a field all 
start with the same convenient-but-unreliable axiom. [9] The ultimate 
purpose of formal proofs of security is to provide information to end users 
about the real-world reliability of a given protocol. If the adversary model 
employed in a formal proof does not match the threats that are present in 
the real world, “the presented protocols may not be fully proven by the 
formalization.” [10] A facially rigorous proof based on a flawed adversary 
model may be worse than no proof at all, because the illusion of security it 
provides can induce end users to leave themselves vulnerable to attack.  
If society is going to employ permissionless ledgers to manage 
billions of dollars in value, the security of those systems must be derived 
from axioms that are known to be true with overwhelming probability. If 
proof of security cannot be obtained from reliable premises, then the public 
should be warned to treat permissionless ledgers as high-risk toys, not 
serious financial platforms. It would be better to disappoint the world now 
than to beg for its forgiveness later.   
Illusion of Security  
This pessimism may sound inconsistent with the track record of 
today’s permissionless blockchains. It is not. Past results provide no 
credible assurances of future safety in this context, because — according to 
game-theoretic modeling — a rational adversary will delay its attack to 
inculcate a false sense of security among protocol participants, then “cash 
out” by executing a double-spending attack once a sufficiently large payoff 
is available. As Ponzi schemes famously illustrate, naïve induction is not a 
reliable method for assessing whether funds are safe.  
In Proof-of-Work systems, the game-theoretic problem is that a free-
entry condition exists, which prevents incentive compatibility between the 
agents currently in control of the protocol and the agents who will be in 
control of the protocol in the future. It has previously been hoped that 
Proof-of-Stake systems overcome this problem, because agents receive 
franchise value. [11] Our results demonstrate that the cure is worse than the 
disease: the franchise value available on a Proof-of-Stake ledger means that 
an adversary who pays the cost of an attack at the protocol’s inception can 
execute a double-spending attack at any subsequent time. This enables an 
adversary to profit through inter-temporal arbitrage; it can join a protocol 
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early and purchase the “option” to attack, then once the option is “in the 
money” — i.e., once the ledger’s market capitalization has expanded 
enough to make high-value double-spending attacks viable — the adversary 
can reap the reward for its patience.   
The exploit we have just described invalidates the concept of ICO-
launched Proof-of-Stake ledgers, such as Tezos and Cardano. The design of 
those protocols assumes that their verifiable security will automatically 
increase as their native assets appreciate. This assumption is in error. It is 
based on the conflation of time probability and ensemble probability, a 
mistake whose revelation rocked decision theory several years ago, but 
which has not yet been sufficiently digested in computer science. In an 
attempt to bridge the conceptual gap, we formalize a new class of “price 
adaptive” asynchronous adversary, which can easily compromise the 
security guarantees of Proof-of-Stake ledgers. 
The new formalism demonstrates that the “sleepy” or “dynamic” 
consensus achieved by algorithms like Ouroboros is not comparable to 
Nakamoto consensus, as claimed in the prior literature. [12] [13] In 
Nakamoto consensus, late-joining agents are not forced to place their trust 
in the initial set of protocol participants, because control of the protocol 
becomes verifiably decentralized as the total hashing power on the network 
expands; in Proof-of-Stake algorithms, the total quantity of cryptographic 
stake does not increase when new agents join the protocol, so the initial 
participants can remain in control indefinitely. 
It has previously been argued that, even if such an attack is 
theoretically possible, it can be ruled out on a given blockchain once 
enough stake has migrated to new addresses. [14] The present paper 
disproves this claim. It demonstrates that the adversary can execute a 
pseudo-transfer attack, in which it shifts stake between its own 
cryptographic addresses to generate the illusion of decentralization. The 
movement of stake on a Proof-of-Stake ledger therefore provides no 
assurance of security.  
We demonstrate that, in formal terms, the externally verifiable 
security properties of such ledgers are indistinguishable from permissioned 
protocols with an initial, fixed set of participants. The difference is that, on 
permissionless ledgers, the identities of the agents are unknown. It is 
therefore a misnomer to refer to Proof-of-Stake protocols as “trust 
minimized.” They are more accurately “trust maximized,” since they 
require absolute, permanent trust in all past sets of participants.  
A New Kind of Sybil-Resistance 
KRNC overcomes the shortcomings of legacy protocols because its 
Sybil-resistance mechanism, Proof-of-Balance, is asymmetric. Just as “a 
lock on a door increases the security of a house by more than the cost of the 
lock,” Proof-of-Balance provides a degree of security that is exponentially 
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greater than the costs it imposes on correct protocol participants. [11] The 
lock analogy is helpful in understanding why asymmetry is so important to 
efficiency and security. If locks were symmetric in the same sense as 
today’s Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake protocols, their purchase price 
would need to exceed the maximum “burglary budget” of all criminals. 
Homeowners would be locked in a constant financial battle with potential 
intruders, forced to waste their money on exorbitant locks, which still 
would not deliver any verifiable security.  
Proof-of-Balance breaks this symmetry by harnessing the efficiency 
advantages of cue-authenticated signaling. Like a handicap, a cue is a trait 
that reliably communicates information because it is too costly to fake. The 
difference is the purpose and timing of the costs. A handicap is assumed for 
the purpose of signaling, so it is inherently wasteful and disadvantageous. 
A cue is a preexisting trait that is later adopted for signaling purposes at 
zero added cost. Cue-authenticated signaling eliminates the greatest barrier 
to blockchain adoption, because it makes it possible for agents to 
participate in consensus for free. Rather than incurring new costs, agents 
verify their pre-protocol sunk costs, which provides Sybil-resistance 
without the need to take anyone’s money or waste their computing power.  
Instead, Proof-of-Balance assigns cryptographic weights in 
proportion to each agent’s existing “stake” in the fiat monetary system. The 
weight that is issued then serves two purposes. First, it allows weight 
owners to participate in consensus, just as if they had invested money in a 
Proof-of-Stake ICO. Second, the weight acts as a form of cryptographic 
“backing” for the original fiat money, which imbues it with inflation 
protection similar to Bitcoin. The goal is to eliminate the need for private 
cryptocurrencies by upgrading the money that everyone already owns. 
The protocol can be analogized to a cryptographic return to the gold 
standard. However, it corrects the design flaw that caused the gold standard 
to collapse in the first place. Instead of entrusting central banks with 
cryptographic gold, KRNC distributes the new resource that backs the fiat 
monetary supply directly to the owners of fiat money. When they transact 
with one another, they transfer both their original fiat money and its 
cryptographic backing. This avoids any single point of failure that can 
default on the promise to maintain sufficient reserves.  
The Future of Consensus  
In a deep sense, KRNC is the logical progression of blockchain 
technology. For the participants in a blockchain protocol to reach 
consensus, it is necessary for them to agree on the protocol’s initial state — 
i.e., the balances recorded in its genesis block. Because a monetary balance 
represents the quantity of goods or services that a given agent is entitled to 
receive from the other members of society, picking an immutable set of 
7 
initial balances that the entire world will be willing to tolerate is a challenge 
that no prior protocol has been able to crack.  
KRNC’s solution is to import the abstract state of the existing global 
monetary ledger. This is the obvious Schelling point, because it is the 
distribution of balances that the world has already accepted. The results we 
obtain in this paper are an extension of that simple truth. In effect, the 
existing monetary system is the “longest chain” of value in society. KRNC 
is the first cryptographic protocol that allows that chain to be extended, 
rather than rejected and replaced. 
1.3 Roadmap 
In Section 2, we formalize the distinction between permissioned and 
permissionless Byzantine consensus. In our taxonomy, protocols are 
categorized according to the axioms their users must accept for liveness and 
safety to be common knowledge. Permissioned protocols require users to 
assume that an honest majority exists among the subset of the population 
who have received permission to participate in consensus, which makes 
them ideal for use by small groups of agents who know and trust one 
another. In a permissionless protocol, the entire population has the 
opportunity to participate in consensus, so users are required to assume that 
an honest majority exists among the subset of the population that chooses to 
participate in consensus. 
In Section 3, we demonstrate that the security guarantees of 
permissionless protocols are statistically reliable if and only if a sufficient 
fraction of the total population is participating in the protocol to ensure an 
unbiased sample. Because the adversary can affect the composition of the 
set of agents that join a permissionless protocol, axiomatic knowledge that 
an honest majority exists in the population does not reliably translate into 
knowledge that an honest majority exists within the protocol itself. We 
employ a toy environment without Sybil attacks to establish the minimum-
participation requirements needed to prevent book-prize attacks.   
In Section 4, we extend the toy environment with a game-theoretic 
model of coordination in the presence of imperfect and incomplete 
information. We prove that the minimum sample size required for 
permissionless consensus is guaranteed if and only if the cost of 
participation is zero, because in that case the equilibrium strategy is for all 
agents to participate in consensus. However, when the cost is positive, no 
reliable security guarantees can be obtained, because the inherent risk of 
book-prize attacks deters correct agents from participating. 
In Section 5, we prove that a protocol’s vulnerability to book-prize 
attacks in the toy environment depends on the temporal structure of its 
sampling frame. If participation is limited to an initially small group of 
agents, the protocol will never achieve verifiable security, because those 
agents can take control and never relinquish it. The only verifiably secure 
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solution is a dynamic system that causes the total quantity of voting power 
to expand as more agents join the protocol.  
In Section 6, we replace the toy environment with a realistic model 
of resource-weighted Byzantine consensus, where the adversary can 
attempt Sybil and book-prize attacks. To apply the results from our toy 
model to the realistic model, we prove that the axioms employed by various 
resource-weighted protocols are special cases of a more fundamental 
“honest majority of capital” axiom. Defining a capital-normalized 
population of agents enables us to use our existing formulas to calculate 
how much capital a real-world protocol must sample for reliable security.  
In Section 7, we demonstrate that the security of Proof-of-Stake 
protocols is limited by the temporal structure of their sampling frames. If 
stakes are sold to an initial set of agents in an ICO, an “option” to attack the 
ledger can be purchased for the price of buying a super-threshold fraction 
of the stake. To objectively quantify the seriousness of this risk, we define a 
new class of asynchronous adversary, which we refer to as “price adaptive.” 
The new formalism confirms that Proof-of-Stake protocols are insecure and 
that a dynamic sampling frame is a necessary component of any solution.  
In Section 8, we adapt our game-theoretic model to the realistic 
environment and derive the conditions that are necessary to achieve zero-
cost Sybil resistance and protection against book-prize attacks. It is critical 
to select the staking resource that is already maximally favored by agents 
for its non-signaling value, because doing so allows sunk costs to harnessed 
without the need for agents to assume new costs. We prove that, to employ 
this technique in the real world, a consensus protocol must assign 
cryptographic weights in proportion to ownership of money. 
In Section 9, we demonstrate that Proof-of-Balance enables the 
incumbent monetary resource to be employed as the staking resource for a  
permissionless Byzantine consensus protocol. For ease of exposition, we 
first present the technology’s security and performance advantages in a toy 
model where all balances are public, the fiat ledger is perfectly consistent, 
and a public-key infrastructure exists. We then remove these simplifying 
assumptions and iteratively specify the innovations that underpin the 
KRNC protocol, including synthetic consistency and retroactive weight 
assignments.  
 
Part II: Toy Environment 
 
2. Requirements for Byzantine Consensus    
 
2.1 Methodology  
We begin with the foundational requirement of Byzantine consensus.  
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Axiom 1: Verifiable Byzantine consensus requires a constraint 𝑘 on the 
fraction of entities executing a consensus algorithm that are faulty.        
 
This is our paper’s equivalent of the “honest majority” axiom from 
Bitcoin or the quorum requirements of traditional BFT algorithms. The use 
of an abstract security threshold is merely a notational convenience to 
preserve the generality of our results across synchrony assumptions and 
algorithm families. The substantive innovation in Axiom 1 is that it does 
not assume that the security-threshold requirement will be satisfied; it 
merely specifies that the requirement exists. The core assumption in prior 
literature that the concentration of faulty agents or replicas would never 
exceed the security threshold rendered past proofs effectively tautological: 
they established that Byzantine consensus was guaranteed if the 
requirements for Byzantine consensus were met.  
Proof that a system is reliable if a given condition is met, without an 
accompanying reason to believe that the condition will be satisfied when 
the system is deployed, does not meaningfully establish the system’s real-
world reliability. If distributed-systems engineering aims to deliver fault-
tolerance assurances that meet the standards employed in the design of 
physical systems like bridges and airplanes, it must make concrete 
predictions based on verifiably accurate premises. The method advanced in 
this paper is an attempt to move the field in that direction.  
 
2.2 Network and Protocol 
We represent the population of agents with access to a computer 
network as a set N, whose elements are indexed by n = 1, 2, …, |𝑁|. The 
population is divided into two sub-populations of NC correct agents and NF 
faulty agents, such that NC∪NF = N. Faulty agents can engage in arbitrary 
behavior, including coordinated attacks, so we treat them as if they have 
been corrupted by an adversary, 𝒜. The adversary embodies all the 
unpredictable factors that can interfere with protocol execution in the real 
world. It may be considered a formalization of Murphy’s Law: anything 
that can go wrong, will go wrong, unless verifiably prevented by the 
protocol, 𝒫, or specified as a limitation on the power of the adversary, 𝒜.  
All corrupted agents are faulty (n∈NF) and all non-corrupted agents 
are correct (n∈NC), unless otherwise specified.  To track which agents 𝒜 
controls, we assign a corruption status of 0 to all correct agents and 1 to all 
faulty agents. Formally, the corruption status is an indicator Y[n] associated 
with each agent n, where 𝑌[𝑛] = 0	if	𝑛 ∈ 𝑁1	1	if	𝑛 ∈ 𝑁3	 
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. 
The mean corruption status 𝑌 within N can be obtained using the formula 𝑌 = 1𝑁 𝑌45467  
, 
which yields a decimal within the closed interval [0,1], such that 𝑌=0 if all 
agents on the network are correct and 𝑌=1 if all agents on the network are 
faulty. An “honest majority” of correct agents exists within N only if 𝑌<0.5.  
We define Byzantine consensus as atomic broadcast satisfying a list 
of required properties, which we assume to include liveness and safety, but 
which can be expanded to include additional properties, such as 
deterministic finality. The participants in a consensus protocol 𝒫 running 
on the network are a collection NS drawn from N, such that NS Í N.1 The 
faulty agents within the protocol comprise the intersection 𝑁8 ∩ 𝑁3 of all 
faulty agents and all protocol participants, which we write as 𝑁83. Let the 
security threshold of the protocol’s consensus algorithm be k, such that 
Byzantine consensus is guaranteed if and only if 𝑁83/𝑁8 < k.  
Equivalently, the security threshold can be expressed in terms of the 
mean corruption status 𝑦𝑁8 of protocol participants. Consensus within 𝑁8 is 
guaranteed if and only if 𝑦𝑁8 < k. In contrast, when 𝑦𝑁8 ≥ k, then the 
concentration of faulty agents within NS exceeds the capabilities of the 
protocol’s consensus algorithm, and the adversary can therefore violate 
liveness or safety. 
 
2.3 Revealed Trust 
We model a protocol’s trust assumptions as a set of objective 
properties, unrelated to the subjective intentions of the protocol’s designer 
or users. Our approach is similar to prior formalizations of “access 
structures” and “adversary structures” in the literature on secure-multiparty 
computation. [15] It is also inspired by the concept of “revealed preference” 
in economics, which allows the preferences of consumers to be inferred 
objectively from their choices. [16] Similarly, we infer the objective trust 
assumptions of a consensus protocol based on the sets of agents that receive 
the power to successfully attack the protocol. This allows us to bootstrap an 
objective definition of trust from the existing, objective definition of 
                                                
1	Throughout this paper, re-indexing is employed when necessary for S and 
P notation. Each subset SUB is treated as if it begins at the first element of 
its superset and ends at |SUB|, the element of the superset indexed by the 
cardinality of the subset.  
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Byzantine faults: a protocol trusts an agent if the corruption of that agent by 
the adversary would violate the protocol’s liveness or safety guarantees.  
We refer to a set of one or more agents who have the power to 
violate a consensus protocol’s security guarantees as a control set, and we 
refer to the combination of all the control sets for a given protocol as its 
control structure. Control sets offer a formalized representation of Nick 
Szabo’s concept of “security holes.” [17] A control structure is, in a real 
sense, an objective map of the security holes that each protocol forces its 
users to tolerate.  
Since we have an objective definition of trust, we can model a 
consensus protocol’s maximum user base as the set of agents whose trust 
sets are compatible with the protocol’s control structure. Ultimately, the 
value of a protocol depends on whether its control structure is well matched 
to the needs of its intended users. We will formalize two different 
paradigms, which can be used separately or in combination. Permissioned 
consensus allows a user to trust a consensus protocol if its control structure 
is verifiably dominated by agents whom the user knows and trusts. 
Permissionless consensus allows all agents in the population to trust a 
consensus protocol if the security of its control structure is validly derived 
from the axiom that a minimum fraction of all agents are trustworthy.  
Permissioned Consensus   
To model permissioned consensus, we assume that each agent n 
believes that certain other, specific members of N are correct. Let T[n] be 
the output of a function that takes an agent n and returns the set of agents 
within N whom n trusts. This collection of agents is the trust set of n. It is 
possible for different agents within N to have different trust sets; in modal-
logic notation, ◊T[n] ≠ T[n′]. 
A protocol’s control structure is the combinations of agents that 
have the power to violate its security guarantees. Formally, let the control 
structure be a family F of sets over N, where F contains every subset f ⊆N 
whose members can collectively violate liveness or safety, such that (𝑦𝑁8 ≥ 𝑘) ≡ (𝑁83 ∈ 𝐹). That is, the security threshold of a protocol’s 
consensus algorithm is exceeded if and only if the set of faulty participants 
in the protocol belongs to the control structure F.  
An agent n can trust a protocol if every control set in the protocol’s 
control structure contains at least one member of n’s trust set. Formally, let 
the set of agents who can trust a protocol be its maximum user base, 𝑁B, 
which can be calculated using the formula  𝑁B = 	 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶ 	𝑇[𝑛] 	∩ 	∀𝑓 ∈ 𝐹	 ≠ 	∅  
, 
i.e., an agent n is a member of the maximum user base of a protocol if each 
intersection of the agent’s trust set and a control set within the protocol’s 
control structure is not the empty set. In other words, an agent can trust a 
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protocol if every possible combination of agents who can break the 
protocol by colluding contains at least one agent whom n trusts not to 
participate in such an attack. If there is a combination of agents who can 
break the protocol, but none of those agents are in n’s trust set, then n 
cannot trust the protocol.  
Equivalently, an agent n’s ability to trust a consensus protocol can 
be defined based on the intersection of its trust set T[n] and the population 
of protocol participants, NS. The maximum user base 𝑁B of a protocol is 
then  𝑁B = 𝑛	 ∈ 𝑁 ∶ 	 𝑁8 − 𝑇[𝑛] ∩ 𝑁8𝑁8 < 𝑘  
 . 
The left side of the inequality represents the number of agents within NS 
whom n believes to be potentially faulty — i.e., who are not members of 
the trust set T[n] — divided by the full number of agents within NS. The  
number of agents participating in the protocol who do not belong to the 
trust set T[n] must be small enough that, even if all of those agents were 
faulty, the adversary still would not control a super-k share of voting power.   
When trust is based on the specific identities of the members of NS, 
the maximum user base NU depends on how much overlap exists between 
the trust sets of different members of N. For example, the Ripple protocol 
derives its security guarantees from the intersection of the trust sets of the 
members of NS. [18] Unfortunately, this need for overlapping trust sets 
inherently limits the scalability of identity-based consensus.  
Permissionless Consensus  
Expanding a protocol’s maximum user base NU to encompass all 
agents requires permissionless consensus, which allows an agent n to trust a 
protocol without knowing the identifies of the participants in NS. Indeed, 
permissionless consensus allows the agent n to trust the protocol even if n 
knows that none of the individual members of 𝑁8  belong to n’s trust set, 
T[n]. Instead, the assumption is made that each agent n knows that the set N 
of agents with access to the network contains the “honest majority” (or 
supermajority, etc.) required for consensus, i.e. 𝑌 < 𝑘. This enables n to 
trust a protocol by verifying that the cardinality of the set NS of protocol 
participants is great enough to guarantee that the honest majority present on 
the network N is retained within the protocol, i.e. |𝑁8|: 𝑦𝑁8 < 𝑘. 
The existence of the requisite honest majority within N is treated as 
common knowledge among the members of N. Each agent n knows that an 
honest majority is present within N because, as Micali observes, “society 
would not exist at all if there were not an honest majority out there.” [19] 
This axiom can be expressed in our trust-set notation by defining a meta-
agent, 𝒩, who personifies the aggregated individual choices of each agent 𝑛 ∈ N. Unlike the adversary 𝒜, the meta-agent 𝒩 does not control other 
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agents or enhance their coordination abilities; rather, it is the individual 
behavior of the agents within N that, when aggregated, produce a collective 
“choice” attributed to the meta-agent. Thus, if an agent n believes that  𝑌 <𝑘, then the meta-agent necessarily belongs to that agent’s trust set — i.e., 𝑇[𝑛] ∋ 𝒩. The axiom that all agents with access to the network know that 𝑌 < 𝑘 can likewise be expressed as all agents trusting the meta-agent — 
i.e., 𝒩 ∈ ∀𝑇[𝑛 ∈ 𝑁].  
However, as Micali accurately warns, it is a misuse of this axiom to 
assume that an honest majority will exist within a “specialized group of 
people,” who may not be a representative sample of the full population. 
[19] A meaningful permissionless security guarantee will exist if and only 
if the set of protocol participants, NS, is large enough to verifiably capture 
the honest majority known to exist among N, the full set of agents with 
access to the network. . If NS is not large enough, then agents who trust 𝒩 
will not have statistically reliable evidence that they should also trust the 
lesser meta-agent 𝒩8, and permissionless Byzantine consensus will 
therefore fail.   
 
3. Book-Prize Attacks 
How large is “large enough” for a set of consensus participants — 
i.e., what is the minimum cardinality |𝑁8|MN5 required to ensure that 𝑦𝑁8 <𝑘? We will first establish the strict deterministic minimum, then consider 
probabilistic alternatives.  
 
3.1 Deterministic Threshold   
Formulas 
In the deterministic version of our model, it is assumed that the 
adversary 𝒜 has control of every faulty agent n∈NF on the network.  The 
adversary can therefore command all of those agents to join the protocol 
and become part of NS. To provide deterministic protection against this 
attack, NS must be so large that it is guaranteed to contain the honest 
majority required for consensus, even if every faulty agent on the network 
joins the protocol, i.e., 𝑦𝑁8 < 𝑘 even if 𝑁3 ⊆ 𝑁8. The minimum size of NS 
for a deterministic guarantee is provided by the formula |𝑁8|MN5(P) = 	 |𝑁83|MQR +	 |𝑁81|MN5 :	|𝑁83|MQR|𝑁8| < 𝑘		 ,	
where	 |𝑁83|MQR = 	 𝑌MQR |𝑁|MQR 	
, 
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i.e., the cardinality of the minimum set of participants in the protocol for 
deterministic security is equal to the maximum cardinality of the 
intersection 𝑁83 of all faulty agents and protocol participants, plus the 
minimum number of correct agents such that the ratio of the maximum 
number of faulty protocol participants to the number of protocol 
participants remains below the consensus algorithm’s security threshold.   
The maximum number of faulty protocol participants is the 
maximum cardinality of the intersection 𝑁83, which is obtained by 
multiplying the maximum mean corruption status on the network by the 
maximum cardinality of the set of agents on the network. 
Application 
The population N can be taken as a constant, which eliminates the 
need to specify its maximum cardinality. Security guarantees can instead be 
defined in terms of the minimum portion of N that must be included within 
NS for consensus to be guaranteed. For example, if an agent n knows that at 
least 90% of the population is correct, then at most 10% of the population 
can be faulty (𝑌MQR = 0.1), so if a protocol’s consensus algorithm requires 
a simple majority of correct agents (k = 0.5), consensus is guaranteed if and 
only if more than 20% of the population participates in the protocol. If the 
agent knows that 99% of the population is correct, then any sample greater 
than 2% of the population is sufficient for deterministic permissionless 
consensus. If the percentage of the population known to be correct drops to 
80%, then participation of more than 40% of the population is required.   
We can apply the minimum participation requirements for 
permissionless consensus in our deterministic-participation model to 
protocols running on the internet by assuming a maximum cardinality of 4 
billion for N, based on present estimates of the number of unique internet 
users. (|𝑁|MQR≈ 4x10^9). To exceed 2% participation, as required if 99% of 
the internet population is correct, a consensus protocol needs more than 80 
million users. To exceed 20% participation, as required if 90% of the 
internet population is correct, the protocol needs more than 800 million 
users. To exceed 40% participation, as required if 80% of the internet 
population is correct, the protocol needs more than 1.6 billion users.  
 
3.2 Probabilistic Threshold   
Formulas 
In the probabilistic version of our model, it is assumed that the 
adversary 𝒜 can only control faulty agents once they join the protocol, i.e., 
if n ∈𝑁83. The adversary therefore does not have the power to cause every 
faulty agent in the population to join the protocol. Instead, the set of 
participants in the protocol is a function of which agents in the population 
choose to participate. This enables us to obtain probabilistic security 
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guarantees by adapting the well-known Horvitz-Thompson estimator from 
the field of statistical inference. [8] [20] 
The minimum size of NS for a probabilistic guarantee is given by the 
formula |𝑁8|MN5(U) = 𝐸( 𝑁83 ) +	 |𝑁81|MN5 ∶ 	 𝐸 𝑁83|𝑁8| < 𝑘		
where  𝐸 𝑁83 = 𝑌MQR + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 |𝑁8|  
. 
The first term, 𝐸( 𝑁83 ), is the expected number of faulty agents within the 
protocol, i.e., the expected cardinality of the intersection of the set of faulty 
agents and the set of protocol participants. It is equal to the maximum mean 
corruption status within the population (𝑌MQR), plus the bias between that 
value and the mean corruption status within the protocol, multiplied by the 
cardinality |𝑁8| of the set of protocol participants. 
To formalize the Bias term, we must define the selection mechanism 
that dictates which members of N are included within NS. We assume that 
all members of N know that joining the protocol requires paying a non-
negative cost, c, in return for a reward, r. The agents within N are rational 
but lazy, in the sense that an agent n will join a protocol if and only if it 
perceives the value of its individualized reward rn as exceeding the value of 
its individualized cost, cn. Thus, rn > cn for all n ∈NS and cn ≤ rn for all n ∉ 
NS. The probability that an agent n perceives its reward as exceeding its cost 
is thus identical to the probability that the agent joins the protocol. To 
quantify its probability of joining, every agent n is associated with a vector 
j of N indicators, where j = (j1, j2, …, jN). Let the n-th indicator take the 
value jn, where jn=1 if n joins the protocol (n∈NS) and jn=0 if not (n ∉NS). 
The probability 𝜌4 that an agent n will participate in the protocol is equal to 
the expected value 𝐸(𝑗4). We refer to this as the agent’s participation 
propensity.  
The agents on the network who choose to join the protocol form the 
set of participants, NS, where  𝑁8 = 𝑗45467	  
. 
If every agent in the population has the same probability of joining the 
protocol — i.e., if 𝜌4	takes the same value for all n — then the mean 
corruption status within the protocol will closely approximate the mean 
corruption status within the population. When formalized as  
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𝑦5] = 1𝑁^ 𝑗4𝑌45567  
, 
this yields an expected value of 𝐸 𝑦5] ≈ 𝑌5∗ = 1𝑁𝜌 𝜌4𝑌45467  
, 
where 𝑁𝜌 is the mean participation propensity of agents within N. 
 Based on the expected value 𝐸 𝑦5] , the Bias term can be calculated 
according to the formula  𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 = 𝐸 𝑦5a − 𝑌5 ≈ 𝑌5∗ − 𝑌5 = 𝐶 𝜌, 𝑌𝜌  
in which 𝐶 𝜌, 𝑌 = 1𝑁 (𝜌4 − 𝜌)(𝑌4 − 𝑌)5567  
is the covariance between corruption status and participation propensity, 
and 𝜌	is the mean participation propensity. Note that the Bias term can 
never be negative because, as we prove in the next section, the mean 
participation propensity of faulty agents will always be greater than or 
equal to that of correct agents. 
The amount of bias depends on two factors. First, the lower the 
covariance between corruption status and participation propensity, the 
smaller the sample size required. Second, the greater the mean participation 
propensity, the larger the sample size achieved. These factors are related: 
the maximum potential covariance between corruption status and 
participation propensity, 𝐶 𝜌, 𝑌 MQR, remains at its peak until the number 
of participants in the protocol is equal to the maximum number of faulty 
agents in the population, i.e., |𝑁8|=|𝑁83|MQR, because until that threshold is 
reached it remains possible that every agent who has joined the protocol is 
faulty. Once the potential supply of faulty agents has been exhausted, every 
additional agent who joins the protocol increases |𝑁81|MN5, thereby 
lowering 𝐶 𝜌, 𝑌 MQR until it assumes a value of 0 once |𝑁8|=|𝑁|MQR.       
Application  
By applying these formulas, we can compare the strength of 
different protocols’ probabilistic security guarantees.  
First, we can quantify how much increasing participation improves 
security by measuring how much it reduces bias. [20] Let 𝜌[𝒫Q] be the 
mean of participation propensity for Protocol A, and 𝜌[𝒫c] be the mean 
participation propensity for Protocol B, where the latter is greater by a 
positive constant Δ, such that 𝜌[𝒫Q]+	Δ = 𝜌[𝒫c]. The bias of Protocol A, 
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𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠[𝒫Q], will be larger than the bias 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠[𝒫c] of Protocol B, per the 
formula 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠[𝒫Q] = 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠[𝒫c] + ef[𝒫g] .	 The lower the baseline mean 
participation propensity, the greater the reduction in bias achieved for a 
given Δ.	For example, if the mean participation propensity is increased from 
0.1 to 0.2, bias is reduced by 50%. If it is increased from 0.5 to 0.6, bias is 
reduced by 17%. In both cases, Δ = 0.1, but the bias reduction in the former 
is ~3-times greater due to the insufficiency of the baseline sample size.  
Second, we can calculate the maximum possible bias for a given 
protocol by making worst-case assumptions. When this value is obtained 
for multiple protocols, their reliability in the worst-possible conditions can 
be compared. To start, we decompose the bias estimator, using the formula   𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 ≈ 𝐶 𝜌, 𝑌𝜌 = 𝐽 𝜌, 𝑌 𝑆 𝜌 𝑆(𝑌)𝜌  
, 
where 𝐽 𝜌, 𝑌  is the correlation coefficient between corruption status and 
protocol participation, 𝑆 𝜌  is the standard deviation of response 
probabilities, and 𝑆(𝑌) is the standard deviation of corruption status. 
For a given mean participation propensity 𝜌 there is a maximum 
value that cannot be exceeded by the standard deviation 𝑆 𝜌  of 
participation propensity. Formally,  𝑆(𝜌) ≤ 𝑆(𝜌)klm	 = 	 𝜌(1 − 𝜌) 
. 
The worst-case scenario for bias occurs when 𝑆 𝜌 = 𝑆(𝜌)klm	and the 
correlation coefficient 𝑅 𝜌, 𝑌  takes its maximum value, 𝑅 𝜌, 𝑌 =1.  
We can thus calculate the maximum bias for a given protocol using the 
formula  𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠klm = 𝑆(𝑌) 1𝜌 − 1 
.   
However, identifying an acceptable amount of potential bias to tolerate in a 
trust-minimized protocol is difficult, which in turn makes it hard to 
objectively define a minimum acceptable ratio between NS and N. To avoid 
the need for subjective judgments, we take an apophatic approach and 
instead identify an objectively insufficient value.     
It is indisputably necessary for the strength of a trust-minimized 
protocol’s security guarantees to exceed the degree of assurance mandated 
for political polls and opinion surveys. Based in part on the 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠klm 
formula just described, mean response propensities below 0.2 are 
considered unacceptable for polls and surveys due to the severe risk of bias 
from even modest correlations between inclusion probability and the 
variable of interest. [20] Under that standard, NS must include at least 1/5 of 
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N. If we once again assume 𝑁 MQR=4 billion and k=0.5, then 
permissionless Byzantine consensus requires at least 800 million 
participants. 
 
3.3 Sybil resistance is not enough    
So far, we have only considered what is required for Byzantine 
consensus in a toy environment where the adversary cannot perform Sybil 
attacks, but the results we have obtained are already a cause for concern. 
The toy environment was intentionally constructed to be more forgiving 
than the real world. [21] Yet, as we have just demonstrated, the adversary 
can still violate liveness and safety by biasing the composition of the set of 
protocol participants. 
We refer to this exploit as a book-prize attack, because the strategy 
was once used to alter the winner of the Book of the Year prize in the 
Netherlands. [8] The honor is supposed to be bestowed on the top example 
of Dutch literature published in a given year. The winner of the prize is 
determined through direct voting, in which any citizen of the Netherlands 
can participate. In 2005, there were 92,000 participants, more than double 
the 40,000 readers who participated the prior year. [22] Yet more than 70% 
of the votes were cast in favor of a new translation of the Bible — which 
had previously been ruled ineligible, since it was not a work of Dutch 
literature. 
The voting process was not compromised by pseudo-spoofing or a 
Sybil attack. A strict “one-person, one-vote” condition was enforced using 
an external identity register. However, the outside group affiliated with the 
Bible translation was still able to bias the results: it simply recruited its 
members to participate. Because the mean participation propensity of Dutch 
readers was too low to ensure a representative sample, the outside group 
was able to dictate the outcome of voting. 
A book-prize attack exploits the same vulnerability to compromise 
permissionless consensus protocols. If the number of agents participating in 
a consensus protocol is too low to ensure a representative sample of the 
agents with access to the underlying permissionless network, then the mean 
corruption status within the protocol may be much greater than 
axiomatically assumed. If the bias is sufficient to raise the protocol’s mean 
corruption status above the security threshold of its consensus algorithm, 
then the adversary can violate liveness and safety.    
The distinguishing feature of a book-prize attack is that, whether by 
adding faulty agents or excluding correct ones, the adversary raises the 
mean corruption status of participants in a permissionless protocol above 
the mean corruption status of agents who have access to the underlying 
permissionless network. This risk has historically been overlooked in the 
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distributed-systems literature due to a subtle error in the way that resource-
weighted consensus has traditionally been modeled. 
We illustrate this error in Figure 3.1, which is based on the three-
level diagram from the first paper on using Proof-of-Work to achieve Sybil-
resistant Byzantine consensus on a permissionless network. [5]   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Consensus is guaranteed at Level 0 and Level 2 of the 
network, but fails at every level of the protocol.  
 
In the original version of the diagram, there was no distinction 
between the collection of agents with access to the permissionless network 
and the subset of those agents that join the consensus protocol. The proof 
that Byzantine consensus could be achieved on the permissionless network 
if k=1/3 was based on counting the voting power of the entire population 
now labeled N: The adversary controls 1/4 agents at Level 0, so consensus 
is possible; it performs a Sybil attack at Level 1, acquiring 3/6 votes, which 
makes consensus impossible; weighing votes in proportion to computing 
power restores the ability to reach consensus at Level 2, where the 
adversary receives 2/9 of voting weight, an approximation of its 5/19 share 
of all computing power.   
The assumption that the paper flagged as being potentially 
unrealistic was the relative parity of computing power between the agents. 
But there is a more fundamental problem. Given that the protocol is 
permissionless, all of the agents with access to the underlying network 
cannot automatically be relied on to participate in consensus. Instead, only 
20 
the subset of agents who exercise the option to join the protocol will 
actually cast votes. The fact that the mean corruption status on the network 
is low enough for Byzantine consensus does not establish that the mean 
corruption status of protocol participants is also low enough for consensus. 
For that deduction to be valid, the number of agents participating in the 
consensus protocol must verifiably exceed the minimum participation 
threshold. If the participation propensity on the network is too low for a 
protocol to reach the minimum participation threshold, then a 
permissionless protocol is vulnerable to book-prize attacks. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how an adversary can exploit that vulnerability 
to successfully attack a Sybil-resistant protocol. The adversary controls 
only 1/4 of the agents with access to the network, but 1/2 of the agents on 
the network have failed to join the protocol. Within the protocol itself, the 
adversary therefore controls 1/2 of the voting power at level 0, which 
makes Byzantine consensus impossible. At Level 1, the adversary executes 
a Sybil attack, so it becomes even more powerful, controlling 3/4 identities 
registered in the consensus protocol. At Level 2, Byzantine consensus 
remains impossible, even after weights are assigned using Proof-of-Work; 
the adversary controls 5/7 of the computing power among the set of 
consensus-protocol participants, and it receives 2/3 of voting weight.  
This illustrates how book-prize attacks can defeat countermeasures 
designed to prevent pseudo-spoofing. A real-world permissionless protocol 
must verifiably resist both Sybil attacks and book-prize attacks, because the 
adversary can employ both in combination.  
Performance Implications 
The failure of existing protocols to deliver verifiable protection 
against book-prize attacks undercuts not only their security, but also their 
performance. The lower the maximum fraction of the participants in a 
consensus protocol who may be faulty, the more quickly transactions in the 
protocol can be confirmed. This is true in two senses.  
First, sharding may be employed to assign responsibility for 
designated data to a subset of all protocol participants. The gains in 
efficiency from this approach are offset by a reduction in security, since 
confirmations are received only from the fraction of agents participating in 
the shard. This may have seemed like a reasonable tradeoff before book-
prize attacks were formalized. However, now that the maximum mean 
corruption status of all protocol participants is in doubt, the mean 
corruption status within individual shards is highly questionable.   
Second, and more important, the maximum mean corruption status 
of protocol participants dictates the confirmation times required by 
algorithms based on Nakamoto consensus. Even if we prohibit Sybil attacks 
by assuming complete resource-parity among agents, the risk of book-prize 
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attacks means that transaction confirmation in today’s state-of-the-art 
protocols actually takes a minimum of hours or days, not minutes.2 	
 
 Confirmation	delay	as	a	function	of	𝑦𝑁8MQR	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The risk of book-prize attacks delays transaction confirmation.  
 
This problem is illustrated in Figure 3.2, which shows how both 
Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-Stake ledgers employing longest-chain 
algorithms require unacceptably long periods of time to achieve 99% 
assurance of finality due to the risk of book-prize attacks. In the legend, 
BTC is Bitcoin, and OB Covert and OB General are two variations of the 
Ouroboros protocol. To preempt any accusation of bias, the consequences 
of book-prize attacks are plotted according to the confirmation speeds 
claimed by the IOHK team in the Ouroboros paper. [12]  
  
4. Cost of Participation  
The problem with existing Sybil-resistance methods is not merely 
that they are ineffective against book-prize attacks, but that they make 
protocols more vulnerable to those attacks. In an attempt to prevent Sybil 
attacks, such systems impose a verifiable cost for voting; this increases the 
                                                
2 Because maximum mean corruption status is the critical determinant of 
both reliability and performance in longest-chain algorithms, we employ it 
as our core metric of a protocol’s security and speed.     
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risk of book-prize attacks, because it decreases the number of agents who 
choose to participate in consensus.  
As we prove in this section, the cost tolerance of faulty agents 
weakly dominates the cost tolerance of correct agents. Imposing costs on all 
agents therefore produces an inherent risk of adversarial bias in the 
composition of the set of protocol participants. The only way to verifiably 
guarantee permissionless consensus is therefore to reduce the cost of 
participation to zero. For now, we will defer the question of how this can be 
accomplished. The results in this section merely establish that the task is 
necessary.  
We start by specifying a game-theoretic representation of our Sybil-
free environment with probabilistic participation, which Figure 4.1 shows 
in extensive form. We then use that model to prove the theorem that 
permissionless Byzantine consensus requires zero-cost participation. First, 
we prove that consensus can be guaranteed among the set of agents with 
access to the network if and only if the equilibrium strategy is for both 
faulty and correct agents to join the consensus protocol. Second, we prove 
that this outcome — known in signaling theory as a “pooling equilibrium” 
— can be guaranteed if and only if the cost of joining the protocol is zero. 
 
4.1 Extensive-Form Game  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Sybil-Free Permissionless Consensus 
Players 
There are |𝑁|+3 players in the game: |𝑁| agents with access to the 
network, the adversary 𝒜, a meta-agent 𝒩 that represents the aggregated 
individual decisions of every agent n	∈ 𝑁, and a stochastic function R that 
represents the probability that such an agent is faulty (n	∈ 𝑁3) or correct 
(n	∈ 𝑁1). The goal of every agent n is to maximize its individual payoff; the 
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goal of 𝒜 is to maximize the net payoff of all faulty agents. No goal is 
specified for 𝒩, because its moves are determined by the individual goals 
of the agents that comprise N.  
Nodes and Payoffs  
At the root node, the meta-agent 𝒩 chooses whether the set of 
agents who join the protocol will have a mean corruption status 𝑦5] that 
exceeds the security threshold of the protocol’s underlying consensus 
algorithm. Unlike the adversary, 𝒩 has no power to control or 
communicate with agents, so its decision node does not permit the members 
of N to make a coordinated choice about whether to join the protocol. 
Instead, 𝒩’s choice is dictated by the criteria already specified in the 
probabilistic participation model: an agent n will choose to join the protocol 
if and only if it expects its reward to outweigh the cost of participation. The 
reward and cost are specified at the bottom of the game tree, which 
introduces an element of reflexivity: every agent n must make its choice 
based on its belief about 𝒩’s choice, but to infer 𝒩’s choice n must take 
into account its own choice, because n is itself one of the agents whose 
aggregated individual choices comprise 𝒩’s decision. 
If 𝒩decides that the mean corruption status of the agents who join 
the protocol will fall below the security threshold of its consensus 
algorithm (𝑦𝑁8 <	k), then consensus is guaranteed, so the adversary has no 
power to attack. If 𝒩 decides that the mean corruption status of the agents 
who join the protocol will exceed the security threshold, (𝑦𝑁8 ≥	k), then the 
adversary can choose whether it will attack (a) or comply with the protocol 
(¬a). If the adversary decides not to attack (¬a), then the resulting subgame 
is isomorphic to the case in which consensus is guaranteed (𝑦𝑁8 <	k).  
 After the ability of the adversary to attack has been determined, the 
stochastic function R dictates whether each agent n within N is faulty or 
correct, according to the binomial distribution 𝜌 ⊕1-𝜌. The location of the 
three stochastic nodes within the game tree is not significant; an equivalent 
extensive-form representation can be constructed by placing a single 
stochastic node at the root and modifying the information sets. The version 
of the game shown in Figure 4.1 begins at the meta-agent’s decision node 
as a matter of convenience. The structure of the resulting game tree pairs 
together payouts for faulty and correct agents in the same protocol 
execution, which simplifies the notation required to prove the Bayesian 
Nash equilibrium.   
In the left subgame — i.e., the branch of the tree in which 𝑦𝑁8 <	k 
—  the action set and payoffs are identical for correct and faulty agents, 
because the adversary 𝒜 has no power to attack. An agent n can either 
stake (j) and receive a payoff of the standard reward minus the standard 
cost (r–c) or decline to join (¬j) and receive a payoff of zero. 
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In the right subgame — i.e. the branch of the tree in which 𝑦𝑁8 ≥	k, 
b 𝒜 has declined to attack (¬a) — the actions and payoffs are the same as 
in the left subgame. By voluntarily choosing not to attack, the adversary 
effectively replicates the condition in which it is unable to attack.   
In the center subgame — i.e., the branch of the tree in which 𝑦𝑁8 ≥	k, and the adversary 𝒜 has chosen to attack (a) — correct and faulty agents 
both receive a payoff of zero if they decline to participation, but they 
receive different payoffs if they join. Correct agents who join pay the 
standard cost (c) while receiving a diminished reward rv that reflects the 
fact that the ledger has been victimized in an attack. Faulty agents who join 
the protocol participate in the attack, so they receive a larger reward that 
reflects their share of the profits generated by the attack (ra), while paying a 
cost (ca) that includes both the standard cost and any punishment for the 
attack. 
Imperfect Information  
Each agent n knows whether it is faulty or correct, so the decision 
nodes for faulty and correct agents do not belong to the same information 
set. However, when an agent must choose between joining the protocol (j) 
and declining to participate (¬j), it does not know whether 𝑦𝑁8 <	k or 
whether the adversary 𝒜 has chosen to attack (a). As a result, the agent is 
unable to determine which subgame play has reached when its decision 
node arrives.  
The limitation applies to both correct and faulty agents in the 
probabilistic-participation model, because the adversary cannot induce 
faulty agents to join the protocol. All three of the decision nodes for correct 
agents therefore belong to a single information set, and all three of the 
decision nodes for faulty agents also belong to a single information yet. 
Because none of the agents know which subgame has materialized, both 
correct and faulty agents will attempt to maximize their utility by choosing 
whichever action (j ⊕ ¬j) delivers the greater expected payoff when 
averaged across the probability distribution for the three subgames. 
An agent’s expected payoff from joining the consensus protocol is 
determined by its expected reward, minus its expected cost. We denote the 
expected reward by 𝜆~, where the subscript Y indicates type-dependence, 
such that all correct agents expect to receive a reward of λC and all faulty 
agents expect to receive a reward of λF. The values of the expected rewards 
are given by the formulas  𝜆1 = (𝑟) 𝜌 +	𝜌 + 𝑟 𝜌1  
and 𝜆3 = (𝑟) 𝜌 +	𝜌 + 𝑟l 𝜌1  
, 
where 𝜌is the probability of the left subgame, 𝜌is the probability of the 
right subgame, and 𝜌1  is the probability of the center subgame. 
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We denote the expected cost with 𝜓~, which is also type dependent. 
The cost paid by correct agents is identical in all three subgames, so 𝜓1= c. 
The same is not true for faulty agents, whose expected costs are given by 
the formula 𝜓3 = (𝑐) 𝜌 +	𝜌 + 𝑐l 𝜌1  
. 
These definitions allow us to extend the conditions previously 
specified in our probabilistic-participation model. The axiom that an agent 
will join the protocol if and only if the expected reward exceeds the 
expected cost can be formalized as a pair of type-dependent decision rules. 
For correct agents,  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁81 ≡ 𝜆1 > 𝜓1  
.     
For faulty agents,  𝑛 ∈ 𝑁83 ≡ 𝜆3 > 𝜓3 
. 
Incomplete Information  
It is common knowledge that the binomial distribution (𝜌 ⊕ 1 − 𝜌) 
employed by the stochastic function R to select a faulty or correct agent at 
random from the set of agents with access to the network is constrained by 
the mean corruption status, 𝑌, such that 𝑌MQR ≥ 1 − 𝜌 ≥ 	𝑌MN5.  
The amount of the standard cost c is known to all players. The value 
of r is not known to the players, but it is common knowledge that r > 0. 
This reflects the fact that, although the value of a reward denominated in a 
new cryptographic asset is highly uncertain, negative or zero values can be 
excluded.3 Each player estimates the value of r according to its own 
probability distribution. Those distributions are private information, so 
players are uncertain how much value other players attach to receiving r. 
However, to exclude trivial solution concepts in which only correct agents 
participate, we require that the average estimated value of r by faulty agents 
be at least equal to the average estimated value of r by correct agents.   
It is common knowledge that the successful execution of an attack 
decreases the value of a ledger’s cryptocurrency (rv <	r). The realized 
amount of the decrease is not known to the players, but rv is known to be 
positive. It is common knowledge that rv <	ra, because ra is composed of rv 
                                                
3 If a value of zero for receiving the reward cannot be excluded, then even 
if the cost of participation is zero, a net payoff of zero for joining the 
protocol cannot be ruled out. Participation will weakly dominate non-
participation, because it guarantees the best possible payoff. However, 
participation will not strongly dominate, because the scenario in which both 
choices yield a zero payout cannot be excluded.   
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plus the faulty node’s share of the attack profits. However, the value of ra is 
known only to the adversary, 𝒜. This reflects the fact that the profits 
available from attacking a cryptocurrency ledger may be higher than the 
quantity of wealth that can be stolen in a double-spending attack, since 
there are agents (competitors, terrorists, etc.) who may assign a value to 
harming the ledger that exceeds its extant market capitalization. 
 It is common knowledge that 𝑐l ≥ 𝑐, because ca is composed of c 
plus any punishment inflicted on the adversary. The concept of punishment 
is broad enough to encompass both criminal penalties and protocol-
enforced penalties such as slashing. However, the amount of the difference, 
if any, between 𝑐l and 𝑐 is unknown, and players’ beliefs about this value 
are private information. This reflects real-world uncertainty about the 
effectiveness of these deterrents at safeguarding distributed ledgers. 
Equilibrium Conditions   
We refer to a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which one or more 
agents join the protocol as a signaling equilibrium, and one in which no 
agents join the protocol as a non-signaling equilibrium. Formally, a 
signaling equilibrium exists in the event that  (𝜆1 > 𝜓1) ∨ (𝜆3 > 𝜓3) 
, 
and a non-signaling equilibrium exists when  (𝜆1 ≤ 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 ≤ 𝜓3) 
. 
By definition, permissionless Byzantine consensus requires a signaling 
equilibrium, because in a non-signaling equilibrium no agents broadcast or 
receive messages.  
A pooling equilibrium exists when the dominant strategy for faulty 
and correct agents is identical, such that an agent n’s decision to join the 
protocol provides no information about whether the agent is faulty or 
correct. A separating equilibrium exists when an agent’s type affects its 
dominant strategy, such that knowledge of n’s decision to participate in the 
protocol conveys information about whether n is faulty or correct. If that 
information indicates that n is faulty — i.e. if the fact that an agent joined 
the protocol increases the probability that it has been corrupted by the 
adversary — then a separating equilibrium is adversarially biased.  
Formally, a pooling equilibrium exists if {(𝜆1 ≤ 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 ≤ 𝜓3)} ⊕ {(𝜆1 > 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 > 𝜓3)} 
. 
A separating equilibrium exists if  {(𝜆1 ≤ 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 > 𝜓3)} ⊕ {(𝜆1 > 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 ≤ 𝜓3)} 
, 
and the separating equilibrium is adversarially biased if  (𝜆1 ≤ 𝜓1) ∧ (𝜆3 > 𝜓3) 
27 
. 
The game-theoretic representation of the toy environment with 
probabilistic participation is now complete, and we are ready to prove this 
section’s core result.  
 
4.2 Zero-Cost Theorem  
Theorem 1: Permissionless Byzantine consensus is a verifiable 
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if the cost of participation is zero.  
Proof: This theorem is a straightforward consequence of the two 
lemmas we prove below. Once we identify the potential Bayesian Nash 
equilibria in the extensive-form game, we analyze how the realized 
equilibrium changes depending on whether c is positive or zero. Our model 
indicates that if the cost of participation in a protocol is positive then there 
is a risk that the set of participants will be adversarially biased, and that risk 
makes it impossible to recruit correct agents since those agents cannot 
guarantee that the protocol’s mean corruption status will remain below its 
consensus algorithm’s security threshold. 
Lemma 1: Any separating equilibrium between correct and faulty 
agents is adversarially biased.  
Proof: In the left and right sub-subgames — i.e., when 𝑦𝑁8 <	k or 
when 𝒜 chooses ¬a — the payoffs for faulty and correct agents are 
identical: j yields r–c and ¬j yields zero for any agent n. Therefore, a 
separating equilibrium can only arise from the center subgame, where 𝑦𝑁8 ≥ 	𝑘 and the adversary chooses 𝒜.  
For a separating equilibrium to emerge in the center subgame, there 
must be a type-dependent payoff differential. There is the potential for such 
a differential, because the payoffs specified for faulty and correct agents are 
not identical. Both types receive 0 for ¬j, but a type-dependent payoff 
differential exists for j: faulty agents receive ra–ca while correct agents 
receive rv –c. A pooling equilibrium will exist if ra–ca and rv –c are both > 0 
or both < 0, because the dominant strategy for faulty and correct agents will 
be the same. If ra–ca  > 0 and rv –c < 0, a separating equilibrium will exist in 
which j is the dominant strategy for faulty agents and ¬j is the dominant 
strategy for correct agents. If ra–ca  < 0 and rv –c > 0, a subgame separating 
equilibrium will exist in which j is the dominant strategy for correct agents 
and ¬j is the dominant strategy for faulty agents. 
However, the latter subgame separating equilibrium is never 
realized, because it is blocked by the adversary 𝒜 at its decision node. If rv  
– c > 0, then r – c > 0, because r > rv. Play will therefore never reach the 
center subgame, because the payoff to 𝒜 from ¬a will weakly dominate a: 
if n	∈ NF plays ¬j, then ¬a and a are both worth 0 to 𝒜, but if n	∈ NF plays 
j, then ¬a returns the higher payoff, because r –c > 0 and ra–ca  < 0. The 
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dominant strategy for	𝒜 whenever ra – ca  < 0 and rv –c > 0 is to prevent a 
subgame separating equilibrium by playing ¬a, since the pooling 
equilibrium within the right sub-subgame will maximize the payoff for 
faulty agents.  
A realized subgame separating equilibrium exists if and only if ra – 
ca  > r – c and ra – ca > 0 while rv –c < 0. In that circumstance, the 
inequalities required for an adversarially biased separating equilibrium in 
the center subgame are present, because j for ra – ca  is the dominant move 
for faulty agents and ¬j for 0 is the dominant move for correct replicas. The 
separating equilibrium is realized, because the weakly dominant strategy 
for 𝒜 is to force the center subgame by playing a: the payoff available if 
n	∈ NF chooses j is greater than in the right subgame, and it is equal if n	∈ 
NF chooses ¬j. □ 
Lemma 2: A pooling equilibrium between correct and faulty agents 
is guaranteed if and only if there is no cost to joining the protocol. 
Proof: For correct agents’ dominant strategy to be j, it is necessary 
but not sufficient that r > c. If c ≥ r, then c > rv, because c ≥ r > rv, and the 
payoff to correct agents from j is therefore ≤ 0 in all subgames. In that 
scenario, j is weakly dominated by ¬j, because ¬j guarantees a 0 payoff, 
while the payoff from j may be < 0.   
Even if r > c, the dominant strategy for correct agents will still be 
still be ¬j if rv < c : 𝜆1 ≤ 𝜓1 . If c > 0, the possibility that r – c ≤ 0 cannot 
be excluded, because the value of r is uncertain. However, if c = 0 then the 
possibility that r – c < 0 can be excluded, because r is known to be positive, 
such that r – 0 > 0 for all potential values of r. Likewise, if c = 0, then it is 
guaranteed that rv – c > 0, because rv is known to be positive, such that rv – 
0 > 0 for all potential values of rv. The dominant strategy for correct replicas 
is therefore guaranteed to be j, even with imperfect information, because j 
yields a larger payoff than ¬j in all three subgames.   
Per Lemma 1, if the dominant strategy for correct agents is j, then 
the dominant strategy for faulty agents is also j, because no realized 
separating equilibrium can be biased in favor of correct agents. □ 
 
5. Inter-Temporal Trust 
We have so far modeled permissionless Byzantine consensus 
without a rigorous formalism for representing how trust in a protocol 
evolves as time passes. Yet time interacts with our results in subtle and 
important ways. In this section, we add temporal restrictions to our formal 
notation, and prove that a protocol’s security and utility depend 
significantly on the temporal structure of its sampling frame.      
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5.1 Temporal Parts 
We divide time into a sequence S of discrete slots. The set of all slots 
is S. A slot 𝑠 ∈ S is the smallest unit of time that can be specified when 
restricting an entity’s temporal parts. A protocol’s initial slot is 𝑠5, which 
we index with 0, so that the ensuing slots are 𝑠7, 𝑠, …, 𝑠. In our formal 
notation, we set out temporal restrictions in superscript using angle 
brackets. For example, n refers by default to agent n in all slots of time, 
whereas 𝑛 ^  refers to agent n in only slot s, and 𝑛 ^^ 	 refers to agent n in 
the closed interval [𝑠, 𝑠′] from slot s to a subsequent slot, 𝑠′. 
This extension of our notation makes it possible to express inter-
temporal trust assumptions. The trust set of agent n during slot s is written 𝑇[𝑛 ^ ]. Note that this temporal restriction applies to the time when the 
agent holds its belief. If we wish to restrict the temporal parts of the agent 
who is being trusted, then the angle brackets are added to the elements of 
the trust set. For example, 𝑛′ ^ ∈ T[n] indicates that, in all slots, agent n 
trusts that agent n′ was correct during slot s. 
The same notation can be employed to specify temporal parts of 
control sets and control structures. A control set during a specific slot is 
written 𝑓 ^ , which denotes one or more agents that have the collective 
power to violate the protocol’s security guarantees during slot s. A 
protocol’s control structure for a specific slot is 𝐹 ^ , which denotes all the 
control sets that have the power to violate the protocol’s security guarantees 
during slot s.  
These definitions make it possible to formalize the temporal parts of 
a protocol’s maximum user base, 𝑁B. Let 𝑁B ^  be a protocol’s maximum 
user base during slot s, which can be calculated according to the formula  𝑁B ^ = 	 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 ∶ 	𝑇 𝑛 ^ ∩	∀𝑓𝐹 ^ ∈ 𝐹 ^ 	≠ 	∅  
, 
i.e., the protocol’s maximum user base during slot s consists of the 
members of N whose trust sets during slot s intersect with all of the 
protocol’s control sets during slot s. Put differently, a user can only trust a 
protocol during a slot if it believes that every set of agents capable of 
violating the protocol’s security guarantees during that slot is verifiably 
correct. 
 
5.2 Temporal Sampling Frames 
With our temporal notation formalized, we are ready to examine the 
practical implications of temporal restrictions.  
Fixed Permissioned Frame 
We begin with the simple example of a permissioned protocol, 
where the set of participants in consensus, NS, is a fixed group of 
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identifiable agents. This is consistent with pre-Bitcoin consensus 
algorithms, such as pBFT. [23] All of the members of NS generate 
asymmetric key pairs before the protocol is initiated. Their public keys are 
embedded in the protocol’s genesis block, so that a quorum of the 
corresponding private keys is sufficient to achieve consensus in any 
subsequent slot. 
If we assume that the agents retain exclusive control of their private 
keys, then all temporal parts of the protocol’s control structure are identical. 
The same identifiable agents who control the protocol in the genesis block 
will necessarily retain control of the protocol in all future slots. In formal 
terms, 𝐹 ^ ≡ 𝐹 ∀^	∈	8 .  
The advantage to this arrangement is that the fixed membership of 𝑁8 has “skin in the game.” Every agent 𝑛 ^  ∈ 𝑁8 ^  who controls a private 
key during slot 𝑠 knows that it will retain the same voting power in any 
future slot 𝑠′. If there is an economic value to voting power, such as the 
ability to earn block rewards or transaction fees by updating a 
cryptographic monetary ledger, the consensus participants will have an 
incentive to act honestly in order to make the protocol a success. If the 
adversary 𝒜 offered a quorum of consensus participants a bribe in the 
hopes of persuading them to destroy the protocol in the present, it would be 
economically rational for the quorum members to accept 𝒜’s offer if and 
only if the present value of the bribe exceeds the time-discounted value of 
their future earnings as transaction validators.  
The downside to the arrangement is that, because the protocol’s 
control structure cannot change, its maximum potential user base cannot 
expand. If the composition of the total population remains constant, then 
the set of agents who can trust the protocol at its inception will be identical 
to the set of agents who can trust the protocol in all subsequent slots, i.e., 𝑁B ^ ≡ 𝑁B ∀^	∈	8 . It is therefore impossible to “bootstrap” the protocol 
by starting with an initially small group of consensus participants. Those 
agents will remain permanently in control of the protocol, so the limits of 
their trustworthiness are the limits of the protocol’s scalability.  
Disposable Permissionless Frame 
The situation is very different for a permissionless protocol with free 
entry. In our toy environment, the set of agents present in the protocol 
during a given slot can update the ledger by executing a new round of 
pBFT. Agents with access to the network join and leave the consensus 
protocol whenever they want, so the composition and size of NS always has 
the potential to change. The set of agents who control the protocol in one 
round may lose some of their members in the next round and be supplanted 
by a different coalition of agents. Even if they retain all their members, an 
even larger group of agents may suddenly join and seize power.  
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The agents who are present for a given round of consensus are 
always collectively in control of the protocol. Formally, for all s, 𝐹 ^ ⊆ 𝑁8 ^ , i.e., the protocol’s control structure in any round s is a subset of the 
set of agents participating in that round. The downside to this is that a given 
round of consensus will be vulnerable to book-prize attacks unless the set 
of active protocol participants is large enough to satisfy the minimum-
participation threshold. Formally, 𝒩8 ^ ∈ 𝑇[∀𝑛 ^ ∈ 𝑁 ^ ] ≡ 𝑁8 ^ ≥ 𝑁8 MN5, where 𝒩8 ^  is the meta-agent comprised of protocol participants 
during slot s. Maintaining the required degree of participation in every slot 
may be difficult or impossible.  
The advantage is that new agents can start trusting the protocol 
without trusting the past sets of protocol participants. If the adversary 𝒜 is 
able to successfully corrupt a super-threshold fraction of consensus 
participants during slot 𝑠, so that 𝑦𝑁8 ≥ 𝑘, then 𝒜 is only guaranteed the 
ability to attack during that slot — not during subsequent slots.	Because 
new agent may join the consensus protocol, an influx of correct agents may 
lower the protocol’s mean corruption status so that 𝑦𝑁8 < 𝑘 in slot 𝑠′. In 
our temporal notation, 𝒜 ∈ 𝐹 ^ ≢ 𝒜 ∈ 𝐹 ^ . The security guarantees of 
such a protocol are therefore “ergodic” in the sense that the risk of failure in 
a given slot is path independent, i.e., agents can join in any order. [24] [25] 
However, the free-entry condition used to achieve ergodicity has a 
downside. It creates a principal-agent problem: the members of 𝑁8 ^  cannot 
guarantee to themselves during slot s that they will remain in control of the 
protocol during a future slot s′, so they may have an incentive to take 
actions in the present — like defecting to the adversary — which provide 
immediate rewards. The harm caused by damaging the protocol so that it 
cannot achieve its full potential by time s′ may not be a sufficient incentive 
to defer defection by the members of 𝐹 ^ , because each agent n ∈ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ^  
will discount those future rewards by the probability that n ∈ 𝑓 ∈ 𝐹 ^ . In 
economic terms, the present consensus participants do not receive franchise 
value in the protocol, so it is rational for them to defect against the future 
protocol “owners” as soon as they receive a sufficiently attractive 
opportunity. [11]    
Fixed Permissionless Frame 
One solution to the problems just described is to create a 
permissionless protocol without an ongoing free-entry condition. Let us 
imagine that an open invitation is issued for all agents with access to the 
network to sign up for the protocol by registering their public keys in 
advance. All registered keys are embedded in the genesis block, so that 
every agent who signed up in advance is eligible to participate in 
consensus. An agent with a registered key can either vote directly in pBFT 
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or delegate its vote to one of the agents in its trust set. Every consensus 
decision is thereby backed by a quorum of registered keys.  
If the cardinality of the set of agents who register their keys, 𝑁 , 
meets the minimum participation threshold 𝑁8 MN5, then this arrangement 
offers the proverbial “best of both worlds” between the permissioned and 
permissionless paradigms. It has the same fixed control structure F and 
incentive compatibility as the permissioned protocol, because the members 
of 𝑁  will verifiably remain in control of the protocol in all future slots. 
Yet it achieves the maximum user base of permissionless consensus, 
because every agent with access to the network can trust the results of 
consensus given that 𝑁 ≥ 𝑁8 MN5 guarantees 𝑦𝑁8 < 𝑘.     
However, if the set of agents who register their keys falls below the 
minimum participation threshold — i.e., if 𝑁 < 𝑁8 MN5 — then the 
protocol is strictly defective. The set of keys embedded in the genesis block 
is not large enough to exclude the possibility that the mean corruption 
status of protocol participants exceeds the consensus algorithm’s security 
threshold, so users cannot rationally trust the results of consensus without 
knowing the identities of the agents whose keys are registered. The result is 
equivalent to a permissioned protocol in which, rather than carefully 
recruiting trustworthy agents, keys are arbitrarily distributed to whomever 
shows up. Per Lemma 1, this arbitrary set of agents cannot rationally be 
trusted, because it may represent the adversary 𝒜 executing a book-prize 
attack.  
Closed Permissionless Frame 
In practice, it may be impossible to arrange for a sufficient fraction 
of agents with access to the network to register their public keys before the 
creation of a protocol’s genesis block. It is therefore desirable to design a 
mechanism that preserves incentive compatibility in every slot while also 
permitting the control structure F to evolve. Ideally, such a mechanism 
would permit the set of consensus participants to expand over time, such 
that 𝑁 < 𝑘 ≢ 𝑁8 ^ < 𝑁8 MN5.  
The mechanism employed for this purpose in today’s Proof-of-Stake 
protocols can be represented in our toy environment as a special case of 
delegation. An agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁  can irreversibly delegate an arbitrary 
fraction of its voting power to a different agent, 𝑛′, who may in turn 
irreversibly delegate arbitrary fractions of its voting power to other agents. 
We refer to this form of delegation as a transfer of voting power. 
In theory, transfers enable the control structure F to evolve, because 
an agent 𝑛 who transfers voting power to 𝑛′ loses control of that voting 
power. If a series of transfers resulted in voting power being evenly 
distributed among a sufficiently large number of agents by slot 𝑠′, such that 
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𝑁8 ^ ≥ 𝑁8 MN5, then 𝑦𝑁8 ^ < 𝑘 is guaranteed, and every agent 𝑛 ^  
would become a member of the protocol’s maximum user base, 𝑁B ^ . 
There are two significant shortcomings to this approach. 
First, there is nothing to force the members of 𝑁  to transfer their 
voting power, so the evolution of the control structure F by slot 𝑠′ is 
possible but in no way guaranteed. The coordination problem from our 
extensive-form game therefore remains in any slot 𝑠 prior to 𝑠′. In the 
earlier slot, an agent 𝑛 has no means of predicting the protocol’s mean 
corruption status in the future slot, so it cannot place its future trust in the 
protocol. Formally, 𝑛 ^ ∉ 𝑁B ^ .  
Second, there is no way for agents to verify that the control structure 
F has actually evolved. This is not a problem in our toy environment, where 
Sybil attacks are prohibited, but it a decisive flaw in the real world.  
In the toy environment, every agent has access to a single private 
key, so a transfer of voting power from the public key associated with 𝑛 to 
the public key associated with 𝑛′ guarantees an actual change in the 
distribution of cryptographic voting power. This is what enables agents 
who could not initially trust the protocol to later become members of its 
maximum user base: even if they cannot trust 𝐹 ^ , they can verify that 
subsequent transfers have redistributed voting power in a manner that 
makes 𝐹 ^  trustworthy. 
In the real world, each agent 𝑛 can generate an unlimited number of 
private keys with corresponding public keys. The members of any control 
set 𝑓 within 𝑁  or 𝑁8 ^  can therefore execute a special form of pseudo-
spoofing, which we refer to as a pseudo-transfer attack. Specifically, every 
agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑓 ^  generates an arbitrarily large number of new key pairs and 
executes a series of transfers before slot 𝑠′ that redistribute all of its voting 
power among the new keys. To the outside world, these transfers make it 
appear that the control structure F has evolved, such that 𝐹 ^ ≢ 	𝐹 ^ . Yet 
the evolution of 𝐹 is an illusion: the members of the control set 𝑓 ^  have 
simply transferred their voting power to themselves. Agents executing a 
pseudo-transfer attack can maintain this charade indefinitely with future 
transfers, invisibly preserving their power to successfully attack the 
protocol at the time of their choosing.  
Dynamic Permissionless Frame 
Pseudo-transfer attacks can be neutralized if, rather than relying on 
the members of 𝑁  to transfer their voting power, new voting power can 
be issued to late-joining agents. The control structure F will thereby 
verifiably evolve, even if the members of 𝑁  retain all of their original 
voting power. To envision a simple scenario in which this is possible, let us 
imagine that a world government has established a global online voting 
system. This provides an approachable preview of the more complex 
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mechanisms that the KRNC protocol employs to bootstrap consensus from 
the world’s online-banking system.  
In our hypothetical, the world government has used its coercive 
power to ensure that every agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁 has one and only one account on 
the online voting system. Every account has a number, which is effectively 
a pseudonym because the identity of the agent associated with each account 
number is known only to the world government. Agents log in to the world 
government’s online voting portal using their account number and a 
password known only to them. Once logged in to its online-voting account, 
an agent 𝑛 can broadcast arbitrary messages to the other members of 𝑁, 
which contain unforgeable proof of the agent’s account number.    
The list of account numbers acts as a sampling frame, so that one 
and only one unit of cryptographic voting power is issued to every agent. 
An agent who wishes to join the permissionless consensus protocol 
generates an asymmetric key pair, uses its existing password to log in to its 
online-voting account, and then broadcasts a message containing its public 
key. This message is treated as a registration of the public key in the 
permissionless consensus protocol, so one unit of voting power is assigned 
to the public key. If another public key is broadcast from the same account 
number, no voting power is assigned to the later key, because the voting 
power associated with the account has already been claimed by its owner. 
Public keys registered before the initiation of the consensus protocol 
are embedded directly in the protocol’s genesis block, but they do not limit 
the total amount of voting power in the protocol. When new public keys are 
registered from unused account numbers after the protocol has been 
initiated, they are simply appended to the list of public keys eligible to 
participate in consensus, which can continue growing until every agent has 
claimed its voting power. Even if the list of keys embedded in the genesis 
block is too short to initially guarantee security — i.e., if 𝑁 < 𝑁8 MN5 
— the protocol’s ultimate security is guaranteed as long as the list of 
registered keys eventually satisfies the minimum participation threshold.  
 
Part III: Realistic Environment 
 
6. Capital-Weighted Byzantine Consensus  
The results we have obtained in our toy environment and world-
government hypothetical must be replicated in an environment that 
corresponds to the real world. In this section, we begin that task. We 
replace the toy environment with a realistic model of resource-weighted 
consensus in the presence of an adversary capable of executing both book-
prize attacks and Sybil attacks.   
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6.1 Resource-Weighted Sybil Resistance  
In the toy environment, the adversary 𝒜 was prohibited from 
engaging in pseudo-spoofing. In reality, the internet is a permissionless 
network, where a single agent n can create an unlimited number of 
identities. Let the collection of all identities be I, indexed by i = 1, 2, …, I. 
Each identity 𝑖	 ∈ 	𝐼 is controlled by an agent 𝑛	 ∈ 𝑁, such that 𝑁[𝑖] = 𝑛. 
The identity i inherits the status 𝑌4 , such that 𝑌 = 0	if 𝑁[𝑖] = 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁1	and 𝑌 = 1 if 𝑁[𝑖] = 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁3.  
Let 𝐼8  be the subpopulation of identities within a protocol. The 
protocol is vulnerable to a Sybil attack if, even though 𝑦𝑁8 < 	𝑘, consensus 
fails because 𝑦𝐼8 	≥ 	𝑘. In other words, even if the requisite fraction of 
agents in the protocol is correct, so that consensus would be guaranteed if 
each agent voted only once, the adversary 𝒜 can still rig the vote by having 
faulty agents create extra identities.  
Sybil Resistance  
Traditional Byzantine consensus is inherently vulnerable to Sybil 
attacks, because it assumes a reliable identity system. Protocols for 
weighted consensus overcome this problem. [26] Every identity i is 
assigned a weight ω[i], where ω[i] ≥ 0. Even if the adversary controls a 
super-threshold fraction of identities — i.e., if 𝑦𝐼8 ≥	k — consensus is still 
guaranteed if correct agents control a sufficient fraction of the weight 
within the protocol.  
Formally, a weighted consensus protocol’s security guarantees will 
hold if and only if    
ω 𝑖 	Na67	 / ω 𝑖 ≥ 	𝑘
Na
67	 	
, 
where ω 𝑖  is a non-negative weight assigned to an identity i and 𝐼83is the 
population of identities in the protocol controlled by faulty agents. For 
every weight-assignment protocol 𝑃, there will be a collection of potential 
combinations of agents within N, the elements of which are sets of agents 
whose members control enough weight to break the protocol.4 That 
collection is the weighted protocol’s control structure, F. If a deterministic 
quorum-based consensus algorithm is employed, then 𝐼8 will represent all 
the weight that has been issued, whereas if a chain-length algorithm is 
employed as required to assume that k=0.5, then 𝐼8 will represent only 
weight that is contemporaneously online and contributing to consensus.  
                                                
4 The sole, trivial exception is the null protocol, 𝒫∅, wherein ω 𝑛 = 0 for 
all n, because ω 𝑖  = 0 for all i. We exclude it from our analysis, because it 
is nonfunctional.   
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Resource Weighting 
In most modern protocols, weights are assigned in proportion to 
stakes within a specified resource, such as hashing power or 
cryptocurrency. To preserve the generality of our model, we define an 
abstract staking resource, V. Let e[n,v] be agent n’s endowment v of 
resource V,  such that the supply of V is the sum of the individual 
endowments of N’s members.  
The weighted voting power of every agent n within NS is scaled in 
proportion to e[n,v]. This can be modeled using a “flat world” 
transformation, in which every agent who owns v units of V becomes v 
replicas who each own one unit of V. When this transformation is applied to 
Ns, let the resulting population be MS, within which e[m,v]=1 for all m. We 
assign every replica m of MS a status Ym whose value matches the status Yn 
of the original agent n within NS.  
Resource-weighted consensus among the members of NS can be 
guaranteed if and only if within MS the mean corruption status falls below 
the weighted-consensus algorithm’s security threshold — i.e., it is 
necessary that 𝑦𝑀8 < 𝑘. In other words, after weights are applied to create 
a simulated electorate on a virtual network, that electorate must contain the 
honest majority or supermajority required by an unweighted consensus 
algorithm. Otherwise, the weighting procedure will place the adversary in 
control of whether the protocol’s security guarantees are violated.  
    
6.2 Allocation-Adaptive Adversaries   
The formal proofs of security employed by today’s cryptocurrency 
ledgers do not demonstrate that 𝑦𝑀8 < 𝑘. Instead, it is standard to specify 
the maximum fraction of the staking resource that the adversary can acquire 
before the protocol breaks — and then to “prove” that the protocol is secure 
by assuming that this threshold will never be exceeded. The problem is that, 
in real life, an adversary can change how it allocates its capital in response 
to the introduction of an anti-Sybil resource-weighting scheme. A static 
adversary can have the agents it controls exchange their shares of non-
staking resources for shares of the staking resource; an adaptive adversary 
has the further ability to change which agents it has corrupted, so that it can 
obtain control of whichever combination of resource endowments will 
maximize the probability of successfully trading for a super-𝑘 fraction of 
the staking resource. The axioms employed in existing proofs are therefore 
unreliable, because they are not guaranteed to remain invariant with respect 
to changes in how voting weight is assigned. [27] 
Bitcoin: A Case Study  
Bitcoin offers a cautionary example. When it was designed, 
Nakamoto chose hashing power as the protocol’s staking resource in order 
to approximate a “1 person, 1 vote” weighting, based on the assumption 
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that every person owned roughly one CPU. 5 [28] [29] Yet, as soon as the 
success of Bitcoin increased the market value of hashing power, agents 
adapted by acquiring extra hardware to inflate their weights in the protocol. 
Today, a standard CPU receives effectively zero weight in Bitcoin, because 
participants in the consensus protocol exaggerate their hashing power using 
distributed supercomputers comprised of ASICs. This undermines Bitcoin’s 
core value proposition — its claimed ability to act as a store of value 
superior to gold, because its absolute cryptographic scarcity guarantees a 
higher stock-to-flow ratio. [30] 
In reality, Bitcoin’s reliability as a store of value depends on two 
stock-to-flow ratios, not one. The familiar ratio is the quantity of BTC held 
by protocol participants relative to the BTC that miners earn from block 
rewards. If one equates Bitcoin with a physical commodity, then this 
represents the most impressive stock-to-flow ratio in history, because the 
total future flow is cryptographically limited. However, Bitcoin is different 
from a physical commodity, in that the value of the existing stock can be 
destroyed even if the future supply is not inflated. If an adversary acquires a 
super-threshold fraction of voting power on the network, then it can begin 
executing double-spending attacks, and the willingness of agents in the 
economy to accept Bitcoin as money will thereby be diminished or 
destroyed. Even a large but sub-𝑘 stake may be sufficient for the adversary 
to force transaction confirmation delays that undermine the usability of the 
network.  It is therefore crucial to consider not only the stock-to-flow ratio 
of BTC itself, but also the stock-to-flow ratio of the staking-resource 𝑣 — 
which, in the case of Bitcoin, is algorithm-specific hashing power.  
Viewed through that lens, BTC’s properties are less impressive. The 
success of the Bitcoin protocol caused demand for hashing power to 
explode, and the flow of new 𝑣 onto the market increased at a rate akin to 
hyperinflation. If the efficiency of the equipment for mining gold were ever 
to increase at a comparable rate, then the flow of gold onto the world 
market would have sped up exponentially, and the price of gold would 
immediately have begun dropping. In Bitcoin, that outcome is avoided 
because the difficulty of the underlying cryptographic puzzles 
automatically increases, so that the flow of BTC remains stable no matter 
how quickly the quantity and efficiency of the hardware being operated to 
mine Bitcoin grows. However, the fact that mining equipment cannot be 
directly used to flood the market with new Bitcoin does not alter the fact 
that control of Nakamoto consensus will inevitably shift to the agents who 
have acquired the newest, fastest mining equipment. This limits the 
                                                
5 In our notation, Nakamoto’s analysis of Poof-of-Work starts with the 
axiom that 𝑌 < 	𝑘 within N, assumes that this inequality will hold within 
NS, and then reasons that 𝑦𝑀8 < 𝑘	because 𝑁 ≈ 𝑀. [26]  
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scalability of the protocol, because its maximum user base 𝑁B encompasses 
only agents who have reason to believe that whoever has the newest, fastest 
mining equipment is trustworthy. 
Worse, the agents with the latest mining equipment can use their 
ability to degrade network performance or execute double-spending attacks 
to hold the protocol hostage unless other stakeholders (Bitcoin users, 
exchanges, etc.) accede to modifying the original supply schedule, so that 
more than 21-million BTC can be mined.6 It is therefore incorrect to portray 
Bitcoin as a “synthetic commodity,” which possesses innate scarcity 
equivalent to physical resources like gold, merely because a tentative 
agreement has been reached about the future supply schedule. [31] Indeed, 
the ability to adhere to a predefined supply schedule was the original 
benefit promised by unbacked fiat money as a replacement for the gold 
standard. [32] That theoretical benefit never materialized because, when 
placed in charge of administering a currency ledger, governments 
eventually succumb to the temptation to deviate from the supply schedule 
to which they are nominally bound. 
As one 19th century advocate of private currency observed, “The 
idea that governments must necessarily control the currency arises . . . from 
the erroneous but prevalent idea that governments are more trustworthy 
than their subjects.” [33] Today, the idea that the Bitcoin protocol should 
control the money supply arises from the erroneous but prevalent idea that 
it is more trustworthy than the government. If Milton Friedman’s vision of 
“replacing the Fed with a computer” is ever going to be meaningfully 
realized, control of that computer must be distributed among a set of agents 
whom the owners of money can verifiably trust. [34] Bitcoin was designed 
to accomplish that, by distributing voting power in proportion to a resource 
that everyone already owned. Unfortunately, it failed because agents were 
able to dynamically adjust their resource allocations. 
GLC: An Eternal Gordian Knot   
The underlying problem is not unique to Bitcoin or cryptocurrencies. 
It is an example of Goodhart’s Law: when a measure becomes a target, it 
ceases to be accurate. [35] A familiar example is the problem of “teaching 
to the test” in education: when student performance is measured by 
standardized tests, teachers devote disproportionate time to the material 
                                                
6 Switching to a different hashing algorithm can temporarily fix this 
problem by making the ASICs employed by existing mining pools 
ineffective, but the structural factors that determine which entities dominate 
Proof-of-Work — including expertise in creating and operating 
supercomputers, access to cheap electricity, and acquiescence of local 
government — will ultimately reemerge.  
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covered by the exams, artificially boosting their pupils’ scores. Variants of 
the same phenomenon are known as “Campbell’s Law” and “the Cobra 
Effect.” [36] These are all names for the core, recurring problem in fields 
that attempt causal interventions in the presence of volitional agents, whose 
ability to alter their choices in response to interventions creates a reflexive 
“feedback loop” between cause and effect. [37] [38] 
Proof-of-Balance is based on a simple solution to this problem, 
which is nonetheless apparently novel. [39] The solution can be phrased 
informally as a rejoinder to Goodhart’s Law: “if whatever you measure will 
become a target, measure whatever is already a target.” In the present 
section, we will begin defining the realistic environment needed to model 
an adversary’s ability to circumvent a Sybil-resistance scheme by 
modifying its resource allocations. This will lay the groundwork for a full 
formalization of our solution in Section 8.  
Endowments and Allocations  
Let there be G resources, indexed by g = 1, 2, …, G. One of these 
resources is the staking resource, V. We adopt the standard assumptions of 
general equilibrium in an Arrow-Debreu environment, including that 
supply and demand will converge on the market-clearing prices p1, p2, …pG 
for all resources. [40] 
Later, it will be convenient to express the total market capitalization 
of every resource g using the per-unit price pg. Based on the simplifying 
assumption that all resources are divisible, we therefore split every resource 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺 into a collection of units with equal cardinality. Because there is no 
production in our model, this yields a supply-normalized price pg for every 
resource, including a price 𝑝¢  for the staking resource, V.7 
Our normalization technique means that the total supply of every 
resource is equal, but it does not affect the distribution of that supply 
among agents in the economy. Let e[n,g] be agent n’s initial endowment of 
resource g, such that the supply of each resource is the sum of the 
endowments of that resource among all members of N. Let x[n,g] be agent’s 
n’s ultimate allocation of resource g after all exchanges, if any, have been 
completed.  
For general equilibrium, it is standard to assume that every agent n 
has Cobb-Douglas utility, such that 𝛼[𝑛, 𝑔] > 0 for all n and g. The utility 𝛼[𝑛] of an agent n is therefore 𝛼 𝑛 = 𝑥¥67 [𝑛, 𝑔]¦[4,¥]	
                                                
7 In practice, this simplifying assumption will be employed only to exclude 
scenarios in which the supply of money is so great that it ceases to be the 
most saleable resource in the economy.         
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, 
which represents the amount of each resource it controls, raised to the 
exponent defined by its utility function for that resource.  
Adversarial Utility Function 
Formalizing the Byzantine adversary 𝒜 in this economic framework 
is a non-trivial challenge. 𝒜 will always prefer breaking the protocol to not 
breaking the protocol, so it has a lexicographic preference for the staking 
resource in quantities sufficient to prevent consensus. Formally,  𝑥[𝒜, 𝑣: 𝑦M] ≥ 𝑘]¦ 𝒜,¢:§¨]©ª > ∀ 𝑥[𝒜, 𝑔: 𝑦M] < 𝑘]¦ 𝒜,¥:§¨]«ª  
. 
Unfortunately, like all lexicographic preferences, this ordering is strictly 
discontinuous, so it cannot be replicated by any von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility function. We will employ a variant of the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function that is continuous up to an asymptotic limit, and which 
approximates a Byzantine adversary’s preferences with arbitrary precision. 
Let there be two forms of utility, standard utility, 𝛼5, and faulty 
utility, 𝛼3. Both correct and faulty agents receive 𝛼5 from all resources. 
However, 𝛼3	represents the utility of a successful attack on the protocol, so 
it is only available to faulty agents, and those agents only receive it from 
controlling units of the staking resource, V. The aggregate utility of the 
adversary 𝒜 is therefore  𝛼 𝒜 = 𝛼5 𝒜 + 𝛼3 𝒜 = 𝑥¥67 [𝒜, 𝑔]¦ 𝒜,¥ + 𝑥[𝒜, 𝑣]¦[𝒜,]	
where  𝛼3 𝒜, 𝑣 = lim¦→	 𝜌[	𝑦M] ≥ 𝑘]  
.	
The strength of the adversary’s preference for a successful attack is 
asymptotically close to infinity, but the value the adversary attaches to the 
staking resource is discounted by the probability of acquiring the necessary 
fraction of voting weight to successfully attack, 𝜌[	𝑦M] ≥ 𝑘].8  
If this probability is 0, then the adversary’s demand for the staking 
resource is based exclusively on the standard utility 𝛼5 derived from the 
resource’s non-faulty uses, because no faulty utility 𝛼3 is available. This 
reflects the fact that, if amassing the staking resource is not a viable means 
to attack the protocol, the adversary 𝒜 will prefer to allocate its capital 
                                                
8 Technically, this utility function is tailored to Proof-of-Stake and Proof-
of-Balance. 𝒜 will rationally continue acquiring the staking resource after 
it knows that it can violate a protocol’s safety guarantees, because the 
staking resource is also the monetary resource that must be transferred and 
then reclaimed in the course of a double-spending attack. 
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towards other avenues of attack, like attempting to destroy or compromise 
critical network infrastructure.  
 
6.3 Honest Majority of Capital    
The simple economic model we have just defined is sufficient to 
obtain a structural axiom for permissionless consensus. The axiom must 
represent a feature of the world that cannot be volitionally altered by any 
agent, including the adversary, 𝒜. The axiom that a majority of an arbitrary 
resource, such as computing power, is owned by honest agents before the 
introduction of the protocol does not satisfy that standard. As Chen and 
Micali observe, “since computing power can be bought with money, if 
malicious users own most of the money, then they can obtain most of the 
computing power.” [41] 
Indeed, since every resource can be bought or sold for money, an 
adversary of sufficient wealth can acquire the majority of any resource. Our 
structural axiom must therefore be the maximum overall wealth of 𝒜, as 
measured by the combined value of all the resources it controls. This axiom 
is intrinsically reliable, because even if 𝒜 trades its endowment for a 
different allocation of resources, it does not have the power to volitionally 
increase its wealth.  
In formal terms, the individual wealth of an agent n is the sum of the 
exchange value of all its resource endowments:    𝑤[𝑛] = 𝑝¥(𝑒 𝑛, 𝑔 )¥67	 . 
The total wealth 𝑤[𝑁] of all agents with access to the network is the sum of 
the individual wealth w[n] of every agent 𝑛	 ∈ 𝑁: 𝑤[𝑁] = 𝑤[𝑛]5467	 	
. 
The wealth available to the adversary, 𝑤[𝒜], is a subset of 𝑤[𝑁] comprised 
of the wealth of faulty agents: 𝑤[𝒜] = 𝑤[𝑛]5467	 	
. 
For simplicity, all wealth in our model is sufficiently liquid to be employed 
as capital in a consensus protocol. The terms “wealth” and “capital” can 
therefore be employed interchangeably. However, when we input real-
world data, only liquid wealth should be included.  
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The structural axiom we introduce is the existence of an Honest 
Majority of Capital. The term “majority” is used broadly to encompass 
either a simple majority or a supermajority, depending on the security 
threshold of the underlying consensus algorithm. Formally, the axiom 
specifies that 
  𝑤[𝒜]𝑤[𝑁] < 𝑘 
. 
This assumption is implicit in every protocol whose security guarantees are 
derived from the axiom that the majority of its designated resource, V, will 
remain controlled by correct agents. The implicit dependence is expressed 
in formal terms by the following theorem.     
 
Theorem 2: Resource-weighted permissionless Byzantine consensus 
is impossible if ¯[𝒜]¯[5] ≥ 𝑘, i.e., if the wealth of the adversary exceeds the 
wealth of all network agents by a ratio greater than the security threshold 
of the protocol’s consensus algorithm.  
Proof: An agent whose total endowment has value 𝑤 can exchange 
that endowment for any possible allocation of value 𝑤 or less. This is a 
standard assumption in Arrow-Debreu environments, which we have 
adopted in our model. It follows that any endowment whose value 
represents a k fraction of all 𝑤 can be exchanged for an allocation that 
contains a k fraction of every resource 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺. Therefore, if 𝑤 𝒜 /	𝑤[𝑁] ≥𝑘, then 𝒜 can obtain a super-threshold fraction of every resource, such that m[4,¥]°±² 	m[4,¥]°±² ≥ 𝑘 for all 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺. If 𝒜 employs this strategy, then m(𝒜,¢)		m(5,¢) ≥ 𝑘, 
because V = 𝑔 ∈ 𝐺. This guarantees that 𝑦𝑀8 ≥ 𝑘 for every possible choice 
of V. □ 
 
6.4 Minimum Capital Threshold    
In the realistic environment, the Honest Majority of Capital axiom 
serves the same role that was filled in the toy environment by the axiom 
that 𝑌 < 𝑘 — i.e., that a majority of all agents with access to the network 
were honest. As we demonstrated in Section 3, that axiom is not inherently 
sufficient to ensure liveness or safety; valid security guarantees can be 
derived from knowledge of the population’s mean corruption status if and 
only if the number of agents participating in the protocol ensures a 
representative sample — i.e., it is also necessary that |𝑁8| ≥ 	 |𝑁8|MN5 : 𝑦𝑁8 ≥ 𝑘. Similarly, the Honest Majority of Capital axiom does not ensure 
liveness or safety in a weighted consensus protocol; valid security 
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guarantees can be derived if and only if the quantity of capital participating 
in the protocol ensures a representative sample of the economy as a whole. 
Formulas 
To formalize this concept, we employ the same flat-world 
transformation technique that we previously applied to 𝑁8 in order to obtain 
the staking-resource normalized population 𝑀8. However, this time the 
transformation is applied to the full population, 𝑁, which is normalized by 
wealth to define the population 𝑊, such that 𝑤[𝑤]=1 for every replica 𝑤 ∈𝑊. Note that the same technique cannot be applied to 𝑁8 in order to derive 
the sample size 𝑊8 . The result of that transformation would be the total 
wealth of all the agents who are participating in the protocol, when what we 
require is the quantity of capital needed to obtain ω[𝑁8], all the weight that 
the protocol has assigned. The correct formula for 𝑊8  is therefore  𝑊8 = 𝑀8 (𝑝¢) 
. 
i.e., the quantity of capital participating in the protocol is the cardinality of 
the normalized population of replicas multiplied by the price of one unit of 
the staking resource.      
Once we have obtained these definitions of 𝑊 and 𝑊8, it is trivial to 
apply the deterministic and probabilistic participation thresholds from the 
toy environment to the realistic environment. The minimum deterministic 
sample |𝑊8|MN5(P) is given by the formula |𝑊8|MN5(P) = 	 |𝑊83|MQR +	 |𝑊81|MN5 :	|𝑊83|MQR|𝑊8| < 𝑘		 ,	
where	 |𝑊83|MQR = 	 𝑦𝑊MQR |𝑊|MQR 	
. 
The minimum probabilistic sample |𝑊8|MN5(U) is given by the formula |𝑊8|MN5(U) = 𝐸( 𝑊83 ) +	 |𝑊81|MN5 ∶ 	 𝐸 𝑊83|𝑊8| < 𝑘		
where  𝐸 𝑊83 = 𝑦𝑊MQR + 𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠 |𝑊8|  
. 
Other than the substitution of 𝑊 for 𝑁, these equations are identical to the 
versions we applied to calculate the minimum-participation threshold in the 
toy environment, and we can therefore apply them using the techniques 
introduced in Section 3. 
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Application  
For the probabilistic threshold, the requirement of a mean response 
propensity of at least 0.2 is as relevant to capital-normalized samples as it 
was to agents in the toy environment. Thus, 𝑊8 must include at least 1/5 of 𝑊. However, as we previously cautioned, our model’s definition of wealth 
is equivalent to liquidity in the real world, so to input real-world data into 
the formula we must define 𝑊based on the quantity of liquid wealth in the 
global economy. There are edge cases that make it difficult to objectively 
define what wealth is insufficiently liquid to be included in 𝑊, much like it 
was difficult to define an objectively tolerable quantity of bias in the toy 
environment. Fortunately, we can once again employ apophatic reasoning 
to sidestep the difficulty.  
It is indisputably necessary for any definition of liquid wealth to 
include the global economy’s most liquid asset, fiat money. Given that the 
combined value of all fiat money is approximately 80 Trillion USD, we can 
therefore conclude that 𝑊 ≥ 80x10^12. If k=0.5, then verifiably secure 
permissionless resource-weighted Byzantine consensus requires a staking 
resource whose value exceeds $16 Trillion USD. This figure is orders of 
magnitude larger than the sample sizes achieved by existing protocols.  The 
largest Proof-of-Stake ICO in history purportedly attracted $4 Billion in 
investment, which is 0.00025 of the minimum sample size we have just 
calculated.  
Stake Laundering 
Why “purportedly?” Even when investments in an ICO are made 
publicly on a platform such as Ethereum, it is difficult or impossible to 
verify how much capital agents actually expended to acquire voting power. 
Before the SEC was created to regulate securities offerings in the U.S., it 
was common for parties to engage in “wash trading” by selling securities to 
themselves or their associates to create an illusion of demand. It is 
plausible, if not likely, that similar forms of market manipulation have been 
engaged in by some parties administering unregulated ICOs for Proof-of-
Stake protocols. 
The administrator simply needs to make a side-agreement with one 
or more high-wealth “whales” to eventually return the funds that those 
parties contribute to the ICO. An audit of the ICO itself will not reveal this 
fraud, because no double counting occurs; every unit of money “invested” 
is transferred into the ICO account once and only once. Proof that capital 
was actually expended would require a full audit of the disposition of the 
funds received in the ICO. In the absence of such an audit, the objectively 
verifiable quantity of |𝑊8| is limited to the price of “renting” money for the 
period of the ICO.  
Even agents who subjectively trust a particular ICO administrator 
not to engage in this form of fraud should expect the objective risk of such 
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fraud to decrease the ultimate value of the protocol’s native asset, because 
the protocol’s maximum user base will be limited to the set of agents with 
subjective faith in the administrator’s past honesty. In effect, ICOs are an 
extremely pernicious form of trusted setup. They cannot be superseded in 
the same manner as e.g. signing ceremonies, because they irreversibly 
dictate the substantive state of the protocol, not merely the composition of 
the cryptographic primitives used to maintain that state.    
 
7. Inter-Temporal Staking Costs   
 
7.1 The Automatic Increase Fallacy   
The designers of today’s Proof-of-Stake protocols believe that it is 
not necessary for the amount of capital invested in an ICO to provide robust 
security guarantees, because as the value of the protocol’s native asset 
grows, the strength of its security automatically increases. According to the 
official position paper of the Tezos protocol, Proof-of-Stake “automatically 
scales up the cost of an attack as the currency appreciates.” [42] This is also 
the theory that underpins the Cardano protocol, according to the CEO of its 
corporate developer, IOHK. [14] Logically, the theory is the underpinning 
of all ICO-launched Proof-of-Stake protocols, which inherently aspire to 
grow in security so that in the future they will be able to securely store and 
transmit greater amounts of value than was possible in the past or is 
possible in the present.   
If the theory of automatically increasing security were true, then our 
criticisms of Proof-of-Stake would be overly harsh. Although the ICO-
based sample size |𝑊8 ^ | is inadequate, and although the present sample 
size |𝑊8 ^ | is inadequate, a protocol could achieve verifiable security by a 
future slot s′ if |𝑊8 ^ | ≥ |𝑊8|MN5. Because its control structure 𝐹 would 
verifiably evolve, there would be no limit to an ICO-launched protocol’s 
maximum user base. The world’s future global monetary standard could be 
bootstrapped from a Proof-of-Stake protocol with an arbitrarily small 
market capitalization. In an extreme case, an ICO that attracted an 
arbitrarily small quantity of initial investment, such as a mere $1,000 USD, 
could theoretically launch a protocol that would later be used to securely 
transfer billions or trillions of dollars.   
Unfortunately, the theory is false. It overlooks the risk of pseudo-
transfer attacks, which we demonstrated in Section 5. We will first make 
our point with a simple hypothetical, then present a more rigorous 
formalization. The hypothetical we offer concerns Tezos, but we are not 
attempting to pick on that protocol or its founders. The underlying criticism 
applies to all ICO-launched Proof-of-Stake protocols.  
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156 Agents vs. The World   
Our hypothetical starts with the publicly documented facts that the 
Tezos protocol raised $250 million in an ICO, and that half of the 
protocol’s voting power was thereby issued to 156 accounts. [43] A ½ share 
of all voting power exceeds the security threshold k, so whoever controlled 
these 156 accounts received the power to successfully attack the protocol. 
In the best-case scenario that the accounts were owned by 156 different 
people, the control structure of the Tezos protocol during its genesis slot 
therefore included a control set composed of just 156 agents. Formally, 𝐹 ^ ∋ 𝑓 ^ 	:	 𝑓 ^ = 156. 
This means that, when the protocol was initiated, its maximum user 
base 𝑁B ^  was limited to agents whose trust set included one of the 156 
agents. However, the 156 agents were anonymous, so their trustworthiness 
could not be evaluated on the basis of their identities. The control set was 
effectively an abstract group of 156 anonymous agents who paid $125 
million for the collective power to control the protocol. It is possible that all 
156 agents were taking part in a book-prize attack. It is also possible that 
they were 156 disconnected individuals who shared nothing but an 
enthusiasm for acquiring large quantities of voting power. In either event, 
the objective ability of the 156 agents to successfully execute an attack 
made the Tezos protocol initially unsuitable as a global trust-minimized 
computation platform.  
Hence the need for the theory of automatically increasing security. If 
growth in the market capitalization of the protocol made its security 
guarantees more and more reliable, then the initial concentration of power 
in the hands of a small group of anonymous strangers could eventually be 
forgotten. The problem is the existence of pseudo-transfer attacks, which 
invalidate the theory’s assumption that the migration of cryptographic stake 
to new addresses proves that voting power is becoming decentralized.  
To retain control of the protocol, each of the 156 agents can create 
an arbitrarily large number of new cryptographic addresses which it 
secretly controls, and it can then restrict future transfers of stake from its 
account to the set of addresses that it individually controls. The 156 agents 
are thereby guaranteed the ability to attack the protocol in any future slot, 
subject only to the requirements that their stake is not diluted to a sub-
threshold level by block rewards or transaction fees. If those conditions are 
satisfied, then in every slot, it is possible that the protocol’s control 
structure contains the 156 agents who were in control of it during the 
genesis block. Formally, ◇𝐹 ∀^ ∋ 𝑓 ∀^  : ( 𝑓 ∀^ = 156) ∧ (𝑓 ∀^ ≡ 𝑓 ^ ). 
Growth in the apparent market value of the protocol’s native asset 
does not offer any protection against pseudo-transfer attacks. There are two 
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reasons for this. First, the 156 agents are not required to relinquish control 
of their stake in order for the protocol’s market capitalization to grow, 
because the transactions that are used as the basis for calculating the price 
of the asset can be executed with the ½ of total stake that is owned by other 
agents. Second, and more dangerous, the 156 agents can effectively “spoof” 
a large market capitalization as part of a pseudo-transfer attack by engaging 
in wash trading. By purchasing stakes from one another, they can “spend” 
money that is actually returned to their own pockets, creating the illusion 
that the protocol’s control structure F is evolving based on large 
expenditures of capital, when in reality the same 156 agents remain in 
power. 
Because the return available from executing such an attack grows as 
the currency appreciates, it would be rational for an agent who has gained 
the option to attack at the moment of its choosing to delay the exercise of 
that option until the slot that delivers the greatest time-discounted payoff. 
Thus, in any given slot, the fact that the protocol has not yet been 
successfully attacked is not reliable evidence that the 156 agents will not 
execute an attack in the future. The initial centralization of power in their 
hands acts as a permanent obstacle to reliable security.   
Tezos is not the only protocol whose security guarantees are 
undermined by pseudo-transfer attacks. All bootstrapped Proof-of-Stake 
protocols are inherently insecure, because what appears to be 
decentralization of power can be entirely spoofed by the adversary. 
If we adopt the definition of Proof-of-Stake from the Ouroboros 
paper, then “[w]hat distinguishes a PoS-based blockchain from those which 
assume static authorities is that stake changes over time and hence the trust 
assumption evolves with the system…” [12] Pseudo-transfer attacks mean 
that the latter deduction is invalid. A Proof-of-Stake protocol’s trust set 
does not evolve over time, because an adversary who corrupts one control 
in the protocol’s initial control structure can successfully launch an attack 
in any subsequent slot. The design of the Cardano protocol based on the 
Ouroboros algorithm is therefore flawed, as is every other protocol that 
attempts to bootstrap a global, decentralized protocol from an initially small 
ICO.  
 
7.2 Staking Asynchrony  
Agents risk finding themselves in the position of the turkey in the 
famous parable about the problem of induction if they assume that the 
ongoing absence of an attack provides increasingly strong security 
guarantees on a Proof-of-Stake ledger, so that larger and large sums of 
money can be transferred with confidence. Indeed, the risk of pseudo-
transfers is more severe than the abstract problem of induction, because the 
known incentives of the adversary provide an affirmative game-theoretic 
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reason to distrust observations that the adversary has the power to rig. An 
agent does not face merely the abstract possibility that the future will not 
conform to the past; it has an affirmative reason to distrust evidence that a 
rational adversary would fabricate, much like an agent trying to ascertain 
whether it has been targeted in a Ponzi scheme should not be reassured by 
its past ability to withdraw money,  
In the prior literature on Byzantine consensus, the distinction 
between these forms of risk has been formalized in terms of the powers 
available to an adversary in a betting game about the results of a coin flip. 
[44] Treating a coin flip that the adversary has the power to bias as fair is 
objectively irrational, because it will cause an agent to systematically lose 
money. Similarly, in an asynchronous environment, the betting game may 
be rigged even if all of the individual coin flips are fair, because the 
adversary has the power to control when the outcome of the game is 
determined. Agents are effectively playing a game in which they must 
guess the probability that the outcome of the last coin flip was favorable to 
the adversary, and in which the adversary decides which flips are included 
after it knows their results.9 
The same principle informs our analysis of pseudo-transfer attacks, 
which present a temporal vector for injecting adversarial bias that is similar 
to the one in the asynchronous coin-flip game. All that has changed are the 
details of what is being guessed. Here, a game is being played in which the 
recipient must infer the wealth of the signaler based on proof that the 
signaler controls a quantity 𝑣 of the staking resource 𝑉. As in the 
asynchronous coin-flip game, the odds of the game depend on whether the 
adversary can control the slot that is used to determine the state of one of 
the relevant parameters. In the signaling game, the parameter that varies 
over time is the market price 𝑝¢ of the staking resource.  
It is impossible to know exactly which of the historic prices a real-
world attacker paid, so even though it may be unlikely that any agent had 
perfect timing, that is the appropriate power to confer on the adversary if 
our goal is to establish robust security guarantees. The point is not to 
prepare for a real-world agent with such overwhelming powers, any more 
than the purpose of the basic Byzantine adversary formalism is to prepare 
for omnipresent coordinated attacks. Guaranteeing that the protocol’s 
security properties will remain intact even in the worst-case scenario is a 
                                                
9 Treating the outcome of those flips as unbiased is equivalent to making 
the wrong choice in the Monty Hall Problem, the infamous puzzle about 
whether it is rational to accept an invitation from the “house” to switch 
guesses in a three-option guessing game given rules that bias which of the 
three options was withdrawn from play. [72]  
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means of deriving objective answers to questions that would otherwise 
depend on unreliable judgments about the likelihood of relevant events. 
Historic purchases of the staking resource by the adversary are an example 
of such events. We therefore extend the technique employed in the existing 
literature for dealing with asynchrony by defining a new class of adversary. 
 In the context of resource-weighted consensus, let a price-adaptive 
adversary have the power to purchase any unit of the staking resource at 
the lowest price ever paid by an agent for that unit of the staking resource. 
Formally, let the units of the staking resource 𝑉 be indexed 𝑣7, 𝑣,…, 𝑣¢, 
with the corresponding price of each unit denoted 𝑝², 𝑝µ,…, 𝑝¶. The unit-
specific prices of the staking resource can be divided into temporal parts, 
with the collection of all such temporal parts indexed 𝑝² ∀^ , 𝑝µ ∀^ ,…, 𝑝· ∀^ .  Let the price 𝑝[𝑣] paid by a price-adaptive 
adversary for a given unit of the staking resource be the lowest price among 
all the temporal parts of the price for that unit, such that 𝑝· ≤ 𝑝· ∀^ . 10 In 
the signaling game, that represents the appropriate formalism for playing 
against an adversary that has the power to control when the price used to 
impose verifiable costs is selected.   
Inter-Temporal Cost Estimator   
In practice, it is often impossible to track the price history of 
individual units of the staking resource. The minimum cost imposed on a 
price-adaptive adversary must therefore be estimated based on whatever 
data is, in fact, available. Here, we will assume that the only information 
available is the historic price of the staking resource in each slot, 𝑝¢[𝑠], and 
the volume of the staking resource transacted in each slot, 𝑞¢[𝑠].  By 
definition, the quantity of the staking resource acquired by a price-adaptive 
adversary in a given slot is a subset of the total quantity of the staking 
resource acquired in that slot.  
Let all slots of a given price 𝑝 be members of the same price era, d, 
such that 𝑝¢[s] returns the same value for every slot s∈d within a price era. 
The collection of eras, D, is indexed d1, d2, …, dD, in ascending order of 
their respective prices. For convenience, we can also abbreviate the price 𝑝¢[d] for a specified era using pd, such that p1 represents the lowest price 
ever paid for the staking resource, because it is associated with the first era 
in the list of eras indexed in ascending order of price. The volume of an 
era,	𝑞¢[𝑑] may be expressed using the equivalent abbreviation, qd. It 
                                                
10 Staking asynchrony may also introduce higher-order uncertainty if 
economies of scale for acquiring the staking resource vary across slots, 
because a price-adaptive adversary can choose the slots where the slope of 
volume-based discounting is steepest.  
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represents the sum of the volume during all periods in the era, per the 
formula: 𝑞º = 	𝑞¢ 𝑑 = 𝑞¢[º^67 𝑠] 
. 
Let 𝑉8	be the quantity of the staking resource in the protocol, and 𝑉83 
be the quantity of the staking resource within the protocol controlled by 
faulty agents. To execute a successful Sybil attack, the adversary’s 
allocation of the staking resource, 𝑥[𝒜,𝑣], must be greater than or equal to 𝑉83𝑚𝑖𝑛: 𝑦𝑀8 > 𝑘, the quantity of the staking resource needed to violate the 
protocol’s weighted consensus threshold. When the volume of all eras is 
progressively summed, starting at the first indexed era 𝑑7 and proceeding in 
ascending order, let 𝑑ª	represent the first era in which the summed volume 
exceeds the cardinality of 𝑉83𝑚𝑖𝑛: 𝑦𝑀8 > 𝑘.  
We divide 𝑑ª	into two sections, the portion 𝑑ª	(U) before the 
threshold is crossed and the portion 𝑑ª	(U¼8½) after the threshold is crossed. 
Let the same operation be performed on the indexed sequence of all eras, 
such that 𝐷ª(U) designates the eras before the threshold is crossed, 
including 𝑑ª	(U), and 𝐷ª	(U¼8½) designates the eras after the threshold is 
crossed, including 𝐷ª	(U¼8½).   
The minimum cost to a price-adaptive adversary of attacking a 
consensus protocol is given by the formula:  𝑊83MN5: 𝑦𝑀8 > 𝑘 = 𝑞º(𝑝ºP¿(ÀÁ)^67 ) 
. 
This represents the sum of the cost of the cost of purchasing all of the units 
of the staking resource during the price-eras before the security threshold is 
reached, plus the cost of purchasing the pre-threshold fraction of the units 
within the price-era in which the threshold is reached.    
A visualization of the formula is provided in Figure 7.1.  It shows a 
protocol with strong security: the protocol’s security threshold is crossed 
many eras away from the first era 𝑑7, where the adversary has the 
opportunity to pay the lowest historic price, 𝑝7. The era in which the 
threshold is reached, 𝑑ª, involves a much higher price for the staking 
resource, because the volume of the staking resource available in the initial 
eras is not sufficient to mount an attack. Therefore, even a price-adaptive  
adversary would have to pay a mean price per unit that greatly exceeds the 
staking resource’s historic minimum price.  
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Figure 7.1: The verifiable costs imposed on a price-adaptive adversary 
depend on the past volume and price of staking-resource transactions. 
 
In contrast, if the staking resource were auctioned for its minimum 
historic price in an ICO, then 𝑑7 and 𝑑ª would be the same era. That is, the 
security threshold would be reached within the era of the lowest historic 
price, 𝑝7, because the volume 𝑞7 available in that era would be sufficient 
for the adversary to mount an attack. The theory that security increases 
automatically as the currency appreciates is incorrect, because the verifiable 
minimum cost imposed on the adversary remains locked at the floor set in 
the ICO. From the perspective of signaling theory, the information 
conveyed by a signal is limited by the minimum cost of spoofing, so the 
adversary’s ability to pay a “discounted” rate must be taken into account 
when seeking a Nash equilibrium that permits permissionless Byzantine 
consensus.  
 
7.3 Errors of Ergodicity 
It is an objective error to assume that the cost to the adversary of 
acquiring half the stake in a protocol is ½ of the protocol’s current market 
capitalization, just as it is an objective error to assume that a traditional 
asynchronous adversary will lose ½ of the betting games it retrospectively 
chooses to play. [44] Naïve application of the normal rules of probability to 
outcomes that are under the potential control of a competing player in a 
zero-sum game is a losing strategy. The fact that major Proof-of-Stake 
protocols were designed on the basis of this false assumption is a warning 
sign that something has gone very wrong.  
The culprit becomes easy to spot if we broaden our view. Computer 
scientists have fallen victim to the same error that plagued decision 
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theorists and economists for 250 years: They have conflated “ensemble 
probability” and “time probability.” [24] [25] This is a special case of the 
error involved in making decisions based on unweighted odds — i.e., 
without regard to the magnitude of relative consequences.  
A classic example of the latter error is judging the skill of stock-
market prognosticators according to who can predict the direction of the 
market, rather than on who can make the most money over time by placing 
bets on the basis of that information. In real life, winning strategies depend 
on the magnitude of costs and rewards. This is particularly true if, as soon 
as players go insolvent, they lose their opportunity to continue playing the 
game. Such a game is “non-ergodic” in the sense that play is not guaranteed 
to reach all of the time slots in the game; the mean payoff available across 
the ensemble of all slots is not an accurate predictor of the payoff that an 
agent will receive, because a sufficiently bad outcome in one slot will 
deprive the player of the opportunity to access the payoffs available in all 
other slots. [24] [25] Simply put, the consequences of losing a bet matter 
even more than the odds. 
In Bitcoin, the consequence of an agent controlling the majority of 
all voting weight (i.e., the majority of the hashing power online and active 
in the protocol) in one slot are limited, because violation of the honest-
majority axiom in a single slot does not permit the agent to execute an 
attack against the protocol during an arbitrary slot in the future. As we have 
demonstrated, pseudo-transfer attacks mean that today’s Proof-of-Stake 
protocols cannot replicate this property. An agent can acquire the majority 
of all stake in an early slot, paying a severely discounted price based on the 
protocol’s lack of adoption, and it can then employ that stake to execute an 
attack in a future slot of its choosing. A Proof-of-Stake protocol can 
effectively be “murdered” by an adversary who overpowers it in its infancy, 
just as an agent is especially vulnerable to “death” at the beginning of a 
non-ergodic game when it has not yet accumulated payoffs that provide a 
buffer against insolvency.  
Weightless Sleep  
Priors claims by Proof-of-Stake protocols to have replicated the 
security properties of Bitcoin are incorrect, because they overlook the 
significance of introducing path dependence into a system’s mean 
corruption status. We will demonstrate the flaw in their reasoning through 
the lens of the “sleepy consensus” or “dynamic availability” properties they 
invoke to substantiate these claims. [12] [13]  
In Bitcoin’s implementation of Nakamoto consensus, new agents can 
come and go from the protocol whenever they want. This free-entry 
condition ensures that the set of protocol participants is a constantly 
updated subset of the population. It was the inspiration for our discussion in 
Section 5 of a toy protocol with a disposable sampling frame, wherein the 
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outcome of every round of consensus depends only on which agents are 
present and online. Such a protocol does not involve anything analogous to 
trusted setup; it can be bootstrapped from nothing, because its present 
security guarantees do not depend on the past mean corruption status within 
the protocol. A group of agents that was in the majority during the early 
slots of the protocol will be a control set that belongs to the control 
structures of those early slots. The same group will not belong to the 
control structures of later slots if the number of agents participating in the 
protocol grows large enough that the group becomes a minority. The group 
itself does not shrink; all of its agents remain in the protocol. However, the 
influx of new agents who each possess one unit of voting power allows for 
verifiable dilution to occur: a quantity of voting power that previously 
exceeded the security threshold 𝑘	becomes a fraction of voting power that 
cannot be used to perform an attack. 
To convert our example from the toy environment to the realistic 
one, we simply specify that when new agents join the protocol their voting 
weight depends on their allocation of the voting resource, 𝑣. Nakamoto 
chose to use computing power as the voting resource because he knew that 
most agents already owned roughly one unit of CPU power, and he hoped 
that the cost of acquiring additional CPU power would be sufficient to 
prevent effective Sybil attacks. [28] In other words, in the protocol’s initial 
slot 𝑠5 every agent n effectively receives a weight assignment ω[n], 
regardless of whether it is asleep or participating, merely by virtue of 
already owning a CPU. This avoided the need for trust to be placed in the 
initial set of protocol participants; the overwhelming majority of agents are 
initially asleep, and so the honest majority axiom has almost no reliability 
in the early slots. However, as more agents decide to participate in the 
protocol, the axiom becomes more and more reliable, because security is 
verifiably based on larger samples of the population.  
The fact that sleeping agents effectively receive weight assignments 
in Nakamoto consensus is the basic reason that the algorithm was suitable 
for bootstrapping a ledger. No trust had to be placed in the protocol’s initial 
control sets during later slots, because their weight was verifiably diluted as 
new agents joined the protocol with the weight that they already controlled. 
If we assume that agents do not alter their allocations of the staking 
resource, 𝑣, then the mean corruption status 𝑦𝑀8 within the protocol will 
verifiably converge towards the mean corruption status 𝑌	on the network as 
larger samples of agents from the network choose to participate, because on 
average each of them will bring in a preexisting weight ω that corresponds 
to the hashing power of one CPU, and there is no reason to expect an initial 
correlation between corruption status and hashing power.  
Unlike Bitcoin, existing Proof-of-Stake protocols award voting 
weight exclusively to the set of agents who are awake during the initial slot, 
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𝑠5. Agents who are asleep during that slot do not receive any weight, so 
they do not have the right to participate in consensus. This forces trust to be 
placed in the protocol’s earliest control structure, since the agents that 
comprise it start out with a monopoly on the present ownership of and 
future ability to acquire all the weight ω that will ever exist. If a single one 
of the protocol’s initial control sets is corrupted by the adversary, then the 
adversary can attack the protocol in any future slot, because its fraction of 
the voting weight inside the protocol cannot be diluted. The agents that 
were asleep when the protocol was initiated did not receive any weight, so 
they cannot join the protocol and increase the total amount of weight that is 
active in consensus. As we showed in Section 5, there is no guarantee that 
the mean corruption status within the protocol will converge towards the 
mean corruption status in the population. The closed sampling frame means 
that most of the population is effectively “locked out” out of the protocol. If 
the initial set of participants choose to abuse that fact by retaining their 
monopoly on power, voting weight can remain centralized indefinitely. 
Gambler’s Ruin Revisited 
The process of wealth-normalized replicas within the population 𝑊 
“waking up” and joining the protocol can be modeled with a variant of the 
gambler’s ruin formalism that Nakamoto used in the original Bitcoin 
whitepaper. [29] Let us assume that a coin exists, with one side labeled 
“faulty” and one-side labeled “correct,” whose ergodic value is known to be 
biased in favor of the correct side because a significant majority of all 
wealth is controlled by correct agents. Because faulty replicas executing a 
book-prize attack can all join the protocol together, the ordering of results 
from flipping the coin may deviate from the ergodic average.   
 During the pendency of an ICO, it is possible for the mean 
corruption status of agents who own stake to decrease if correct agents 
invest additional wealth. Therefore, every flip of the coin represents one 
replica 𝑤 ∈ 𝑊 joining the protocol, and the initial distribution of agents in 
the protocol is based on a number of coin flips equal to the total quantity of 
wealth invested in the ICO. If the fraction of times the coin has landed 
“faulty” exceeds the security threshold k during the ICO period, the game 
does not end, because the adversary is not guaranteed to ultimately win. 
The remaining flips in the ICO may dilute the mean corruption status below 
the security threshold. However, if the threshold is still violated when the 
sequence of ICO flips is complete, then the adversary wins and the game 
ends. 
In order to predict the results of this coin-flipping game, it is not 
enough to know the ratio of faulty to correct flips that will emerge if the 
coin is flipped an infinite number of times. If the adversary can arrange the 
order of the flips, so that the coin is likely to begin with a streak of faulty 
results, then it can bias the results of the sequence of flips included in the 
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ICO period. The adversary will win the game as soon as the ICO is 
complete, so it will be irrelevant if the early concentration of faulty flips 
would have been offset by a later series of correct flips. The adversary 
achieves victory before the later correct flips can return the mean corruption 
status associated with flipping the coin to its ergodic average. 
The dynamic sampling frame that we described in Section 5, and 
which is realized in the KRNC protocol, can be understood as a mechanism 
for extending the sequence of coin flips that are guaranteed to occur before 
the results of the game are decided. If the adversary can only re-order a 
limited number of coin flips, then prohibiting it from achieving victory until 
an extremely large but finite number of flips have occurred can eliminate 
the adversary’s opportunity to win the game. The finite bias that the 
adversary can initially introduce will be diluted by the results of additional 
correct flips, so that once the outcome of the game is on the line, the mean 
corruption status is guaranteed to have converged below the threshold 𝑘 
with overwhelming probability.   
 
8. Adaptive Capital Signaling   
In the last section, we translated the minimum-participation 
threshold from the toy environment into the realistic environment, and we 
proved that existing permissionless protocols have not attracted enough 
capital to achieve verifiable security. In this section, the focus shifts to 
obtaining a solution to this problem by designing a superior Sybil-
resistance mechanism.  
To formalize what is required to prevent book-prize attacks while 
also preserving Sybil-resistance, we extend our game-theoretic model of 
participation costs with three new layers of decision nodes, including a 
capital-allocation subgame. The results we obtain provide clear criteria for 
designing a secure permissionless protocol.  
 
8.1 Weighted Extensive-Form Game  
In the extensive-form game from the toy environment, the only 
choice that agents faced was whether to join the protocol. In the realistic 
environment, the protocol must choose a resource 𝑣 to employ for assigning 
weights in a consensus protocol. Each agent who joins the protocol must 
therefore choose a quantity of the staking resource to verify, and the 
protocol must respond to that choice by assigning a quantity of voting 
weight. 
We will prove that the equilibrium cost of participation depends on 
which resource is adopted by the protocol as a staking resource. Identifying 
a resource that reduces the cost of participation to zero will enable us to 
design a protocol that satisfies the requirements of Theorem 1.  
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Staking Resource Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The protocol selects a resource that will be used 
to assign weights in the consensus protocol. 
 
The first addition that we make to the extensive form game is to add 
a new root node. The root node is now a decision node for the protocol, at 
which it chooses one of the G resources to be the staking resource, 𝑉. As 
we will prove in this section, this choice by the protocol determines the 
outcome of the game, since choosing the correct staking resource will 
ultimate dictate whether the resource-weighted mean corruption status 𝑦𝑀8 
crosses the security threshold 𝑘 in equilibrium.  
Capital Allocation Subgame 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The protocol assigns a weight to a participating 
agent based on the agent’s allocation of the staking resource. 
 
When an agent 𝑛 joins the protocol, it now enters a capital-allocation 
subgame. At the subgame’s root node, n must choose a quantity v of the 
staking resource to distribute among its identities in the protocol from 
within the closed interval [vmin, vmax], where 𝑣k4 ≤ 𝑣	 ≤ 	𝑣klm. The 
protocol 𝒫 assigns a weight ω 𝑖  to every identity in IS based on the 
identity’s share of the staking resource, x[i,v]. One identity i in the subset of 
IS controlled by n receives x[i,v]≥	𝑣k4 , and the others each receive x[i,v]≥	0, 
with the sum totaling x[n,v]. Thus, no matter how 𝑣 is divided among n’s 
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identities, the total weight they receive is still equal to the quantity of 
weight 𝒫 assigns in response to x[n,v]. 
In the extensive-form representation, n’s choice of 𝑣 is followed by a 
decision node where 𝒫 responds by assigning a weight ω 𝑛 . This is an 
abstraction that represents the sum of every individual weight ω 𝑖  that 𝒫 
assigns to an identity i within IS for whom N[i]=n. When those assignments 
are made, 𝒫 has no information about each i except for x[i,v]. However, 𝒫 
is able to adopt a strategy for assigning ω 𝑖  that is guaranteed to assign a 
weight ω 𝑛  to any agent n proportionate to n’s share v of the staking 
resource. The difference between employing such a strategy and directly 
choosing ω 𝑛  is that the former does not involve 𝒫 acquiring information 
about n’s actual choice of 𝑣. We account for this difference by specifying 
that 𝒫 knows it has followed its chosen strategy for mapping x[n,v] to ω 𝑛 , but 𝒫 forgets n’s specific choice of 𝑣 and 𝒫’s corresponding choice 
of ω 𝑛 . If the subgame were extended with an additional layer of decision 
nodes for 𝒫, those nodes would all belong to the same information set due 
to the memory-erasure property we have just specified.  
Wealth Signaling and Estimation 
Let the strategy 𝒫 employs for mapping x[n,v] to ω 𝑛  be 𝒫Â. The 
strategy can be understood as a rule of inference when we recall that 
weights must be assigned in proportion to capital. It is common knowledge 
that the protocol 𝒫 will attempt to guarantee that 𝑦M] < 𝑘 by ensuring that ω 𝑛 =	𝑤 𝑛  for all n, because ¯[𝒜]¯[5] < 𝑘. As a corollary, every weight 
assignment ω 𝑛  by 𝒫 based on 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑉] represents an estimate 𝒫[v] that an 
agent n controlling v units of the staking resource has total capital of 𝑤 𝑛 . 
Given that wealthier agents are able to acquire more of any resource, we 
further assume that an agent n’s endowment 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣] of the staking resource 
is a function of its wealth 𝑤[𝑛], and that 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣] increases linearly with 
wealth, such that  𝑒 𝑛, 𝑣 = 𝑣MN5 +	(𝑤 𝑛 − 𝑤MN5)𝛽 
, 
where 𝑣MN5 is the minimum endowment of the staking resource for an 
agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, 𝑤MN5 is the minimum wealth for an agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁, and 𝛽 is the 
slope of the relationship between each agent’s wealth and its endowment of 
the staking resource. The linearity of 𝛽 is a simplifying assumption that we 
must take into account when considering the generality of our results.  
The probability-distribution function for w among the members of N 
is denoted by W[w], where the points of increase for W are the whole 
interval [wmin, wmax]. The probability-distribution function for w among the 
subpopulation of protocol participants is W[wS], where W is constrained to 
values of w realized by w[n] : n ∈ 𝑁S. In the special case that all agents join 
the protocol, NS ≡ N, and as a corollary W[w] ≡	W[wS]. 
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Costs and Rewards 
In our model, the amount of the staking resource an agent can 
distribute among its identities is limited by the total exchange value of all 
the resource it controls. Formally, 𝒫’s attempt to estimate w from 
knowledge of v presupposes that the equilibrium quantity of v an agent 
controls is constrained by w, because if w did not constrain v, then v would 
not be informative of w. However, this constraint will not necessarily apply 
with equal force to faulty and correct agents, because faulty agents may 
receive more utility from ownership of the staking resource than correct 
ones, per Lemma 1.   
The total utility of each agent n is therefore a function of four 
factors: its corruption status, its allocation of the voting resource, the 
weight its identities are assigned by the protocol in response to that 
allocation, and its wealth as measured by the market value of its initial 
resource endowment. Formally, we introduce a total-utility function 𝛼½for 
each agent n, which takes four arguments:  𝛼½[𝑛]= 𝛼½(Y[n], x[n,v], ω[𝑛], w[n]) 
. 
Let the strategy employed by an agent n to choose an allocation x[n,v] that 
maximizes its total utility 𝛼½[n] be 𝑋(𝑌[𝑛], 𝑤[𝑛]). It is sometimes 
convenient to specify a type-dependent strategy, so we use 𝑋1(𝑤[𝑛]) to 
denote the strategy employed by a correct agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁1 , and 𝑋3(𝑤[𝑛]) to 
denote the strategy employed by a faulty agent 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁3.  
The specific form of 𝛼½ that we employ is a modified version of the 
bell-shaped distribution from [45], which has been translated into the 
notation from our model, and extended to permit type-dependent utility 
differentials: 𝛼½[𝑛]	=	exp ω[𝑛] 𝜆~–𝜓~ ∗ exp	 − 7 m[4,]È[4,]É¶  	
. 
The left term captures the utility that an agent receives from being assigned 
weight by the protocol; the quantity of weight it is assigned is scaled by the 
type-dependent expected payoff.11 The right term captures the utility that an 
agent loses from expending capital to acquire additional units of the staking 
resource; the difference between its final allocation of the staking resource 
and its original endowment is scaled by the price of the staking resource.  
To find a Nash equilibrium, it is also necessary to specify a 
corresponding utility function for the protocol 𝒫, to constrain its weight-
assignment strategy, 𝒫Â. Let 𝒫’s utility be dictated by a loss function 
                                                
11	The type-dependent term 𝜓𝑌captures potential costs to faulty agents that 
are unrelated to purchasing units of the staking resource, such as the risk of 
criminal penalties from taking part in an attack.  	
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D(𝑤 𝑛 ,ω 𝑛 ), which penalizes it in proportion to the discrepancy between 
an agent’s true wealth and the weight it is assigned. This loss function only 
describes the utility penalty associated with assigning weight to the subset 
of identities controlled by a single agent, n. To determine the utility penalty 
across all weight assignments by 𝒫, the loss function must be averaged 
over the distribution of wealth within the subpopulation NS of protocol 
participants:   𝐷 𝑤[𝑛], 𝒫Â 𝑋 𝑌 𝑛 ,𝑤[𝑛] 𝑑W[𝑤]¯  
. 
Equilibrium Conditions  
All of the toy-environment Nash-equilibrium conditions from 
Section 4 apply in this extended version of the game, however we must also 
introduce new equilibrium conditions that capture the concept of stable 
resource allocations. The solution concept we will prove is an 
evolutionarily stable Nash equilibrium (“ESS”), in which neither the 
protocol nor the agents can increase their utility by modifying their 
respective strategies. Formally, let an allocation strategy 𝑋 that has been 
adopted by every agent n be 𝑋∗, and let the protocol’s corresponding 
weight-assignment strategy be 𝒫Â∗. An ESS for 𝑋∗ and 𝒫Â∗ must satisfy the 
following two conditions, which translate Grafen’s definitions into our 
model. [6]   
First, the utility that each agent n receives from strategy 𝑋∗ must be 
greater than or equal to the utility available from adopting any alternative 
allocation strategy. Formally, for all 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣] and 𝑤 𝑛 : 𝛼½ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 , 𝒫Â∗ 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 ,𝑤 𝑛 ≥ 𝛼½ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣], 𝒫Â∗(𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 ), 𝑤[𝑛]  
. 
Second, the utility penalty that 𝒫 receives from 𝒫Â∗ must be less 
than or equal to the utility penalty available from adopting any alternative 
weight-assignment strategy. Formally, for all	𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣] and 𝑤 𝑛 :   𝐷 𝑤 𝑛 , 	𝒫Â∗ 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 𝑑W 𝑤¯ ≤ 𝐷 𝑤[𝑛], 𝒫Â 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 𝑑W[𝑤]¯  
. 
Consistent with the original signal-theoretic models we are extending, we assume 
continuity and differentiability for 𝛼½ and D, and measurability for X* and 𝒫Â∗. 
[45]  
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8.2 Proving Evolutionary Stability  
To find the ESS, we employ a proof technique drawn directly from 
the biological signaling-theory literature. [45] First, we show how the 
original technique can be translated into our model’s terminology and 
notation, but defer consideration of whether the type-dependent argument 
Y[n] prevents an ESS. Once we have demonstrated the proof technique, we 
consider its generality and prove that the ESS it yields will exist in our 
model if certain additional requirements are satisfied.  
Given that an agent n’s initial endowment e[n,v] of the staking 
resource reflects its freely chosen pre-protocol apportionment of capital to 
V, the agent will necessarily suffer a utility penalty from switching to a 
different allocation x[n,v], with greater divergences from e[n,v] inflicting 
greater utility penalties. Formally,  𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝛼Ê(Y[n], x[n,v], ω[𝑛], w[n])) = −𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣] − 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣]) 
, 
where the subscript two in 𝛼Ê indicates that a partial derivative is taken 
with respect to the second argument in the total-utility function, x[n,v]. If an 
agent’s allocation is larger than its initial endowment, the derivative 𝛼Ê is 
negative, which indicates that the agent would prefer to allocate less of its 
wealth to the staking resource. If an agent’s allocation is smaller than its 
initial endowment, the derivative 𝛼Ê is positive, which indicates that the 
agent would prefer to allocate more of its wealth to the staking resource. 
To find an ESS that is consistent with this assumption, we take the 
first derivative of an agent n’s utility with respect to x[n,v] at the candidate 
ESS,  𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 ,𝑤 𝑛 , 𝒫Â∗ 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 . Logically, the slope of the 
first-order utility gradient must equal zero at the candidate ESS, because 
otherwise an agent n could improve its utility by buying or selling the 
staking resource. An ESS therefore requires  𝛼Ê 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , 𝑤[𝑛]+ 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣] 𝛼ÊË 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣], 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , 𝑤[𝑛] = 0 
. 
The first bracketed expression is the partial derivative of the agent’s total-
utility function, taken with respect to its allocation of the staking resource. 
Reducing this expression to zero ensures that the agent’s intrinsic capital-
allocation preferences are consistent with the ESS. The second bracketed 
expression represents the partial derivative of the protocol’s weight-
assignment strategy taken with respect to an agent’s allocation of the 
staking resource, multiplied by the partial derivative of an agent’s total-
utility function taken with respect to its weight assignment. Reducing this 
expression to zero ensures that the reward offered by the protocol does not 
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induce the agent to have capital-allocation preferences that are inconsistent 
with the ESS.  
To find a version of 𝒫Â∗′ 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣]  that satisfies the zero-slope 
requirement, we consider how the protocol assigns weight to agents of the 
lowest possible wealth within the distribution W[wS]. If we assume that 𝒫Â∗ 𝑣k4 = 𝑤k4 – i.e., that the protocol accurately infers that an agent 
who controls the minimum quantity of the staking resource also controls 
the minimum quantity of wealth —  then the zero-slope requirement is 
satisfied by 𝒫Â∗′ 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣] = −𝛼Ê(𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 ), 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣𝛼ÊË(𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 ), 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌[𝑛], 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣  
. 
Note that the fourth argument in the total-utility function has been 
modified. Ordinarily, it is w[n]; here, w[n] is replaced with 𝒫Â∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 , because at the ESS it is necessary for the protocol to 
accurately infer wealth based on control of the staking resource, such that 
w[n] =𝒫Â∗(X*(Y[n], 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 .) We will prove that this requirement is 
satisfied for an initial range, starting at 𝑣k4. This provides a solution for 𝒫Â∗ within that range, which we can invert to obtain X* over the same 
initial range. If the range of the solution extends to 𝑤klm, we will have 
found an ESS, because the protocol will have assigned an accurate weight 
to every agent, and neither the protocol nor any agent will be able to 
improve its total utility by modifying its strategy.    
First, we prove that the monotonic section at the beginning of 𝒫Â∗ 
must be increasing, based on the conditions we have already specified. At 𝑣k4, the initial slope of 𝒫Â∗ is zero, because  𝛼Ê(𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑣k4, ω 𝑛 , 𝑤k4) = 0. 
Given that 𝒫Â∗ initially has zero slope, and that 𝑣 increases immediately 
above 𝑣k4, we can infer that the slope of 𝒫Â∗ is positive immediately 
above 𝑣k4. The slope of the agent’s staking strategy 𝑋∗ is therefore 
effectively infinite, such that 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 > 𝑒 𝑛, 𝑣 , and 𝛼Ê < 0. Because 𝒫Â∗ 
is the inverse of 𝑋∗, it follows that 𝒫Â∗	has a positive initial slope, and that 
its slope remains positive for at least some interval above 𝑣k4. By 
inverting 𝒫Â∗ over that interval, we can obtain an agent n’s partial staking 
strategy,  𝑋∗ ∶ 𝒫Â∗ 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 = 	𝑤 𝑛  
, 
whose properties include that 𝑋∗ (𝑌 𝑛 ,𝑤k4]) = 𝑥[𝑛:𝑤 𝑛 = 𝑤k4, 𝑣], 
that the initial slope at 𝑣k4 is infinite, and that the slope is positive for all 
values within the range of the solution.  
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Generality and Type-Dependence  
Is this sufficient to prove an ESS in our model? Yes, but only if 
additional conditions are satisfied.  
Even without the potential for a type-dependent payoff differential, 
if the expected utility of receiving a weight assignment from the protocol is 
too small, such that 𝛼ÊË assumes a near-zero positive value, then the 
protocol’s weight-assignment strategy 𝒫Â∗ may issue infinite weight in 
response to a finite quantity of the staking resource. We overcome this and 
similar failure modes by adopting the viability axiom that an ESS exists if: 
(1) the existence of the ESS is consistent with our model; and, (2) the 
existence of the ESS is necessary for permissionless Byzantine consensus. 
This is a much narrower axiom than assuming that permissionless 
Byzantine consensus is, in fact, possible; it forces us to identify a viable 
ESS in a model where the adversary is powerful enough to defeat all 
existing permissionless Byzantine consensus protocols.  
The challenge arises from the first argument 𝑌[𝑛] in the total-utility 
function 𝛼Ê. Because an agent’s type 𝑌[𝑛] is private information, the 
protocol 𝒫 cannot observe the agent’s true type when deciding how much 
weight to assign, so its strategy 𝒫Â will represent a probability-weighted 
average of the appropriate weight assignment for a correct agent and the 
appropriate assignment for a faulty agent. If the partial derivative 𝛼Ê7 of 
total utility with respect to corruption status is positive, then faulty agents 
receive greater utility than correct agents from allocating capital to the 
staking resource. The result is a type-dependent “wealth gap” for an 
observed quantity of the staking resource, between the true wealth of a 
faulty agent with that allocation 𝑤[𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁3] and a higher wealth of a 
correct agent, 𝑤[𝑛: 𝑛 ∈ 𝑁1]. The mean weight assignment from 𝒫Â will 
therefore be systematically biased in favor of faulty agents, which prevents 
the pooling equilibrium mandated by Theorem 1. To obtain an ESS that 
enables permissionless Byzantine consensus, we will need to find a way to 
verifiably reduce the partial derivative 𝛼Ê7 to 0, so that faulty and correct 
agents receive the same utility from the staking resource.  
Bayesian Inference Rules  
We start by applying the ESS proof technique to the specific bell-
shaped distribution of 𝛼Ê we previously formulated. The protocol’s 
candidate weight-assignment strategy 𝒫Â∗ is given by the formula 𝒫Â∗ = 𝑤k4 + 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣 − 𝑣k4𝛽 − (𝜆~–𝜓~)(∞ − 𝑝𝑉)𝛽  1 − exp − 𝑣 − 𝑣ÍÎÏ 𝛽(𝜆~–𝜓~) ∞ − 𝑝𝑉 2  
. 
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The first two term describe the wealth	𝑤[𝑛] of an agent for whom 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣] = 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣], i.e., whose original endowment of the staking resource is equal to 
the allocation of the staking resource observed by the protocol, 𝒫. The rest 
of the equation accounts for the fact that the introduction of the protocol 
may induce agents to exaggerate their holdings of the staking resource, 
such that 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣] < 𝑥[𝑛, 𝑣], which forces the protocol to downgrade its 
wealth estimates. The result is a type-independent wealth gap, which we 
refer to as the “Sybil gap” to distinguish it from the type-dependent gap we 
have already defined.  
At 𝑣k4, the Sybil gap is zero, because the protocol accurately infers 
that  𝑣k4 = 𝑤k4. However, as 𝑣 increases the Sybil gap expands; it 
assumes progressively larger negative values, indicating that the wealth 
associated with a given quantity of the staking resource is diminishing.  
Formally, the Sybil gap converges exponentially towards an asymptote of  (𝜆~–𝜓~) ∞ − 𝑝𝑉  𝛽 
, 
with the distance along the 𝑣 axis for the gap to halve (i.e., the function’s 
half-life) given by (𝜆~–𝜓~)(∞ − 𝑝𝑉) 𝛽 ln 2 
. 
For each agent 𝑛, there is a corresponding “staking gap” between the 
pre-protocol endowment	𝑒 𝑛, 𝑣  and post-protocol allocation 𝑥 𝑛, 𝑣  for an 
agent 𝑛 of a given wealth 𝑤[𝑛]. Unlike the Sybil gap, the staking gap 
assumes a positive value, reflecting the post-protocol increase in an agent’s 
quantity of the staking resource. After beginning at 0 for 𝑤k4, the staking 
gap converges asymptotically to    (𝜆~–𝜓~) ∞ − 𝑝𝑉  𝛽 
, 
with a half-life, of  (𝜆~–𝜓~) ∞ − 𝑝𝑉  𝛽 ln 2 
. 
To satisfy the requirements of Lemma 1 and achieve permissionless 
Byzantine consensus, we will need to find an ESS that eliminates all of the 
potential gaps we have identified. As Lemma 2 demonstrates, the only way 
to accomplish that is to reduce the cost of participation in the protocol to 
zero. In the next sub-section, we move closer to that goal by formalizing 
the factors that determine the equilibrium costs of participation. 
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Equilibrium Staking Costs      
To identify the equilibrium cost of participation in Sybil-resistant 
consensus, we scale the difference between an agent’s post-protocol 
allocation and pre-protocol endowment by the market price of the staking 
resource. Formally, we obtain the following type-dependent cost function 𝑐[n] for agents of a given wealth: 𝑐[𝑛] 	= 	𝑐 𝑌 𝑛 , 𝑤 𝑛 = 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 ,𝑤 𝑛 − 𝑒[𝑛, 𝑣])∞ − 𝑝𝑉  = (𝜆~–𝜓~)(∞ − 𝑝𝑉)𝛽 exp 	− 𝑋∗ 𝑌 𝑛 ,𝑤[𝑛] − 𝑣k4 𝛽(𝜆~–𝜓~) ∞ − 𝑝𝑉   
. 
The equation makes it clear that the equilibrium cost of protocol 
participation depends on 𝛽, the slope of the pre-protocol association 
between wealth and the staking resource.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Equilibrium costs depend on 𝛽, the slope of the pre-
protocol relationship between wealth and the staking resource.  
 
As shown in Figure 8.3, a higher value of 𝛽 indicate that the slope 
of the association is steeper. A steeper slope means that there is a greater 
difference between the low-wealth and high-wealth agents’ initial 
endowments of the staking resource — i.e., that the pre-protocol quantity of 
the staking resource an agent owns grows more quickly as a function of its 
wealth. This increases the cost that a lower-wealth agent would have to pay 
to imitate a higher-wealth agent, because it forces the lower-wealth agent to 
purchase a larger amount of the staking resource in order for its post-
protocol allocation to match the higher-wealth agent’s pre-protocol 
endowment. The greater the cost of exaggeration, the less that low-wealth 
agents’ post-protocol allocations will deviate from their pre-protocol 
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endowments, and therefore the less that high-wealth agents will be forced 
to increase their own allocations of the staking resource in order to obtain 
accurate weight assignments.  
A simple way of understanding this result is to consider the 
difference between sunk costs and prospective costs. High values of 𝛽 
indicate that high-wealth agents have already incurred significant sunk 
costs to acquire large pre-protocol endowments of the staking resource, 
while low-wealth agents have not. This creates a natural cost asymmetry: 
high-wealth agents can acquire weight “for free” based on the costs they 
have already incurred, while low-wealth agents attempting to acquire the 
same quantity of weight would be forced to incur new costs, because they 
do not already possess the necessary quantity of the staking resource. The 
higher the value of 𝛽, the greater this natural asymmetry, and the less that 
high-wealth agents are forced to incur new costs to distinguish themselves 
from low-wealth agents. 
In contrast, low values of 𝛽 are associated with high participation 
costs at equilibrium, because there are fewer sunk costs to provide 
asymmetry. In the absence of sunk costs, the only asymmetry available to 
guarantee honest signaling is the prospective ability of high-wealth agents 
to expend more capital than their low-wealth counterparts. Such high-cost 
signaling is employed as the Sybil-resistance mechanism in Proof-of-Work 
and Proof-of-Stake protocols, which force agents to verifiably expend 
computational or financial resources. If the only factor affecting cost 
tolerance were access to capital, these methods would be reliable. However, 
per Lemma 2, faulty agents have an inherently higher cost tolerance than 
correct agents in permissionless protocols that have not cleared the 
minimum participation threshold required to prevent the adversary from 
successfully attacking. Existing Sybil-resistance methods are therefore 
unsuitable for permissionless Byzantine consensus.   
 
8.3 Zero-Cost Staking 
To overcome the problem we have just formalized, we need a Sybil-
resistance mechanism that relies on an asymmetry in pre-protocol sunk 
costs, rather than an asymmetry in present cost tolerance. This concept 
becomes intuitive if we recall the biological mechanisms that inspired the 
underlying signal-theoretic models 
Tigers and Peacocks   
It is already well known that Sybil-resistance methods like Proof-of-
Work are based on the “handicap principle” that an untrusted signaler can 
prove that it is an agent with a high cost tolerance by sending a signal that 
is verifiably expensive. [4] In biology, this is the signaling mechanism 
famously employed by male peacocks to communicate their fitness to 
females: Wasting finite biological resources to grow an oversized tail 
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imposes a verifiable fitness penalty that only the fittest peacocks can 
survive.  
As the example of the peacock illustrates, handicap-authenticated 
signaling is inherently wasteful. The waste itself is what makes the signal 
reliable, “because by wasting one proves conclusively that one has enough 
assets to waste.” [3] In Proof-of-Work, by wasting computing power on 
arbitrary puzzles, agents conclusively prove that they are wealthy enough to 
acquire the necessary computing power. In Proof-of-Stake, by transferring 
funds to an ICO administrator, agents conclusively prove that they are 
wealthy enough to tolerate the loss of the funds. In both instances, security 
is based on the assumption that the combined cost tolerance of all the 
correct agents who join the protocol will exceed the combined cost 
tolerance of all the faulty agents who join the protocol.  
The problem is that, unlike peacocks, human agents can choose to 
opt out of handicap-authenticated signaling. Most of the agents on the 
internet have exercised that option; they have declined to join 
permissionless consensus protocols that require all users to sacrifice 
computing power or money. Thus, even if Proof-of-Work and Proof-of-
Stake were effective as Sybil-resistance methods, they still would be 
impractical for building a verifiably secure permissionless protocol, 
because the costs of the handicaps they impose deter agents from 
participating in consensus. Assigning capital-weighted voting power 
equally among the set of all consensus participants is meaningless if the set 
of protocol participants is so small that the adversary can simply execute a 
book-prize attack.  
Fortunately, there are alternatives to handicap-authenticated 
signaling that do not impose the same costs. One of them is identity-
authenticated signaling, which biologists formalized in the context of group 
selection. This has already become one of the pillars of modern computer 
networking, as evidenced by the numerous permissioned protocols that rely 
on identity. However, there is a third form of biological signaling that 
computer scientists have overlooked: cue-authenticated signaling. [45] 
Like a handicap, a cue is a trait whose verifiable cost makes it 
impossible for low-fitness organisms to spoof. The difference is that cues 
represent traits that developed for an initial non-signaling purpose; they 
allow authentication to be performed based exclusively on sunk costs, with 
zero added costs. For example, male tigers compete to grow as large as 
possible in order to kill one another and their prey, so female tigers are able 
to identify high-quality males based on their larger body size (or, indirectly, 
from the elevation of scratch marks left on trees by male tigers to mark 
their territory). [46] This is a far more efficient signaling protocol than the 
method employed by peacocks, because it does not force male tigers to 
handicap themselves in any way.   
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High-quality male tigers allocate their finite biological resources in 
the same manner that they would have in the absence of any signaling 
protocol, because the signaling protocol is based on their non-signaling 
preferences. A low-quality male who was unable to compete against high-
quality males in the original body-size competition has no ability to “spoof” 
a larger body size once that trait is adopted by females as an informative 
cue. The cue is informative precisely because it is based on the results of a 
competition in which all male tigers are already guaranteed to be fervent 
competitors.  
The Measure of All Things   
A cue-authenticated Sybil-resistance scheme would overcome the 
shortcomings of today’s handicap-authenticated methods, because it would 
decrease the cost of participation to zero. The key is to identify a staking 
resource that everyone is already competing to acquire, because then 
everyone will already own the resource needed to participate in consensus. 
Agents will not need to incur any new costs, because the protocol will be 
able to measure their sunk costs in society’s preexisting resource 
competition.  
There is one and only one resource that can fill this role: Money 
itself. It is the one resource that everyone is already competing to acquire, 
because it is not really a resource at all. [47] Rather, it is an abstraction that 
records every economic agent’s individual balance of trade with the rest of 
society. [48] Those balances can then be used to obtain whatever resource 
an agent requires in the future, so there is no limit to the quantity of money 
that agents desire. [49] This accounts for why money is inherently the most 
valuable resource. It also explains why the slope of the relationship 
between money and wealth is orders of magnitude steeper than for other 
resources. 
Formally, those are the two critical attributes for achieving a zero-
cost ESS. Because receiving weight in a successful permissionless protocol 
will inherently be valuable, we must anticipate a significant positive value 
for 𝜆~. This value cannot reliably be reduced by 𝜓~ for two reasons. First, 
the incomplete-information conditions specified in Section 3 mean that the 
value of 𝜓~ is uncertain. Second, even if the value of 𝜓~ were significant, it 
would still only offset 𝜆~ for faulty agents in the event of an attack by the 
adversary. To verifiably reduce the cost of participation to zero for all 
agents in all subgames, it is necessary for the values of 𝛽 and 𝑝¢ to be so 
high that agents cannot practically imitate the endowments of their higher-
quality counterparts. The unique characteristics of money guarantee that 
using it as the staking resources will maximize the value of these 
parameters, so that the equilibrium cost of protocol participation will be 
lower than is possible with any other resource. 
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Theorem 3: If a protocol’s staking resource is the incumbent 
monetary resource, the evolutionarily stable equilibrium cost of 
participation in permissionless Byzantine consensus is zero. 
Proof: We obtain this result through a proof by contradiction. 
Negative costs do not exist in our model. Therefore, if the equilibrium cost 
of participation is not zero, then it must be positive. If the equilibrium cost 
is positive when the staking resource 𝑉 is money, then the equilibrium cost 
is positive for ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, because money has maximal 𝛽 and 𝑝¢. If the 
equilibrium cost is positive for ∀𝑔 ∈ 𝐺, then Lemma 2 is not satisfied, and 
permissionless Byzantine consensus is impossible per Theorem 1. The 
result is a contradiction: permissionless Byzantine consensus would be 
verifiably impossible, but our model would include an ESS that is 
consistent with permissionless Byzantine consensus, which contravenes the 
viability axiom. □ 
 
The fact that the equilibrium cost of participation drops to zero if 
money is used as the staking resource enables us to tie up all the remaining 
loose ends in our game-theoretic model. Because it costs agents nothing to 
participate in consensus if the staking resource is money, Lemma 2 
establishes that the dominant strategy for all agents is to join the protocol. 
When all agents join the protocol, W[wS] ≡	W[w], so the wealth-weighted 
mean corruption status of protocol participants is guaranteed to be below 
the security threshold, 𝑘. Theorem 3 guarantees that weight assignments 
made in proportion to money will accurately reflect wealth, so all agents 
can verify in advance that 𝑦𝑀8 < 𝑘. The possibility for a type-dependent 
payoff differential therefore vanishes: 𝜆3 = 𝜆5, because play is guaranteed 
to reach the left subgame where faulty and correct agents receive identical 
payouts. In economic terms, there is no faulty utility 𝛼3 available, so 𝒜 is 
motivated exclusively by 𝛼5, and its behavior is therefore indistinguishable 
from that of a correct agent.  
 
8.4 The “New Money” Trap 
The security and performance improvements that a permissionless 
consensus protocol can achieve by using the incumbent monetary resource 
as its staking resource 𝑣 are such an improvement over current technology 
that it is natural to suspect trickery or gimmickry. Those fears subside when 
one understands the deeper principles that underpin our approach.  
Whenever a new resource is adopted as a monetary store of value, 
agents respond by producing more of the resource, which then destroys the 
resource’s value by expanding its supply. This has been dubbed the “easy 
money trap.” [30] A well-known solution to this problem is to continue 
employing the incumbent monetary resource as money. Because the 
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incumbent monetary resource has already achieved an equilibrium price 
that reflects its value as money, its rate of production has already been 
virtually maximized, and the available supply cannot suddenly expand. 
Gold enjoys this as a key advantage over other metals: it has been 
treated as money for so long that most of the gold available on Earth has 
already been mined. [30] The existing “stock” of gold vastly exceeds the 
“flow” of new gold onto the market, since all of the easily mineable gold 
has already been obtained. In contrast, whenever a different metal starts to 
become accepted as money, the rate of production for that metal increases, 
inflating the circulating stock and diminishing the metal’s per-unit value. 
Gold has the highest stock-to-flow ratio of all physical commodities, which 
is what makes it a reliable store of value.  
There is an inherent circularity to what we have just described: gold 
has the highest stock-to-flow ratio because it is a form of money, and it is a 
form of money because it has the highest stock-to-flow ratio. As it turns 
out, this circular pattern extends beyond gold. For anything to function as 
money in society, it is necessary that “everybody wants it because 
everybody knows that all the others want it.” [49] Money is thus the 
ultimate Keynesian beauty contest. [50] Agents insist on receiving payment 
in whatever resource they expect other agents to treat as money in the 
future, and the best predictor of what will be treated as money in the future 
is what has attained the status of money in the present. [51] 
So far, we have described this process in terms of physical money, 
but there is no formal difference between using ownership of tokens to 
track monetary balances and recording those balances on a ledger. [52] In 
game-theoretic terms, the choice of which metal to accept as money when 
used in coins can be directly compared to which ledger to accept as a record 
of monetary balances. In both instances, an agent is forced to choose 
between competing versions of reality, since the canonical definition of 
money dictates how much money everyone owns. [53] 
Fractal Salience   
There is an obvious parallel to Nakamoto consensus, in which the 
canonical branch of the blockchain determines how much Bitcoin everyone 
owns. Miners all want to receive their rewards on the branch that will 
become the canonical version of reality in the future, so the equilibrium 
strategy is for them to mine on the longest branch in the present.  
This “incumbent” branch represents the obvious Schelling point, and 
selecting it enables miners to reach a Nash equilibrium. [54] 
In the Tezos shell, the same concept is extended to a higher level of 
abstraction: instead of using the “follow the crowd” mechanism merely to 
define a canonical ordering of transactions for a given consensus algorithm, 
a meta-protocol allows participants to express preferences about which 
implementation of the ledger protocol should be treated as canonical. [42] 
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The logical Nash equilibrium is for all agents to accept only the version of 
the protocol that has received the required endorsement of the crowd. Thus, 
at both the base level of transaction ordering and the higher level of 
protocol design, the principle of “follow the crowd” enables groups of 
strangers to effectively coordinate their decisions. 
When a protocol stacks coordination games on top of one another, it 
is important for the Schelling points at both levels to be consistent. By 
definition, a Schelling point is an option that players in a coordinate game 
expect one another to pick. [55] This requires: (1) that there is a 
characteristic of the option that distinguishes it from the others; and (2) that 
each player expects the other players to treat that characteristic as salient. 
The latter requirement depends on the decision rules that players follow for 
identifying salient features. The choice of properties upon which salience is 
evaluated can be modeled as a meta-game, in which rational players 
exclude properties that lack meta-salience given the structure of the 
coordination space. Players converge on the focal property precisely 
because it yields the focal point. [56]    
In a two-level coordination game, if there is one potential decision 
rule that designates a Schelling point at two levels, and other potential 
decision rules that each designate a Schelling point at only one of the two 
levels, then the “meta-Schelling point” is for players to follow the rule that 
delivers Nash equilibria at both levels. In a slight abuse of terminology, we 
will refer to this variant of subgame perfection as fractal salience. [56] 
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Figure 8.4: The blue cell has fractal salience, because it can be 
reached by a consistent decision rule. The red cell does not. 
 
A simple example of fractal salience is offered in Figure 8.4, which 
depicts a two-level coordination game. At the first level, the players must 
select one cell within the 3x3 grid that spans the entire figure. At the second 
level, whatever cell the player selected becomes another 3x3 grid, and the 
player can either choose to select one of the cells within that grid or return 
to the first level of the game. In the absence of any colored cells, the 
Schelling point would be to choose the center cell at both levels of the 
game. However, the introduction of colored cells provides two stronger 
Schelling points at level two, and the rational strategy at level one is 
therefore to choose one of the two cells whose internal sub-grids contain a 
colored cell — i.e., to choose one of the two subgames that contains its own 
Schelling point. Despite the fact that there are facially two competing 
Schelling points available in level 2, rational agents can still achieve Nash 
equilibrium by adhering to the principle of fractal salience: the blue cell is 
the superior Schelling point, because it permits agents to choose the same 
cell at both levels of the game.  
The Schelling points available in Bitcoin, Tezos, and other 
cryptocurrency protocols are equivalent to the red cell. At the intra-protocol 
level of choosing a canonical ledger version, they invoke the “follow the 
crowd” decision rule. Yet at the inter-protocol level of choosing the 
canonical version of money, they force agents to deviate from the crowd by 
accepting an arbitrary set of bootstrapped balances rather than the balances 
recorded in the incumbent fiat monetary system.  
The OLG Prisoner’s Dilemma  
The overwhelming network effects that favor incumbent currencies 
mean that a new, bootstrapped currency like Bitcoin will only achieve 
adoption as a global monetary standard if the existing system crumbles in, 
e.g., a severe economic crisis. [57] In contrast, when balances on a new 
cryptographic ledger are assigned in proportion to the data recorded in the 
world’s incumbent monetary ledger, then the congruence between the two 
versions of monetary reality means that the new ledger is “at no 
disadvantage whatsoever against the established ledger.” [53]  
 
 Option 1:  
Fiat 
Option 2: 
Cryptocurrency 
Option 3: 
Crypto-Fiat 
Protocol Keep Change Change 
Data Keep Change Keep 
 
Figure 8.5: The third option broadens the search space by allowing 
agents to express a new preference combination. 
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When the only way for a market agent to express a desire for 
cryptographic inflation protection is to switch to using a cryptocurrency, 
then agents can only express that preference if it is so strong that it 
overrides their desire to maintain the stability of the incumbent monetary 
order. Even people who individually stand to profit from the replacement of 
fiat money by cryptocurrency do not wish for their loved ones and friends 
to have their savings destroyed in a monetary-protocol transition. As 
Figure 8.5 illustrates, assigning balances in proportion to existing money 
allows the market to converge on agents’ true preferences more accurately. 
It broadens the search space, so that a new preference combination can be 
expressed — one that favors keeping the world’s existing monetary 
balances while upgrading the protocol used to track those balances.  
For the sake of argument, let us assume that the network effects 
favoring fiat money are not, in fact, strong enough to fend off the challenge 
from cryptocurrency. This is the view held by many in the Bitcoin 
community, who have publicly cheered perceived dips in the value of fiat 
money, which they believe presage the death of the dollar and today’s other 
national currencies. Is this an outcome that the public should embrace? Is it 
an outcome that their elected officials should tolerate? Only if they wish to 
crown a new crypto-oligarchy. 
It is clear why the early adopters of Bitcoin are seeking a million- or 
billion-fold return on their initial “investments” of computing power, but it 
remains a mystery why the rest of humanity should acquiesce to their plan. 
There is nothing inherent in the creation of a nongovernmental monetary 
protocol that requires it to function like a pyramid scheme. That was never 
the intention of early advocates of private money, who were at pains to 
design systems that would empower the people — not impoverish them. 
[33] [58] [59] [60] [61]Some of these visionaries have been appropriated by 
today’s cryptocurrency advocates, but they would not have supported 
concentrating the world’s wealth in a handful of early protocol adopters.  
The transition to a new monetary protocol can be accomplished 
smoothly only if it inherits the balances stored in the existing system. Those 
balances represent the public’s savings — value earned for past work, 
which has not yet been redeemed for goods or services. [48] As Nobel 
Laureate Paul Samuelson warned, it has always been in the myopic self-
interest of the young to “unilaterally repudiate the money upon which the 
aged hope to live in retirement.” [62] To prevent this injustice, “a 
continuing social compact is required,” one in which each new generation 
resists the temptation to betray its elders by repudiating their money. [62]  
This same game-theoretic mechanism explains why the reign of any 
bootstrapped successor to the incumbent monetary system would inherently 
be short-lived. Having defected against the prior incumbent, Bitcoin has 
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forfeited access to the Nash equilibrium in which every generation honors 
its predecessor’s money. The alternative equilibrium is one in which every 
succeeding generation defects against its predecessor by repudiating the 
incumbent money. [63] This is an equilibrium in which everyone loses, 
because long-term value storage is impossible. Yet it is the equilibrium that 
has been mandated by the limits of prior technologies.  
Ironically, this problem was recognized by the creators of the Tezos 
protocol, but their empathy extended only to the holders of 
cryptocurrencies whose savings would be destroyed if their crypto-balances 
were not included in new monetary ledgers. [42] No concern was given to 
the billions of owners of fiat money who would suffer the same fate if 
Tezos or Bitcoin became a new universal medium of exchange and value 
storage. Or, more realistically, no concern was given to the fact that Tezos 
and Bitcoin will never reach that status, due to the overwhelming inertia in 
favor of fiat money as the “longest chain of value” in society. 
At the intra-protocol level, Nakamoto consensus embodies the same 
basic game-theoretic equilibrium that has underpinned money for thousands 
of years: When everyone puts skin in the game, the game itself can become 
‘too big to fail’– which makes it the game that everyone wants to play. 
Trying to bootstrap a new game is a critical mistake. The security of money 
has always come from the protection of the herd. [49] 
A Perfect Circle  
The lessons of this sub-section may sound as if they relate to 
economics rather than protocol security. Yet, as we have demonstrated with 
our formal model, these concepts cannot be separated from one another: the 
value of the staking resource is ultimately what dictates the security of any 
resource-weighted protocol.  
This is not a wholly new insight. It has long been recognized that a 
“chicken-and-egg” problem exists in Proof-of-Stake: a protocol needs to 
have a valuable native asset in order to be secure, but it also needs to be 
secure in order for its native asset to be valuable. [64] In the conventional 
view, the flaw in Proof-of-Stake is therefore that it is circular. [65] We have 
proved that the opposite is true: The flaw in Proof-of-Stake is that it is not 
circular enough. 
Money itself is circular. It “is accepted as money by everybody 
merely because it is accepted as money by everybody else.” [51] By 
assigning cryptographic weight in proportion to money, a consensus 
protocol can be created that everyone will join merely because they know 
that everyone else will join. That consensus protocol will represent a meta-
agent more trustworthy than any institution or actor in human history. 
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Part IV. Protocol Design 
 
9. Key Retroactivity Network Consensus   
To harness our theoretical results in the real world, we need a way to 
employ the incumbent monetary resource as the staking resource in a 
permissionless Byzantine consensus protocol. Our solution is the Key 
Retroactivity Network Consensus (“KRNC”) protocol. For expositive 
clarity, we introduce it in three steps.  
First, we provide an informal summary of the KRNC protocol’s 
intended architecture. We start by drawing an analogy to the gold standard, 
then explain the differences and advantages of KRNC.  
Second, we formalize the intended architecture in an idealized 
environment, where a PKI exists and all commercial banks operate a 
public, sharded ACID database. A toy Proof-of-Balance protocol is defined, 
which surpasses the verifiable security and performance of Proof-of-Work 
and Proof-of-Stake systems by a factor of ~40,000.   
Third, we turn the idealized environment into a realistic environment 
by removing the assumptions that allowed the toy protocol to function. We 
iteratively extend the toy protocol until we have obtained the full KRNC 
protocol, which delivers the same security and performance advantages in 
the real world.  
 
9.1 A New Gold Standard  
The basic goal of the KRNC protocol is to distribute something 
inherently scarce to the present owners of government-issued digital 
money. There is thus an obvious parallel to the historic use of precious 
metals like gold to provide commodity backing for government-issued 
paper money. In the simplest version of the gold standard, every paper 
banknote is effectively a ticket, which can be redeemed for gold bullion of 
a specified weight. In KRNC, “weight” is cryptographic, but it serves the 
same purpose as gold bullion by protecting the value of the public’s money. 
The inherent flaw in the gold standard is that, if a central bank is 
entrusted with maintaining adequate gold reserves, then it can simply 
renege on its promise. In that event, the owners of gold-backed paper 
money can suddenly find themselves owners of unbacked paper money. 
KRNC corrects this problem by issuing cryptographic backing directly to 
the owners of government-issued money, rather than having physical 
backing stored by a central bank. In each transaction, both the original fiat 
money and its cryptographic backing are transferred from the purchaser to 
the seller. There is accordingly no “single point of failure” that can 
eliminate inflation protection. 
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Sellers can confidently ask buyers to pay in backed money rather 
than unbacked money, because obtaining backing is free for owners of fiat 
money. In KRNC, using a monetary “ticket” to claim cryptographic weight 
does not mean losing the original government-issued money. Instead, a 
record of which tickets have already been redeemed is maintained, which 
ensures that each ticket can be used once and only once to unlock its 
corresponding cryptographic backing. Because protocol participants are not 
forced to part with their money in order to gain access to its backing, the 
cost of participation is zero. There is nothing to buy, and no need to waste 
computing power. Users simply verify their unbacked fiat holdings, and 
they receive the weight needed to back that quantity of money. 
A Meta-Dollar 
For simplicity, let us temporarily imagine that the U.S. Dollar is the 
world’s only currency, and that all agent who own dollars choose to join the 
KRNC protocol and unlock their free cryptographic weight. The result is 
similar to a “hard fork”: for every dollar that previously existed, there is 
now one dollar plus one unit of cryptographic weight, both of which are the 
property of the dollar’s owner.12 However, when a hard fork is performed 
on a cryptocurrency, the two resulting assets are generally in competition 
with one another. In KRNC, they are complimentary: the unbacked fiat 
dollar can be used to pay taxes, while the cryptographic weight offers 
inflation protection and smart-contract functionality.  
Each of these two assets exists on a different layer-one ledger, so 
they can be transferred independently. However, when used in 
combination, one dollar and one unit of cryptographic weight can be treated 
as a single unit of account. We refer to this meta-asset as a 
cryptographically backed dollar. It is a modern twist on the “symmetallic 
standard” proposed by Alfred Marshall, one of the founders of neoclassical 
economics, in the late 1800s. [66] Under Marshall’s proposal, the base 
money in society would have been a meta-commodity composed of gold 
and silver in a specified ratio. The virtue of this concept was the protection 
that it provided against supply or demand shocks in either of the meta-
commodity’s constituent elements. In the KRNC protocol, 
cryptographically backed dollars deliver the same diversification of risk. 
The only difference is that the commodities in question are digital, rather 
than physical. 
Under the symmetallic standard, if an unexpected technological 
innovation destroyed the value of either gold or silver (a fate that befell 
aluminum, the 19th century’s most precious metal) the price of the meta-
                                                
12	Technically, cryptographic weight in KRNC is a form of “forked fiat 
currency.” [14] The term “weight” has been employed to make Proof-of-
Balance technology more intuitive.    	
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commodity would have remained relatively stable; demand for the other 
metal would have proportionately increased, given that gold and silver were 
the only two credible base-money candidates. This was a precursor to 
“handcuffing” in modern fantasy sports, a strategy in which a fan drafts 
both a starter (generally, an American football running back) and that 
starter’s backup. The backup player acts as an insurance policy, of sorts; if 
the starter is injured during the season, then the backup will receive the 
bulk of the point-scoring opportunities that previously went to the starter, 
ensuring stability in the weekly point-scoring value of the fantasy-sports 
team. The same principle holds true in KRNC: cryptographic weight is 
effectively the “backup” to unbacked dollars, so that in the event of a 
hyperinflationary crisis the value originally assigned to government-issued 
dollars will naturally shift to their scarce cryptographic backing. This 
change in the relative value of the components of the meta-resource will not 
affect the value of crypto-backed dollars, just as shifts in the relative value 
of gold and silver would not affect the value of base money under 
Marshall’s symmetallic standard.  
The diversification of control over the monetary supply that this 
architecture enables may be compared to the advantage of a bicameral 
legislature. From an engineering standpoint, splitting responsibility for 
maintaining a working form of base-level money is a prudent redundancy. 
If political instability or economic miscalculation causes traditional 
sovereign money to lose its effectiveness as a store of value, the danger of a 
global economic crisis can be reduced by the ready availability of a parallel 
monetary system that is not exposed to the same risks. The converse is also 
true: should anything go wrong with the cryptography used to maintain the 
protocol’s blockchain, the traditional fiat monetary system would remain 
intact and ready to take over. 
An International Standard 
The entire world does not, of course, use the U.S. Dollar. If we wish 
to maximize the security and performance of the KRNC protocol, it will 
also be necessary to assign weight to the owners of other currencies, and to 
do so in a manner that makes those weight assignments compatible with 
one another.  
This is where the analogy to the gold standard once again becomes 
useful. In the contemporary monetary system, the prices of different 
currencies float against one another; under a gold standard, each national 
currency is backed by a specified quantity of gold, which creates fixed 
exchange rates. If the gold standard were still in place, we could then 
accomplish our goal merely by assigning cryptographic weight in 
proportion to the weight of the gold bullion specified as the backing for 
each national currency. Can we apply the same approach in the absence of a 
gold standard? Yes. First, based on the value of the U.S. Dollar, we define a 
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weight necessary to achieve full backing of U.S. Dollars. Second, we take a 
snapshot of every foreign currency’s exchange rate against the U.S. Dollar, 
and use those ratios to determine the weight necessary to achieve full 
backing of each of those currencies. An abstract reconstruction of the gold 
standard is thereby created, which can be used to assign the appropriate 
quantity of cryptographic weight to every unit of electronic fiat currency on 
Earth.  
The credibility of cryptographic weight as an alternative to sovereign 
currency may be a powerful mechanism to dissuade central banks from 
taking excessive inflationary risks — a role that has been suggested for 
Bitcoin, but which it does not seriously fill because of fiat money’s 
incumbency advantage. [67]  If excessive quantities of sovereign currency 
are introduced, then the supply of sovereign money will exceed the supply 
of cryptographic weight available to provide backing to the sovereign 
money. In the event of a global hyperinflationary crisis, rapid growth in the 
supply of sovereign money would make it trivially inexpensive to obtain 
the national currencies that, when matched with their corresponding 
cryptographic weight, would represent one unit of cryptographically backed 
fiat money. As the limiting factor in the set of two inputs needed to produce 
the standard unit of account, cryptographic weight would organically 
evolve into the world’s de facto monetary standard. 
 
9.2 Toy Protocol   
Now that the reader has an intuitive understanding of the protocol, it 
is time to begin formalizing its architecture.   
Definitions 
We model the world monetary system as a pair of abstract arrays — 
one for settlement, the other for custody and clearance. Central banks 
exercise their authority to create new units of base money on the settlement 
array, which the public cannot access directly. The accounts that members 
of N maintain at financial institutions display the data recorded on the 
custodial array, where commercial banks introduce new digital money into 
circulation when they make loans. There is more fiat money in the custodial 
array than the settlement array due to the “money multiplier,” which 
determines the fraction of the balances shown on the custodial array that 
must actually be backed by reserves on the settlement array. 
Because the power to issue new currency is exercised by modifying 
the balances on the settlement array, the base version of a fiat currency is 
necessarily recorded and updated on the shard of the settlement array 
controlled by the central bank with authority to issue that currency. 
Similarly, every cryptocurrency is recorded and updated on the shard of the 
settlement array administered by its consensus protocol. A decentralized 
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Proof-of-Balance protocol also administers a shard on the settlement array, 
except the balances on that shard – which also serve as weights in the 
consensus algorithm that controls the shard – are “forked” by importing 
data from past states of the custodial array. This enables the users of the 
custodial array to collectively trust the consensus algorithm, since its 
security guarantees are verifiably derived from their own aggregate 
trustworthiness. 
Formally, we index the custodial array by the 7-tuple (o, i, a, m, p, b, 
s), where o is a custodial institution such as a commercial bank or credit 
union, a is an account number, i is the identity of the accountholders, m is a 
specified currency, p is the price of that currency in the numeraire, b is a 
balance, and s is a slot. We denote the column of values to which an 
element belongs using the capitalized version of the indexing character; 
thus, o represents a financial institution while O denotes the collection of 
all financial institutions, i represents an identity while I denotes the 
collection of all identities, and so on for all elements of the 7-tuple. Values 
are associated with accounts only in slots after their creation and before 
their termination, but the array is otherwise dense — i.e., all elements have 
defined values. Thus, at all times that an account exists at a financial 
institution, it is associated with one or more accountholders, and it contains 
a specified quantity of currency whose objective market value is a function 
of the exchange-rate expressed by the numeraire. We assume that the 
participants in the protocol have access to accurate records of past exchange 
rates and that these records are consistent with one another. In a real-world 
execution, the records do not actually have to be consistent or even 
perfectly accurate; they simply have to be accurate enough that agents are 
willing to tolerate the protocol’s canonical version.   
In our model, the custodial array is divided into |O| shards. Each 
financial institution o administers the shard that contains the elements of 
the array associated with o. This corresponds to the fact that commercial 
banks are responsible for individually managing the accounts opened by 
their customers.   
Simplifying Assumptions 
We now introduce three unrealistic axioms that make a fork of the 
fiat custodial array possible in our idealized model. Later, in the non-
idealize model, the axioms must be replicated or approximated by 
extending the protocol’s capabilities.  
First, in the idealized model, we assume that all transactions are 
performed through real-time gross settlement, such that a global state-
transition function instantly updates the ledger in every slot. If in slot s an 
accountholder i transfers a quantity q of currency m from account a to 
account a′, then in slot s+1 the balance b associated with a will be q less 
than in slot s, while the balance b′ associated with a′ will be q greater. 
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However, the transaction will be executed if and only if it is valid: i.e., the 
summed q of all transfers authorized from a for slot s+1 must be less than 
or equal to the balance b associated with a in slot s. The combination of 
synchrony and validity ensures that our idealized custodial array maintains 
a perfect global state GS in all slots. 
Second, we assume that the global state GS is recorded publicly, so 
that it can be verified directly by all members of N. Any agent can 
download the latest set of balances for all accounts at all custodial 
institutions and use them to populate balances in a consensus protocol.  
Third, we assume that every identity i is already associated with a 
public key pki, corresponding to the secret key ski controlled by the agent 
behind the identity. This makes it possible for a balance in the new protocol 
to be placed under the control of its rightful owner, n : n=N[i], merely by 
associating the balance with the key pki.  
These three assumptions make it trivial to assign weights in a new 
consensus protocol based on balances in the incumbent monetary resource. 
Let 𝑠ÑÒÓª	be the slot in which balances are imported from the incumbent 
monetary ledger. The weight ω[pki] assigned to each public key in the new 
protocol is given by the formula  ω 𝑝𝑘 = (𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠ÑÒÓª]	)(𝑝 𝑚, 𝑠ÑÒÓª )QÕl67	  
, 
where 𝐴 is the subset of all accounts within S associated with i, 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠ÑÒÓª] 
is the balance recorded for account a at the slot of the fork, and 𝑝 𝑚, 𝑠ÑÒÓª  
is the price of the account’s currency, m, at the slot of the fork. 
Every unit of voting weight in the new protocol is transferrable, 
because it is also the native asset of the new monetary ledger. For 
convenience, we assume that the numeraire is the U.S. Dollar, and we 
therefore refer to units of voting weight in the new protocol as “forked 
dollars.” A cryptographically backed dollar consists of both a government-
issued dollar and a forked dollar. By definition, the existing monetary 
system is already capable of executing arbitrary transfers of government-
issued dollars. In order to demonstrate the viability of transferring 
cryptographically backed dollars, it will therefore suffice to define a 
protocol that is capable of transferring the corresponding forked dollars. 
That is the approach that we take here, because it greatly reduces the 
complexity of the protocol that we must define.  
The constituent elements of crypto-backed dollars always remain 
separate on the settlement array, but for clearance purposes they can either 
be transferred in parallel or merged into a token that represents a claim on 
both a government-issued dollar and a forked dollar. To become the owner 
of one forked dollar in the genesis block of the new protocol, at the time of 
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the fork an agent must own a quantity of fiat currency equal in value to one 
U.S. Dollar. This can be accomplished either by directly holding a U.S. 
Dollar or by holding a quantity of other fiat currency equal in value to one 
U.S. Dollar, as measured by the exchange rates in effect at the time of the 
fork. This enables all fiat currencies to receive cryptographic backing. 
For this simple implementation, the initial distribution of forked 
dollars is specified by a list of public keys and corresponding balances 
included in the new protocol’s genesis block. Proof-of-Balance acts as a 
verifiably secure mechanism for assigning those balances, but in our 
idealized model its role ends there. Once the genesis block has been 
finalized, the new ledger can be maintained using an off-the-shelf 
consensus algorithm, such as Tendermint or Ouroboros. [68] [12] The 
initial set of balances can also be used to initiate a meta-protocol, like the 
Tezos shell, so that the ledger can become transparently self-governing. 
[69] We anticipate that weight owners will vote to determine the initial 
consensus algorithm, so we leave that decision to their discretion.  
Protocol Characteristics   
If a ledger could be constructed with the properties of the new 
protocol in our idealized model, it would provide unprecedented 
capabilities. Given that the total value of fiat currency is estimated to be 
~80 Trillion USD, if we assume that k=0.5, the wealth required to unlock a 
super-k fraction of all voting weight in the idealized model is ~40 Trillion 
USD. It has often been estimated that the cost of a successful attack on 
Bitcoin is $1 Billion, which is 80,000-times less than the attack cost we 
have just derived. To our knowledge, the highest estimated cost is $4 
Billion, and even this liberal figure is 20,000-times less than the attack cost 
we have just calculated for Proof-of-Balance. If we make the conservative 
assumption that the true cost is $2 Billion, then the cost of an attack on the 
Proof-of-Balance system in our idealized model is 40,000-times greater 
than the cost to compromise Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work system. If we treat 𝑤[𝒜] as a constant, the maximum fraction of adversarial voting power is 
1/40,000th of Bitcoin. Because the adversary’s maximum fraction of voting 
power is so severely limited, Proof-of-Balance can support lower 
confirmation times and more aggressive sharding than any proposed Proof-
of-Work or Proof-of-Stake system.  
A potential objection to this figure is that it is derived from an 
estimate of the total value of fiat currency that includes coins and 
banknotes, which are not actually recorded in the electronic fiat ledger. If 
we adopt an estimated value of ~5 Trillion USD for all physical monetary 
media and exclude them from our calculation, then the value of the 
electronic balances recorded on the fiat ledger is ~75 Trillion USD. Given 
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our assumption that k=0.5, the adversary would require control of more 
than ~37.5 Trillion USD to execute a successful attack. 13 
A second potential objection is that these figures represents the price 
of the original fiat currencies, not the price of their cryptographic weight, 
i.e., if the weight assignment were performed at slot s, then the adversary 𝒜 
would be guaranteed not to initially control a super-k fraction of voting 
weight, but it would have the opportunity to purchase the additional weight 
required at slot s+1, s+2, etc. The security of the protocol therefore 
depends, not merely on the price to the adversary of acquiring a super-k 
fraction at slot s, but also in later slots. This is tautologically true for any 
protocol facing a price-adaptive adversary: the initial cost of acquiring a 
staking resource sets the ceiling on verifiable security, but that ceiling is 
lowered if the price of the staking resource drops. In effect, we have 
defined what is the equivalent of a Proof-of-Stake protocol bootstrapped 
from a Proof-of-Work distribution in which $75 Trillion was expended by 
miners. Only the market can decide how much of that security will be 
preserved by the future exchange value of the asset that was mined. 
The question is how to actually build the ledger required to make 
forked-fiat money a reality, once we remove the convenient assumptions of 
our idealized model.    
 
9.2 KRNC: Private Non-ACID Ledger 
We now define a real-world model of the fiat ledger. We will replace 
the unrealistic assumptions from our idealized model with accurate 
descriptions of the obstacles that must be overcome to fork the commercial 
banking system.  
Synthetic Consistency  
First, in the real-world model we can no longer assume strict 
consistency or validity. Settlement is not performed in real time for most 
transactions, overdrafts sometimes permit unearned funds to be spent, and a 
balance may be recorded incorrectly in a given slot due to myriad other 
factors, from human error to electrical faults. A balance b[a,s] recorded in 
the real world may therefore differ from the version recorded in the 
idealized model. 
We adopt the notation c[a,s] to denote the latter value, which is not 
affected by the faults found in the real-world model. Based on this 
distinction, the set of slots is partitioned into SC correct slots and SF faulty 
slots. If the balance of the account is accurately recorded at slot s, such that 
                                                
13 This calculation is conservative in that it treats the ratio of electronic to 
physical fiat currency as a structural parameter that cannot be altered by the 
introduction of the protocol. It is possible that the protocol will induce 
agents to collectively store more of their fiat money at commercial banks. 
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b[a,s] = c[a,s], let s be a correct slot, sc, where sC∈SC. If not — i.e., if 
b([a,s] ≠ c[a,s] — let s be a faulty slot, sF, where sF∈SF. 
We refer to a sequence of one or more slots with identical balances 
as a period, l, and the set L of all periods is indexed l1, l2, …, lL. L is 
partitioned into LC correct periods and LF faulty periods, such that every 
correct slot belongs to a correct period (sC ∈ lC ∈ LC) and every faulty slot 
belongs to a faulty period (sF ∈ lF ∈ LF).  
In Proof-of-Balance, rather than assigning a weight ω to an account 
based on its value at a single slot s, the value is measured across periods 
and averaged.14 We refer to the sequence of periods measured by the 
protocol as lP, where P ≥ 1 ≤ L. Our task is to determine how quickly Proof-
of-Balances causes the effect of faults to converge to zero.  
For indexing purposes, we assume that a fault arises at the initial slot 
(s1=sF∈SF), so that the initial period is faulty (l1=lF∈LF). We adopt the 
scale-setting assumptions that: (1) the initial faulty period contains the same 
number of slots as subsequent correct periods, such that |l1|=|lC| and |l1|P=LP; and (2) the absolute difference between the correct value c[a,s] 
and the faulty value ¬c[a,s]  equals the numeraire, such that |(b[a, sC]) – 
(b[a, sF])| = 1. The mean balance of slots within all protocol periods is 
therefore 𝑏𝐿U = 1|𝐿U| 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠]À^67  
. 
This value is derived from the mean balance within the initial faulty period, 
and the mean balance within the ensuing correct periods:  
 1|𝑙7| |𝑐[𝑎, 𝑠]Ù²^67 − 1| +	 1|𝐿U| − |𝑙7| 𝑐[𝑎, 𝑠]
ÙµÚÀ
^67
12 
. 
Through a series of straightforward reductions, we obtain 
 𝑏𝑙7 + 𝑏𝑙U𝑃 = 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 − 1 + 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 + ⋯+ 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠𝑃= 	 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 − 1 + 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 𝑃 − 1𝑃  
 
                                                
14 When multi-currency staking is being performed, for maximum accuracy 
the balance b[a,s] from each slot should be multiplied by p[m,s] before 
being averaged.  
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=	 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 𝑃 − 1𝑃 = 𝑐 𝑎, 𝑠 − 1𝑃  
, 
i.e., as the number of periods captured by the protocol is extended, Proof-
of-Balance exponentially converges on the correct value.     
The use of staking periods not only allows Proof-of-Balance to 
asymptotically replicate the security guarantees from the idealized ledger, it 
actually provides stronger security guarantees than are available in the 
idealized model. The key is that the honest majority of capital axiom does 
not assign a privileged position to a specific slot: i.e., our knowledge that ¯[𝒜]¯[5] < 𝑘 is equally reliable in s or s′, so taking the mean value of the slots 
provides at least as much assurance as measuring any single slot.15 The 
reason it provides greater assurance is that, as our earlier signal-theoretic 
model demonstrated, an agent may attempt to exaggerate its holdings of the 
staking resource in order to artificially increase its voting power, e.g., by 
borrowing money to boost its bank balances when they are measured. 
Sampling the value of those balances over a longer period of time increases 
the duration of the necessary loan, thereby raising the costs paid by agents 
who attempt to exaggerate their wealth.     
Balance Verification  
Second, in the real-world model, we can no longer assume that every 
agent N has read access to the entire fiat ledger. Indeed, no single agent or 
institution has access to all the values that comprise S.  Instead, an 
institution o has access to all elements that are associated with o, because 
those elements are properties of the accounts that it maintains on its internal 
database, which functions like a shard of the full abstract array. An agent n 
has access to all of the accounts it controls across financial institutions, 
even if it assumes different identities to do so. Formally, let o[a] designated 
the institution that administers an account, such that o[a] has both read 
access and write access to the value of elements associated with a, and let 
i[a] designate the identity associated with the account, such that n has read 
access to the value of the elements associated with a if and only if i[a]=i : 
N[i]=n.  
                                                
15 Technically, a slot s can enjoy a privileged position indirectly if it 
corresponds to a pre-intervention state of the world in which ¯[𝒜]¯[5] < 𝑘 is 
axiomatic, while s′ corresponds to a post-intervention state in which the 
axiom’s reliability is diminished. This is not a problem in KRNC, but it is 
relevant to cryptocurrencies, e.g., global adoption of Bitcoin could 
theoretically deliver a sufficient ROI for the protocol’s early adopters to 
acquire the majority of all wealth, undermining the reliability of the “honest 
majority of capital” axiom needed for permissionless consensus.    
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Third, although an institution o can effectively associate itself with a 
public key pko using official channels (e.g., its website or verified social-
media accounts), we can no longer assume that every identity i is already 
associated with a public key pki. This reflects the fact that accountholders at 
commercial banks do not, in fact, rely on asymmetric cryptography to 
access their funds. Instead, banks rely on many different authentication 
factors, including but not limited to control of a registered email address or 
phone number, knowledge of a password or alphanumeric code, possession 
of a hardware authentication device, and/or in-person presentation of 
physical credentials, such as a driver’s license or passport.  
To simplify our formal notation, we define any combination of 
authentication factors sufficient to control account a within the ledger shard 
administered by institution o as an account key, denoted by oka. An account 
key is not an actual cryptographic key; it is simply a useful abstraction for 
representing the credentials required to access the specified account. 
However, an account key can be employed by an agent n to authorize the 
execution of a transaction by o, much like a private key can be used to sign 
a message that authorizes a transaction on a blockchain. We capture this 
similarity by using the notation 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÕ for asymmetric cryptographic 
signatures and 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ for conventional transaction authorizations. We use 𝐸𝑁𝐶ÉªÕto denote encrypting a message with public key 𝑝𝑘, such that it can 
be decrypted with 𝑠𝑘. An account key cannot be used to encrypt a 
message, since it is not actually a member of a cryptographic key pair.  
The challenge in the real-world model is how to specify a protocol 
that will enable every agent n to trust the accuracy of both its own weight 
assignment and also the weight assignments to other agents, whose 
balances it cannot directly observe. Our solution relies on two related 
axioms. First, we adopt the axiom that an agent n who has deposited fiat 
money at an institution o necessarily also trusts that institution to act as a 
custodian of n’s forked-fiat money. Formally, o∈T[n] where o[a]=o and 
i[a]=i : N[i]=n. However, we restrict the scope of the axiom by specifying 
that it holds if and only if n retains the ability to withdraw its money from o 
on demand. This reflects the empirical relationship between demand 
deposits and bank runs, in which trust in a custodian vanishes as soon as it 
freezes withdrawals. 
Second, we assume a weak version of transitivity, in the sense that 
an agent n who trusts an institution o necessarily trusts balances whose 
validity o accepts based on attestation from o′, where o′ ∈O : o ≠ o′. This 
reflects the fact that the customers of one bank are inherently placing trust 
in the institutions their bank partners with to execute, e.g., SWIFT transfers 
and other permissioned transactions. 
Synchronous Weight Assignment 
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In this sub-section, we will define a simple implementation of the 
protocol that requires all members of O to cooperate at its inception. This is 
not technologically impossible, but it may be bureaucratically impractical.  
A cryptographic weight ω[𝑜] is hardcoded into the protocol’s 
genesis block for every institution o∈O. An institution o calculates its own 
weight, ω[𝑜], according to the formula  ω 𝑜 = ω 𝑎QÞl67	  
 , 
where 𝐴Ò = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐴 ∶ 𝑜 𝑎 = 𝑜} 
, 
and ω 𝑎 = 1|𝐿U ∪ | (𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠]	)(𝑝 𝑚, 𝑠 )ÀÙ67	  
. 
The custodial weight represents the mean quantity of wealth controlled by 
the institution during the protocol’s staking periods. It is calculated by 
normalizing each past fiat balance according to its contemporaneous 
exchange value, which yields the mean quantity of wealth held in each 
account during the staking periods, then summing that quantity for every 
account within an institution’s shard of the fiat ledger. The denominator in 
the fraction to the left of the sigma expression is the cardinality of the 
transitive closure of the protocol periods, i.e., the number of slots within 
those periods.      
Each institution o generates an asymmetric key pair and discloses its 
public key, pko. It then employs the corresponding secret key, sko, to 
generate and broadcast a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑜, 𝐶𝐿𝑀,ω 𝑜 ), where 
CLM is the opcode for claiming cryptographic weight. The genesis block 
contains a valid weight-assignment signature from every member of O. The 
weight-assignment signatures define the quantity of forked currency that 
each custodial institution o receives on behalf of its customers. Once the 
protocol commences, a custodial institution’s voting power changes 
whenever the quantity of forked currency it controls increases or decreases. 
Customers may transfer their forked-fiat balances to other custodial 
institutions or to their own private keys for direct access to the settlement 
layer. Voting power is thus “pre-delegated” to each user’s existing financial 
institution(s) of choice, but there is no limit to how decentralized the 
protocol can become as users become comfortable managing their own 
keys.  
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We refer to this system as liquid custody, because it complements 
and extends existing stake-delegation mechanisms, which are based on 
proposals for “liquid democracy.” In that framework, which is also known 
as delegative democracy, individuals can choose to participate in the 
consensus process either actively by casting votes directly or passively by 
delegating their vote-casting authority. KRNC realizes that ideal more 
faithfully than today’s Proof-of-Stake systems, because it makes it possible 
for agents to exercise their voting power without ever interacting with 
cryptographic keys, and because all agents who own fiat money receive 
voting power by default instead of authority being concentrated in the small 
pool of agents who opt to purchase stakes in a new cryptocurrency.   
To place the forked-fiat balances under the initial control of their 
customers, the members of O modify their respective shards of the 
custodial array by creating new accounts containing forked fiat currency. 
For an original fiat account a that receives a weight assignment of ω 𝑎 , an 
institution o creates a forked-fiat account 𝑎 whose initial balance b[𝑎, s] is 
equal to ω 𝑎  and whose initial account key 𝑜𝑘l is identical to the account 
key 𝑜𝑘l	associated with a. The result is that every agent n is placed in 
control of the appropriate weight ω 𝑛  by virtue of the account keys that it 
possesses. Specifically, the initial weight ω 𝑛  controlled by n is given by 
the formula  ω 𝑛 = ω 𝑎Q°l67	  
where  𝐴4 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐴: 𝑖 𝑎 = 𝑖: 𝑁 𝑖 = 𝑛}, 
i.e., n controls a weight equal to the summed weight of all accounts whose 
associated identities are controlled by n.  
Agent n has the ability to withdraw its forked-fiat funds from 𝑎 at its 
convenience. It simply generates an asymmetric key pair, such that it 
controls the secret key 𝑠𝑘4, then privately transmits to institution o a 
message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ(𝑖′, 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑝𝑘4, 𝑞,𝑚), where 𝑖′ is the identity 
associated with 𝑎 and 𝑝𝑘4is the public key that corresponds to 𝑠𝑘4. If the 
requested transfer is valid, then institution o publicly broadcasts a message 
of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑝𝑘Ò, 𝑞,𝑚, 𝑝𝑘4), causing the forked-fiat funds to be 
transferred to n’s control on the settlement array, based on n’s knowledge 
of 𝑠𝑘4.  
An agent n can employ a similar procedure to transfer forked-fiat 
funds to a third-party. The third-party, 𝑛′, generates an asymmetric key 
pair, such that it controls the secret key 𝑠𝑘4,	then it discloses the 
corresponding public key, 𝑝𝑘4 to agent 𝑛. Agent 𝑛 then privately transmits 
a message to institution o of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ(𝑖′, 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑝𝑘4, 𝑞,𝑚). If the 
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requested transfer is valid, then institution o publicly broadcasts a message 
of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑝𝑘Ò, 𝑞,𝑚, 𝑝𝑘4), causing the forked-fiat funds to be 
transferred on the settlement array to the control of the third party, 𝑛′, based 
on its knowledge of 𝑠𝑘4. 
As we have just demonstrated, although the forked-dollar ledger is 
initially controlled by custodial institutions, normal users have the ability to 
take direct responsibility for managing their own asymmetric keys. 
However, one advantage of the protocol is that users are never forced to do 
so against their will, because their forked currency is automatically 
available on the custodial platforms where they chose to store their original 
fiat currency. This is a matter of not only convenience, but also security: 
forked balances represent weights in the consensus algorithm, and forcing 
billions of bank customers to suddenly start managing cryptographic keys 
for the first time in their lives would represent a critical vulnerability that 
the adversary could exploit. 
To authorize a transfer of forked-fiat money from account 𝑎 without 
using an asymmetric key pair, an agent n transmits a message to institution 
o : o=o[𝑎] of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ(𝑖, 𝑎, 𝑞,𝑚, 𝑜, 𝑖, 𝑎′), where 𝑎′ is the forked-
fiat account receiving the transfer, o is the institution o[𝑎] administering the 
account receiving the transfer, and 𝑖 is the identity associated with the 
receiving account. For simplicity, we assume that the quantity q is low 
enough for the transfer to be valid. If o[𝑎′]=o, then the transfer is executed 
internally by o without affecting the settlement layer of the decentralized 
ledger, simply by debiting q from 𝑎 and crediting it to 𝑎′. If o[𝑎′]=o′, such 
that o[𝑎′]≠o, then o debits q from 𝑎, privately transmits a message to o′ of 
the form 𝐸𝑁𝐶ÉªÞ(𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(o, 𝑎, 𝑞,𝑚, 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑖, 𝑧)), and publicly broadcasts a 
message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ 𝑝𝑘Ò, 𝑞,𝑚, 𝑝𝑘Ò,𝑧 , where z represents an 
arbitrary transaction identifier for conveniently associating the public and 
private messages with one another. The public message causes the transfer 
of forked dollars to be executed on the decentralized settlement layer, so 
that the funds involved in the transaction leave the control of o and become 
controlled by 𝑜; the private message allows the institution receiving the 
transfer, 𝑜, to associate the incoming funds with the accounts and identities 
involved in the transaction, which span its shard of the custodial array and 
the shard administered by o. It modifies its shard of the custodial array by 
crediting q units of m to account 𝑎 of 𝑖, and it associates that operation 
with the account and identity of the transaction initiator, 𝑎 and 𝑖. This 
enables the ultimate recipient of the funds, the agent n : n=N[𝑖], to verify 
that it has been paid without the need to interact with asymmetric keys or 
addresses; it simply uses 𝑜𝑘l	to gain read access to the relevant portion of 
the custodial shard administered by o′. 
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There are, of course, many improvements in efficiency and 
functionality that can be obtained by modifying the fields just described or 
specifying procedures for batching cleared payments into larger, less-
frequent transfers on the settlement array. This paper intentionally omits 
those and other obvious refinements in favor of highlighting the novel 
aspects of the KRNC protocol. In the next sub-section, we will remove the 
need for an initial, synchronized distribution of voting weight.  
Retroactive Weight Assignment 
In the prior specification of the protocol, all members of O must 
simultaneously participate in the creation of the protocol by assigning 
themselves synchronized weights, because the initial set of weight 
distributions is directly encoded in the genesis block. The need for 
synchronization is a byproduct of the genesis block’s immutability: if a 
custodial institution is excluded from the initial distribution of weights but 
later chooses to join the protocol there is no mechanism to expand the 
supply of forked dollars so that the late-joining institution’s customers can 
receive their fair allotment. 
One solution to this problem would be to encode the public keys of 
all O institutions in the genesis block, but to leave the accompanying 
weight assignments undefined. Each public key would instead act as a 
minting authorization memorializing the right of the key owner o to claim 
its custodial weight ω[o] if and when it joins the protocol. If such a scheme 
were implemented, then when an institution o chose to join the protocol, it 
would calculate its weight assignment ω 𝑜  and then use its secret key sko 
to sign and broadcast a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ 𝑜, 𝑝𝑘Ò, ω 𝑜 . In other 
words, upon joining the protocol each institution o ∈	O would have a one-
time opportunity to retroactively issue itself the quantity of forked dollars 
that must be given to its customers in order to provide them with their 
rightful weights on the new ledger. 
The advantage of retroactive weight assignment is that the fork of 
the fiat ledger can be initiated by a single founding institution,	𝑜, then 
joined by other institutions as the protocol and its native asset grow in 
popularity. For now, we assume that the founder is one of the existing 
institutions within O, such that 𝑜 ∈ O.  
Without retroactive weight assignment, no single institution 𝑜 would 
be able to launch a credible forked-fiat ledger, because everyone except that 
bank’s customers would be excluded from the protocol’s finite weight 
distribution. That would prevent its consensus algorithm from providing 
reliable security guarantees, and it would make it impossible for the 
ledger’s native asset to piggyback on the network effects of fiat money to 
achieve mass adoption. Those problems are resolved by retroactive weight 
assignment, which enables the quantity of forked dollars authorized by the 
genesis block to be revised and expanded. This increases the expected 
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equilibrium price of the protocol’s native asset, since the market 
capitalization of the ledger is a time-discounted function of the protocol’s 
anticipated future user base. [70] 
The potential user base of a protocol that can accommodate 
arbitrarily many late-joining institutions is limited only by the size of 
population, |N|. Critically, users whose institutions join later are not placed 
in an inferior position to those whose institutions join early, because all 
users receive their proportionate weight assignments. The structure of the 
custodial array is employed as a statistical sampling frame to ensure that 
voting weights are properly assigned, regardless of the order in which the 
members of the population initially join the protocol. 
However, there are two immediate drawbacks to the retroactive-
weighting scheme we have just described. First, although it reduces the 
work that every individual institution o must perform at the outset of the 
protocol, it does not fully eliminate the need for all members of O to opt in 
before the genesis slot, since each must generate and broadcast its public 
key 𝑝𝑘Ò	before the genesis block can be created. Second, although the 
scheme is secure if all the members of O remain correct indefinitely, the 
corruption of even a single institution o by the adversary can trigger a 
catastrophic failure. If the institution is corrupted before it has generated 
and broadcast its retroactive-weighting message, then the adversary 
receives an opportunity to issue itself an unlimited number of forked 
dollars. This is a more dangerous failure mode than a standard 51% attack, 
in which only the safety guarantee of the consensus algorithm is violated. 
Here, the adversary also controls a nominally unlimited quantity of money 
on the ledger, which magnifies the harm it can inflict by reverting its own 
transactions. 
Precommitment Scheme  
To deliver robust real-world security guarantees, our proposed 
implementation of the KRNC protocol must not only minimize the 
probability of institutional Byzantine faults, but also mitigate the severity of 
the failures that would result from their occurrence. For practical 
commercial adoption, KRNC will also need to eliminate the requirement 
that institutions lay claim to their public keys prior to the creation of the 
genesis block. Fortunately, these goals can all be accomplished using a 
cryptographic precommitment scheme. 
The founding institution 𝑜 embeds the precommitment message 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑜,	GEN, 𝑧, 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑠) in the genesis block, where GEN is the opcode 
indicating the commencement of the protocol, 𝑧 is a nonce, and terms are 
the terms of ledger administration, which we will define iteratively below.  
First, the terms include a pledge from 𝑜 that it will award 
institutional authority to any member of O that chooses to join the protocol 
before a designated slot number, 𝑠. Possession of institutional authority 
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replaces control of a public key listed in the genesis block as the 
prerequisite to validly laying claim to a custodial weight ω[o]. As of the 
genesis block, 𝑜 is the only member of O with institutional authority, but in 
subsequent blocks it can award institutional authority by broadcasting a 
message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑜,	INS,𝑜, 𝑝𝑘Ò, 𝑧), where INS is the opcode 
indicating an award of institutional authority,  𝑜 is the institution within O 
receiving institutional authority, and 𝑝𝑘Òis its public key. To reduce 
centralization of power in the founding institution, 𝑜, the terms also specify 
that any recipient of institutional authority can award such authority to 
other institutions. This makes it rapidly infeasible for any coalition within 
O to withhold authority from all remaining members once that authority 
begins to disperse.16   
The ability of institutions to lay claim to their public keys through 
official channels ensures that all protocol participants can easily verify that 𝑜 is fulfilling its obligations. Any institution 𝑜 that wishes to be awarded 
institutional status can broadcast a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑜,	REQ,	𝑧) 
where REQ is the opcode indicating a request for institutional status. If the 
signature provided matches the public key that o has claimed through its 
official channels, and o has not previously been awarded institutional 
status, then the message containing the REQ code is valid, and all 
institutions that have received institutional status are mandated to award 
institutional status to the requester. If they fail to broadcast the mandatory 
INS message, then they are faulty; the ongoing failure of the requestor to 
receive institutional status would be evidence that an adversary has either 
broken the protocol’s liveness guarantees or corrupted all the institutions 
that have received institutional status.  
Second, the terms include a global shut-off date for all minting 
authority derived from the genesis block, specified by the shut-off date’s 
slot number, 𝑠. This ensures that the risk of an adversary abusing the 
retroactive-weighting system introduced in the genesis block verifiably 
drops to zero if the risk has not manifested itself after 𝑠 slots. The 
protocol’s potential user base NU is thereby expanded: prior to 𝑠, NU 
includes all agents who are willing to tolerate the risk of the attack until no 
later than 𝑠, then once 𝑠 has passed NU grows to encompass all agents 
whose aversion to the risk of attack foreclosed participation pre-𝑠.  
Third, the terms minimize the consequences of institutional 
Byzantine faults by specifying cryptographic limits on weight assignment. 
For example, the genesis block may specify ωMQR[o] to cap the maximum 
quantity of cryptographic weight that a specified institution o can claim or 
                                                
16	In practice, once an initial degree of institutional decentralization has 
been achieved, it may be prudent to mandate that awards of institutional 
authority be co-signed by e.g. 3 other authorized institutions.   	
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ωMQR[m] to cap the maximum quantity of weight that all institutions can 
collectively claim based on deposits of the specified fiat currency. These 
are cryptographic restrictions that must be complied with by future weight 
assignments in order to maintain their validity. 
The scope of the limitations depends on what information is 
axiomatically available about the maximum weights that could validly be 
associated with a given institution or national currency within the 
protocol’s staking periods. The more specific the common knowledge of 
the maximum quantity of forked dollars that could validly be issued, the 
more efficiently the potential harm from institutional Byzantine faults can 
be mitigated. Where axiomatic knowledge is available about the quantities 
of specific fiat currencies held by specific institutions during the protocol’ 
staking periods, restrictions may be inserted of the type ωMQR[m ⋂ o]. The 
consequences of the adversary corrupting an institution can thereby be 
mitigated, because the maximum quantity of cryptographic money and 
voting weight it can obtain from each institution o is pre-restricted.  
Balance Verification (Pre-Bank Participation) 
A downside of the implementation we have just specified is that it 
forces members of N to rely on their pre-selected institutions of choice in 
order to obtain their voting weight, ω 𝑛 . This is fine for agents whose 
institutions choose to participate in the protocol from its inception. But an 
agent whose bank or credit union delays in joining the protocol may be 
forced to wait an unreasonably long time to access the forked-fiat money 
that he or she rightfully owns. In this sub-section, we introduce a solution 
to that problem. 
The solution relies on an additional institution, the remote verifier, 
which takes responsibility for issuing weights to agents whose original 
custodial institutions have not yet joined the protocol. For simplicity, we 
will assume that the found institution is the remote verifier. If the founding 
institution is 𝑜, one of the financial institutions that the public already relies 
on as a custodian of fiat money, then agents can trust the remote verifier 
based on the weak transitivity assumption we have already introduced. In 
this sub-section, we will consider the more difficult case in which the 
remote verifier is 𝑜 – a brand new institution. Our goal is to achieve 
retroactively untrusted setup: once all institutions join the KRNC protocol, 
its security guarantees should no longer depend on whether the remote 
verifier was correct.   
The first step is for the remote verifier to create its shard of the 
custodial array. Initially, the shard is empty, because the remote verifier 
does not have custody over any traditional fiat money. Its custodial shard 
will only be used to store and move forked-fiat money.   
An agent 𝑛 who wishes to unlock forked-fiat money controlled by an 
institution that has not yet joined the protocol must register an account with 
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one of its identities on the remote verifier’s custodial shard. During the 
registration process, 𝑛 demonstrates control of authentication factors (e.g., 
email address + phone number) required for 𝑜 to define the account key, 𝑜𝑘l: 𝑎 = i[𝑎] : N[i] = 𝑛.  
We assume that 𝑛 wishes to unlock a forked-fiat balance earned 
from storing money at bank 𝑜, which has not yet joined the KRNC 
protocol. Agent 𝑛 uses a private channel to send 𝑜 a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ(𝑜, 𝑅𝐸𝑉, 𝑜, 𝑎), where REV is the opcode for requesting remote 
verification, and 𝑎 is the account at 𝑜 where the funds were stored during 
the protocol’s staking periods, such that o[𝑎] = 	𝑜. 
When 𝑜 receives a remote-verification request for 𝑎, it first checks 
whether the institution 𝑜 has joined the protocol — i.e., whether 𝑜 has 
requested institutional status. If so, then the remote-verification request is 
invalid, and 𝑜 will not attempt to execute it. If not, then 𝑜 checks whether 
this is the first remote-verification request for an account at 𝑜. If so, then 𝑜 
generates a new key pair that 𝑜	will control and exercise on behalf of 𝑜 in 
advance of 𝑜 joining the protocol. We refer to this as the provisional key 
pair for 𝑜, where the provisional secret key is 𝑠𝑘Ò and the provisional 
public key is 𝑝𝑘Ò. If 𝑜 has already created provisional keys for 𝑜 then it 
simply selects retrieves the existing public key, 𝑝𝑘Ò.   
Next, to determine the correct value of ω[𝑎], 𝑜 must query the 
values associated with the account during the protocols’ staking periods, 
which are recorded on the shard administered by 𝑜 within the custodial 
array. There are three methods that can be employed to access the data:  
• The optimal method is delegated access through a modern standard 
like OAuth 2.0, which enables 𝑛 to employ its existing credential, 𝑜𝑘l, 
to authorize that 𝑜 issue a cryptographic token to 𝑜 permitting 𝑜 to 
download 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠,𝑚]ÀÙ67	 , i.e., the quantity of a specific fiat currency 
held in account 𝑎 during all staking periods. This functionality is already 
mandatory for institutions in the European Union due to PSD2 open-
banking directive, which requires banks to let customers share their 
personal financial data with third-party services. 
 
• The second-best method is intermediated access, where 𝑛 authorizes 
a trusted intermediary 𝑜 : 𝑜 ≠ 𝑜 to employ 𝑜𝑘l to download 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠,𝑚]ÀÙ67	  from 𝑜 and to immediately forward that data to 𝑜. This 
functionality is available today through third-party services like the 
Plaid API, which platforms like Coinbase and Robinhood have relied on 
to verify bank balances. Krnc Inc. has also successfully employed the 
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Plaid API to test forking units of fiat currency from major U.S. banks 
onto a permissionless ledger. The downside compared to native 
delegated access is the addition of another institution, 𝑜, and the 
attendant expansion of necessary trust. Formally, n ∉NU if 𝑜 ∉ T[n].  
 
• The final method is direct access, where 𝑛 entrusts 𝑜 with 𝑜𝑘l so 
that 𝑜 can download 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠,𝑚]ÀÙ67	  directly from 𝑜. Formally, this 
method is identical to intermediated access, except that 𝑜=𝑜. It is 
employed by some accounting software, which requires users to input 
the credentials necessary to access and download their banking records. 
In general, we oppose this form of validation. It should only be 
considered in the special case where a significant number of agents trust 
the remote-verifier 𝑜 but not any available intermediary, 𝑜. 
 
Upon receiving the imported data, 𝑜 is able to calculate ω[𝑎] 
according to the formula we have already defined for ω 𝑎 . All agents and 
institutions, including 𝑜, axiomatically have access to the historic 
exchange-rate data that determines 𝑝 𝑚, 𝑠 .  The imported data discloses 
the quantity of a specified currency held in account 𝑎 during each slot 
within the protocol’s staking periods. The remote-verifier calculates ω[𝑎] 
by multiplying the balance in each slot by the market-value set by the 
exchange rate, then dividing by the number of slots to obtain the average 
value of the fiat balance held in the account during the staking periods. 
To issue the weight on the forked-fiat shard of the settlement array, 𝑜 broadcasts a message of the type 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÉªÞ(𝑜, 𝐼𝑅𝑉, 𝜔, 𝑝𝑘Ò, 𝐸𝑁𝐶ÉªÞ(𝑜, 𝑎)), 
where 𝐼𝑅𝑉 is the opcode for issuing weight based on remote verification, ω 
is the weight equal to ω[𝑎], 𝑝𝑘Ò indicates that the weight should be issued 
to the remote verifier’s own public key, and 𝐸𝑁𝐶ÉªÞ(𝑜, 𝑎) represents the 
coordinates of the historic fiat balances on the custodial array, encrypted 
with the provisional public key for 𝑜 so that they can be decrypted only by 
an agent who possesses the provisional secret key, 𝑠𝑘Ò.  
To issue the corresponding funds on its shard of the custodial array, 𝑜 simply credits the money to the forked-fiat account that 𝑛 created when it 
registered the account key 𝑜𝑘l. If 𝑛 wishes to take control of its funds 
directly on the settlement array, it can generate a public key 𝑝𝑘4 and 
initiate the standard withdrawal procedure we have already specified. 
However, the security guarantees of the KRNC protocol would be damaged 
if the weight ω[𝑎] could be re-issued as part of ω[𝑜] once 𝑜 finally joins. 
To complete our specification of the remote-verification procedure, we 
must define a mechanism that guarantees no double-counting will occur. 
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That is the purpose of the provisional keys. When 𝑜 joins the 
protocol, it broadcasts a request for institutional status that specifies its true 
public key, 𝑝𝑘Ò, and one or more correct members of O approve the 
request, which they know to be valid since it is signed with the public key 
that 𝑝𝑘Ò has claimed through its official channels. However, let us assume 
that 𝑜’s request was made in a slot after remote verified weight has already 
been issued. To counter the risk of double-counting that we just described, 
a different procedure for obtaining ω[𝑜] must therefore be followed, rather 
than each institution o having the authority to issue itself the appropriate 
weight ω[o] as soon as its request for institutional status is approved.  
In the new procedure, for ω[𝑜] to receive authority to issue itself 
weight, it must receive a message from 𝑜 of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑘Ò(𝑜,	𝑅𝐹𝐴, 𝑜, 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑝𝑘Ò 𝑠𝑘Ò ), where the second term is the opcode for requesting 
attestation of remotely verified weight, and the last term is a message 
encrypted with the public key of 𝑜, containing the provisional secret key 
created by 𝑜 for use on behalf of 𝑜 to encrypt the coordinates of remotely 
verified weight assignments based on past fiat balances from the late-
joining institution 𝑜’s shard of the custodial array. Once 𝑜 receives 𝑠𝑘Ò 
from 𝑜 it gains the ability to identify all of the past weight assignments that 
have been made on its behalf, simply by decrypting the relevant portion of 
their signed messages. 
To confirm that the weight assignments were made in conformity 
with the values recorded on its shard of the custodial array, 𝑜 uses the 
decrypted coordinates to query its own copy of the relevant data and based 
on that data re-calculates the correct value ω[𝑎] for every account listed in 
a signed message field decrypted by 𝑠𝑘Ò. For every such decrypted field, 
the late-joining institution 𝑜 confirms that its independent calculation of the 
correct weight for the account listed in the decrypted field matches the 
actual quantity of weight ω issued by the remote verifier 𝑜 in the 
corresponding non-encrypted field of the same messaged signed by 𝑜. 
Upon confirming that its calculation of the appropriate weights 
matches the assignments made on its behalf by the remote verifier, 𝑜 
calculates the quantity of weight that its customers must be issued. Let the 
eligibility status of an account be an indicator	𝐸𝑆l associated with each 
account a, which takes the value 0 if the account has been remotely verified 
and 1 if it has not. A late-joining institution 𝑜 calculates the quantity of 
weight that it must be issued on behalf of its customers according to the 
following formula: ω 𝑜 = (ω 𝑎 )QÞl67	 	𝐸𝑆l 
, 
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where 𝐴Ò is the collection of all accounts associated with 𝑜 on the custodial 
array. 
It issues itself the necessary weight by broadcasting a message of the 
form 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑘Ò(𝑜, 𝐴𝑅𝐴, 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑘Ò(𝐴𝐿𝐿)), where 𝐴𝑅𝐴 is the opcode for 
approving a request for attestation, and the ensuing term is a message 
signed with the provisional secret key that 𝑜 received from 𝑜, and 𝐴𝐿𝐿 is 
the opcode for approval of all specified transactions. Note that an internal 
signature from 𝑝𝑘Ò is included by 𝑜 because this publicly identifies 𝑜 as the 
specific member of O that received the provisional secret key 𝑠𝑘Ò from 𝑜. 
Requiring the signature is a safeguard against adversarial corruption of the 
members of O, because it prevents an institution o that has not actually 
been transmitted a provisional secret key by 𝑜 from damaging confidence in 
the protocol by spoofing an attestation for weight assignments unrelated to 
its shard of the custodial array.  
For simplicity, the sample message indicates that 𝑜 is attesting to the 
validity of all the transactions signed on its behalf by 𝑜 using the 
provisional key created by 𝑜 for that purpose. If 𝑜 instead wished to dispute 
the validity of certain transactions, it would need to employ an alternate 
opcode, DIS, followed by a list of all the transactions it disputes. In this 
paper, we assume that institution o reveals the specific weight assignments 
it is endorsing when it transmits a message with the 𝐴𝐿𝐿 opcode. However, 
the KRNC protocol can also be implemented with zero-knowledge 
primitives, so that the members of O collectively attest to every remotely 
verified transaction without any individual member o associating itself with 
any specific weight assignment. 
In either implementation, once all the constituent members of O join 
the protocol, the weight assignments performed by the remote verifier are 
entirely superseded by attestations signed by the members of O using 
public keys that they have each claimed through official channels. The 
protocols potential user base NU therefore ultimately encompasses the set of 
agents who trust the institutions comprising O, rather than the smaller set of 
agents who trust the original remote verifier, 𝑜. Relying on the protocol 
before attestation from late-joining institutions requires temporary faith in 
the remote verifier, but the fact that the remote verifier will ultimately be 
exposed if it engages in fraud ensures that it has an incentive to execute the 
protocol correctly. 
There are two additional refinements that can enhance the security of 
the protocol beyond the specification set forth above. We omit them from 
this initial technical paper, due to their complexity, but flag them as 
potential additions to the final KRNC implementation. First, instead of 
responsibility for acting as the remote verifier 𝑜 being handled by the 
founding institution, it may be desirable for other institutions that join the 
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protocol to jointly take part, so that the responsibilities are effectively 
handled by a meta-agent who belongs to a greater fraction of agents’ trust 
sets. Second, to refute false accusations that the remote verifier 𝑜 is 
assigning cryptographic weight to addresses that were not actually provided 
by balance owners, it may be important to require that individuals receiving 
weight assignments verifiably claim their public addresses (e.g., through 
social media) or that the remote verifier employ a secure enclave such as 
Intel SGX to create an auditable record of the weight-assignment 
procedures it executes.   
Pre-Verification Weight Issuance  
Many agents will be able to trust that weight assignments remotely 
verified by 𝑜 are correct before the underlying data has received external 
attestation, based only on the knowledge that defecting from the protocol 
would foreseeably harm 𝑜’s own interests. In this sub-section, we 
demonstrate that a variation of the same principle permits weight 
assignments to be trusted before they are even remotely verified. Such 
weight assignments are provisional, in the sense that they are not yet 
cryptographically immutable. In the KRNC protocol, weight is also a new 
form of cryptographic money, so we employ the terms provisional weight 
assignment and provisional balance interchangeably.  
Because provisional balances are not immutable, 𝑜 cannot issue 
them on the forked-fiat shard of the settlement array. Instead, to acquire a 
provisional balance based on a fiat balance held in account 𝑎 at institution 𝑜 
during the protocol’s staking periods, an agent n that has already registered 
a forked-fiat account 𝑎 on the remote verifier’s shard of the custodial array 
uses the corresponding account key to transmit a message on a private 
channel to 𝑜 of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ(𝑖, 𝑃𝐵𝑅, 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑏,𝑚), where i is the identity 
that n associated with the account during registration, PBR is the opcode 
indicating a provisional-balance request, 𝑜 is the institution where the fiat 
balance was maintained during the protocol’s staking periods, 𝑎 is the 
number of the account at that institution, and m is the balance’s monetary 
unit of account. 
For the provisional request to ultimately be valid, it is necessary not 
only for a single identity i to have been used to register both account 𝑎 at 𝑜 
and account 𝑎 at 𝑜, but also for one or more of the authentication factors 
used to generate 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ in the signature to overlap with one or more of the 
authentication factors that comprise the account key 𝑜𝑘l associated with 
account 𝑎 at institution 𝑜. The overlap requirement is necessary to ensure 
both (1) that an agent n′ : n′≠N[i] cannot spoof a provisional-balance 
request for the account that n registered as i, and (2) that n cannot send a 
fraudulent provisional-balance request as i and later blame some agent n′. 
Technically, as long as the overlap requirement is satisfied, a collection of 
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one or more authentication factors that are collectively insufficient to 
qualify as 𝑜𝑘l because they cannot authorize a transfer of funds can still be 
used to generate a valid signature 𝑆𝐼𝐺ÒªÜ. For example, even if two-factor 
authentication is necessary to spend forked-fiat money stored in 𝑎, 
verifying control of the email address associated with the account would 
still be enough to confirm the identity i used to register the account – and, 
in turn, to later establish authentication-factor overlap with other accounts 
that agent n registered as i at other institutions using the same email 
address.  
To establish verifiable incentive compatibility, it is further necessary 
to specify that once a valid provisional-balance request has been submitted 
for an account, no weight based on that account can be assigned on the 
forked-fiat shard of the settlement array until verification that the correct 
weight was less than or equal to the amount provisionally requested. To 
enforce this restriction, we must extend the mechanism already defined to 
prevent double counting. 
If remote verification shows that the balance held in 𝑎 was less than 
represented, 𝑜 will broadcast a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑘Ò(𝑜,	𝑁𝐵𝐸, 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑝𝑘Ò 𝑜	𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑏′ ), where 𝐹𝑃𝑅 is the opcode for a notice of balance 
exaggeration, and the next term is a message encrypted using the 
provisional public key created for 𝑜, which when decrypted with the 
corresponding provisional secret key reveals the institution and account 
number of the false request, followed by the claimed balance 𝑏 and the 
actual balance, 𝑏′. For the message to be valid, it is necessary that 𝑏 > 𝑏′, 
so that an attempt to exaggerate the true balance is documented. 
Upon joining the protocol and receiving its provisional secret key, 𝑠𝑘Ò, 𝑜 decrypts the notice of balance exaggeration and discovers that 𝑎 was 
associated with an authenticated, false request for a provisional balance. It 
switches the eligibility status 𝐸𝑆l of account 𝑎 to 0, which will prevent any 
weight from being assigned based on that account when 𝑜 calculates its 
own weight assignment, ω 𝑜 .    
If no remote verification of account 𝑎 occurs before 𝑜 joins the 
protocol and broadcasts its request for institutional status, then 𝑜 will 
respond to that request by broadcasting a message of the form 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑝𝑘Ò 𝑜, 𝑅𝑃𝑉, 𝐸𝑁𝐶𝑝𝑘Ò 𝑜, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑖, 𝑜𝑘l ∩ 𝑜𝑘l  where RPV is the opcode 
for requesting provisional-balance verification, and the next term is a 
message encrypted with the provisional public key created for 𝑜, which 
specifies the institution associated with the account, the account number, 
the claimed balance, the identity used to submit the provisional request, and 
the claimed intersection of one or more authentication factors comprising 
the two account keys.  
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The result is another message that 𝑜 must decrypt and include in its 
computation of how much weight its customers are owed. First, 𝑜 checks 
whether the claimed intersection between authentication factor exists; if 
not, the original provisional-balance request is considered invalid, and the 
data it contains is discarded. If the intersection is confirmed, then 𝑜 queries 
its records of the balance data for account 𝑎 and computes the average 
balance during the protocol’s staking periods. If the mean balance returned 
is less than or equal to the value listed in the decrypted message, then 𝑜 has 
verified that the request was truthful; if not, 𝑜 determines that the request 
was false. If the request was false, then 𝑜	switches the eligibility status 𝐸𝑆l 
of account 𝑎 to 0. 
When applied to all provisional-balance requests, the procedures we 
have just specified guarantee that an agent n who uses an identity i to 
submit a false provisional-balance request for an account 𝑎 will receive a 
resulting weight assignment ω 𝑎  of 0. This makes it trivial to prove that, 
given only the choices of submitting a true or false request for an account 
with a non-zero mean balance, honesty is the strongly dominant choice: any 
honest request for an account with a non-zero mean balance is eligible for a 
positive weight, ω 𝑎 :ω 𝑎 > 0, which is strictly greater than the payoff 
from a false request. This result holds for all accounts with a positive mean 
balance during the protocol’s staking periods.  
We can further prove that the strongly dominant choice is disclosure 
of the specific mean balance recorded on the custodial array.17 As we have 
just demonstrated, all choices greater than the true value are ruled out 
because they guarantee a payoff of zero; the largest value within the 
collection of non-excluded values will necessarily guarantee the largest 
weight assignment — and thus, the optimal payout. That unique, strongly 
dominant choice is the true value — the largest value not excluded by 
virtue of being false. The result is a unique Nash equilibrium: the recipient 
of the signal expects the signaler to maximize utility by disclosing the true 
value; when that expectation is realized, the recipient’s payout is 
maximized, so both parties have simultaneously maximized their payoffs. 
This result establishes that, in the absence of any reward for false 
provisional-balance requests, the accuracy of data submitted in a non-
spoofed provisional balance can be validly derived from the axiom that all 
agents maximize their individual utility. However, it does not establish that 
agents would actually submit such requests in the absence of a reward, nor 
does it show that the signaling equilibrium for provisional-balance requests 
will remain honest if a reward mechanism is introduced. Fortunately, an 
                                                
17 To rule out “trembling hand” errors, in this specific calculation we 
assume perfect execution of the protocol’s calculation requirements. This 
eliminates the need to consider the optimal margin against such errors. 
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honest signaling equilibrium is still possible if agents have a preference for 
the success of the protocol over the failure of the protocol, since they will 
rationally take zero-cost actions that help bootstrap its adoption. 
In the absence of explicit economic rewards, preliminary-balance 
requests from the public have the potential to act as a form of coordinated 
signaling, similar to voting or participating in an online petition. As the 
quantity of fiat money participating in the “signaling campaign” grows, the 
protocol enters the social consciousness, and how widespread support for 
its adoption truly is becomes an open empirical question. If the remote 
verifier 𝑜 discloses the provisional-balance requests to the members of O, 
each institution o will be able to verify the authenticity of non-spoofed 
requests associated with its custodial shard. In effect, their customers are 
given a bullhorn to demand the cryptographic money that they have 
rightfully earned. 
If a significant number of institutions have the foresight to join the 
protocol early in its existence, then a critical mass in favor of adoption 
might be reached without the need to complicate the protocol by extending 
the functionality available during the provisional-balance period. However, 
consistent with a “defense in depth” approach to the risk of insufficient 
inertia, we present other bootstrapping mechanisms.  
First, to minimize early vulnerability to staking-asynchrony attacks, 
it may be strategic to accelerate price discovery by introducing small 
quantities of cryptographic weight into advanced circulation. Before the 
periods sampled during the fork, agents submit weekly (or monthly, etc.) 
provisional-balance requests for the preceding week, and those who are 
later verified to have sent one or more honest requests become eligible to 
have weight assigned in proportion to the “interest rate” in effect at the time 
each request was submitted. Technically, the term “interest” is incorrect — 
no risk is being assumed, and units of account spanning multiple ledgers 
are involved — but there is no equally natural word for earning a monetary 
reward in proportion to a fiat bank balance.  
One downside to such a reward scheme is the potential to violate the 
immutability of the forked-fiat shard of the settlement array if proper 
safeguards are not taken. In particular, consistency can be violated if weight 
assignments are based on mean balances that can be lowered by overdrafts. 
If a negative balance in a slot s causes the mean balance in a period to be 
lower than 0, the weight assigned pre-s based on balances verified in other 
slots of that period may be invalid.  
Our preferred solution is to assign a non-negative balance 𝑏44  to 
each slot using the formula 𝑏44 = 	𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠] 	+ 	 𝑏[𝑎, 𝑠]2  
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which leaves positive and zero balances unchanged, but converts negative 
balances to zero. This allows weight to be assigned safely for periods with 
one or more slots whose values are unknown, because the correct weight 
assignment for those (and all other) periods will monotonically increase if 
additional slot values are verified in the future. If those values reveal that 
the weight previously assigned for a period was insufficient, then the 
shortfall can be corrected in a supplementary assignment of additional 
weight — which is verifiably safe, because it preserves the validity of every 
forked dollar issued in the original assignment.  
An alternative is to define which collections of slots are eligible to 
be aggregated in a weight assignment (e.g., only slots comprising a full 
calendar month) and to prohibit weight from being issued for any collection 
if a single one of its constituent slots has not been verified.  
Second, price discovery may also be facilitated through the use of 
identity-based issuance of future claims on forked-fiat currency. This is one 
of the protocol’s most elegant features: because the set of agents and 
institutions that will initially control forked-fiat currency on KRNC is the 
same set of agents and institutions that will control fiat money, it is obvious 
which actors can be trusted to make good on forked-fiat denominated debts 
issued in the present. A wealthy individual or institution that has decided to 
participate in the KRNC protocol in the future can thereby issue forked-fiat 
denominated tokens on other platforms in the present, even before the 
protocol has been implemented. An equivalent procedure can be used to 
issue tokens denominated in cryptographically backed fiat money; the only 
difference is that such tokens represent a claim to one traditional dollar and 
one forked-fiat dollar, rather than simply the forked-fiat dollar.  
Conclusion 
 
KRNC replicates the advantages of Bitcoin and Ethereum, without 
the problems inherent in introducing new currencies. It gives the people of 
the world the cryptographic money they deserve — the money they already 
own.  
 
My faith is in the honesty of the majority of people. Actually, 
if you want, technically speaking, that the majority of money 
belongs to honest people. 
  – Silvio Micali  
Turing Laureate (2012), Gödel-Prize Winner (1993) 
Just so. 
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